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5Abstract
Organizational Change as Reframing
by Bjørn W. Hennestad
This is a study of management of change from a cultural perspective. It develops a model for
reframing organization by exploring what happens when attempts are made at changing the way
members of organizations define and enact their tasks. The problem was focused through the
lens of the concept of organizational frames. They are defined as collective models of and for
organizational action that channel interpretation and enactments of work situations.
The notion of organizational frames draws attention to the fact that organizations tend to stay on
their course. When organizations face a need to do other things or things differently,
organizational frames sustain obsolete orientations and hinder the implementation of new ones.
Organizational reframing, a change in the system of organizational frames, was seen as
necessary for organizations to change the way they operate. A model of reframing
organizations should highlight important aspects of the reframing task and propose along what
lines they could be dealt with.
The process of inductive- and grounded-oriented research drew upon data from key informants
in a joint setting of seven case organizations. A set of reframing concepts emerged; anchoring
deals with the qualtity of the active support from leaders, integration deals with the quality of
consistency in trying to implant the new in the old, top management vs. local solutions deals
with the location of formulation of new solutions, and inductive vs. deductive learning deals
with the way people learn the new solutions.The choices made or avoided in the issues reflected
by these concepts should create a reframing momentum for the reframing endeavour to succeed.
The study further suggests that a reframing rationale must be created or exist, and that the
reframing efforts must be handled so as to create a process of structuration continously
enforcing new performance. The conceptual findings are further discussed and put forward as
a set of propositions. In analyzing their interrelationships four modes of reframing
organizations are suggested. The respective modes of convincing, directed dialogue,
constitution and consolidation each attend to a particular concern of the reframing process.
Consequently their approaches to formation; finding and learning solutions, and integration ;
implanting the new in the old, are different.
The study contributes to the body of knowledge on management of change. The findings are
based on actual change attempts and the process of research integrated various practical validity
checks. It provides a source for further research questions as well as guidelines and ideas for
reflection for the practitioner. It is also valuable because it demonstrates an application of a
cultural perspective to the study of organizational change.
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9Chapter 1: The Problem of Reframing Organizations.
The aim of the study
Management of change is an important area of knowledge today. Seeking to expand this
knowledge, I have made use of the notion of organizational frames, drawing attention to the
fact that organizations are channelling attention and energy in a persistent way. Organizations
develop collective systems for defining and enacting work situations. The models for
interpretation become embedded in the social structures of the organization, and in doing so
they becomes self sustained.
When organizations face the need for doing other things or doing things differently, the
established ways of seeing things become both inappropriate and represent a hinderance for
change. The strength of the conception of organizational frames is that they highlight these
funnelling, persistent and hindering features. Organizational frames are defmed as collective
models of and for organizational action that channel interpretation and enactment of situations.
Organizational frames are consequently seen as becoming embedded in the social structures of
the organizations thereby sustaining their own existence.
The implication of the notion of organizational frames is that for organizations to change their
orientations they must change the established organizational frames. These both channel and
sustain the obsolete orientations and hinder the implementation of new ones. Organizational
!kframing is defmed as the planned change of system of organizational frames.
Therefore, the interest in organizational change is one of reframing organizations. The aim of
the study is to develop a model for reframing organizations. This chapter outlines what is meant
by that, As the aim of the study rests, to a large extent, on its key concept of organizational
frames, I shall start by explaining the choice of this concept and how it relates to the nature of
knowledge that is being sought.
The key concept
The choice of the concept of organizational frames is essentially a personal one. Experience has
inspired me to put it into a more systematic use as they are fruitful for the understanding of
organizations. The conception has, however, also been quite widely used in the literature:
Terms like "individual frames", "frames of references", "frames of understanding" or
"interpretation" as well as "organizational frames of reference" can for example be found in
literature on cognitive psychology (e.g. Newcombe 1943), psychotherapy (e.g.Watzlawick et
al. 1974), management (information) behaviour (Churchman 1971, Shrivastava and Mitroff
1983) , organizational theory (Cyert and March 1972) and design (Tushman and Nadler 1978)
strategy (Nadler and Tushman 1989) and strategic decision making (Shrivastava and Schneider
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1984) and organizational change (Snyder 1988).
All these terms deal with the framing of understanding and knowledge. There are also a host of
other concepts referring to knowledge structures in organizations. A recent inventory counted
53 (Walsh 1989), in spite of omitting several such as "organizational paradigms" (Brown 1978)
and "interpreting systems" (Daft and Weick 1984).
The notion of frames, or frame of reference, is employed at an individual as well as an
organizationallevel in the literature. In the latter case it is used as a rather broad term referring
to characteristic manners of selective organizational information processing (Shrivastava and
Schneider 1984).
Furthennore, it is used as a key word for the understanding of how problems in human affairs
develop and can be solved by Watzlawick et al. (1974). Their field is psychotherapy, but their
work has inspired many writers in fields like organizational change and oranizational learning.
Their notion of frame draws attention to the systemic and circular character of problems within
and between human beings. Communication becomes framed because it is formed by the rules
of the system that emerge between people that reciprocally influence each other. The origin of
these rules becomes implicit or irrelevant Frame and reframe are key concepts because when
the frame is inappropriate it is impossible to solve the problem(s) within it. This calls for
"reframing" - putting new frames on old situations.
This notion of "frame" is appealing. Applied to an organization it seems to highlight that
organizations tend to stay on their course in spite of external changes. The concept of
"organizational frames" encapsulates the fact that people in organizations tend to define tasks
and situations in particular and recurrent ways. It also suggests that this tendency is hard to
change, it represents a pattern, a "frame", to break out of.
As I see it, this is due to its metaphorical strength, because it is often used in everyday language
to connote constraints on the way people see reality. "We have to try to step out of the frame"
is, for example, a phrase one comes which across means that people have to think outside
established patterns. Frames are also used to connote entrapment both in the concrete and
abstract sense. "I am framed" or "it is a frameup" represent phrases well known from, for
example, gangster movies.
Finally, the notion of organizational frames encapsulates essential and relevant insights that
follow from the cultural perspective taken in organizational understanding. According to this
perspective organizations can be envisaged as being characterized by a system of interpretations
(Daft and Weick 1984) or meanings (Smircich 1983). In line with social anthropology such a
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system can be seen as being constituted by models of and for action (Hanssen Bauer 1983).
These models are seen as collective, taken for granted and socially constructed. When enacted
they become embedded in the social systems of the organization: "Meaning resides in the acts,"
as Geertz says (Geertz 1973).
In conclusion, the notion of organizational frames is fruitful because it highlights essential
problems of organizational change. It also implies that reframing is called for if organizations
are to change their tasks and the way they operate. Establishing legitimacy for reframing as a
practical problem is one thing. It is also needed to justify the choice of the research problem as
one of developing a model for reframing organizations. Doing so demands a clarification of the
theoretical perspective as well as the way the problem is seen.
A Cultural Perspective on Organizing
The need for organizational change can be caused by many factors of technological, market
oriented or structural nature. The result, however, is that the foci and priorities in organizational
processes and functioning must be altered. People have to do other things or do the things they
do differently. They have to define their roles, tasks and/or situations in different terms. Change
is in other words related to the issue of collective interpretations of situations, events, actions,
ete. that are guiding the actions of the organizational members. A common notion for this is the
system gtmeanin~ (Smircich 1983).
In the literature on organization culture this is seen as an important, perhaps the most important,
source of energy and direction to the actions, and lack of actions, of the organizational members
(e.g. Jelinek et. al. 1983, Daft and Weick 1984). The system of meaning represents solutions
to common problems encountered by the members of the organization (Gibb Dyer 1982, Schein
1985).These have developed through a historical process and become ~ way of seeing and
solving problems, making decisions, ete. Shaping interpretation and organizational action also
makes the system of meaning a crucial factor for the quality of the performance of the enterprise
(Wilkins 1983).
The system of meaning is defined as models of and for action that are learned, shared and taken
for granted by the members of the organization (Hanssen- Bauer 1984). People do not usually
realize that their ways of responding to and acting upon situations and problems are socially
constructed by themselves (e.g. Bate 1984). New organizational members learn these models
by processes of socialization (Louis 1980).
Figure 1.1 below illustrates that there is a duality in the system of meaning. Duality because it
exists as as ideational models on the one hand (Goodenough 1961), and because the social
patterns reflect the enactments of these models on the other (Geertz 1974, Maruyama 1980).
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This "objectivation" of ideational models is important for the understanding of the persistence
and resilience of the system because it implies a self reinforcement process. This point will be
discussed in the next chapter.
Interpreting system offering: Forming and embedded in:
Models: --->---->----->------>--------> Patterns
- collective
- learned <-----<----<------<-----<----<---
- taken for granted
- behavioural
- material etc.
Fig 1.1 ORGANIZATIONS AS SYSTEMS OFMEANING
This is not meant to imply that the organization is a homogeneous system. It is also
characterized by tensions and variations (Allaire and Firsirotu 1984). There are tensions
between, for example, the ideas behind new systems and those embedded in established
systems (Schwartz and Davis 1982, Smircich and Morgan 1982). There are variations between
subgroups who are sometimes antagonistic to each other and who sometimes have something in
common but differ on other aspects (Siehl and Martin 1983, Hennestad 1988). In other words,
although representing a pattern, a system of meaning does not necessarily imply complete
identical ways of interpretation.
From a management point of view the system of meaning is important because of the functions
it fulfils. It strongly influences the organization's operations and results by being descriptive
(define the reality), controlling resources (time, efforts and other resources), and maintaining
the system (stabilizing) (Dandridge et al. 1980). This also implies that it represents the source
Qf solutions collectively drawn upon when problems are to be solved (Feldman 1986).
This represents an essential problem when change is on the agenda. There is a general -
psychologically inspired - understanding in the organizational sciences that organizations
develop several mechanisms that escalate commitment to a (organizational) course of action
(Staw 1981). The meaning aspect of organizations represents an additional explanation for
the tendency to stay on the same course. It can be seen as a reservoir of old models offering
solutions to new problems. One aspect of the system of meaning is consequently that it is
conservative in nature and constitutes a major blockage against attempts to change (e.g Lorch
85).
All in all, this leads us to the conception of the system of meaning as constituted by
organizational frames when organizational change is the focus. The organization is seen as a
framework in the sense of a system of organizational frames. The notions of frames and
framework connotes both that shaping and the rigid aspects of organizations. Organizational
frames put the organization on auto pilot not only by shaping how organizational members
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define and enact situations, but also because these in a sense become locked up. That is, as
the context of the organization changes, the organizational frames stay the same. Reframin&
is the tenn for the process of moving from organizational frames developed under certain
conditions to frames more suited for new and/or changed conditions. This is a problem for all
members of the organization. In this study it is seen primarily from the management
perspective.
Problem and contribution
It makes sense to develop a model for reframing organizations as the task of reframing
frequently confronts organizations and management Taking on this ambition places the work
in what has been called the context of discovery (Starrin et al. 1984). I have seen the need for
this kind of knowledge and also been encouraged to explore it by the writings of other
authors.
That means that I have relied on some authors more than others. The number of contributions,
concepts and dimension are quite plentiful in the area of management of change. The picture
seems quite complex, but, of course, the problem of change is quite complex and reflects basic
issues. The approaches and assumptions therefore vary and the ambitions differ. It is not the
sort of field characterized by coherent knowledge. There is even a question whether it ever can
be, given the nature of the field.
In spite of the amount of contributions, there is reason to put considerable weight on the view
held by two prominent organizational researchers Child and Bate (1987): "The plain truth of
the matter is that we just do not know what is actually happening within the planning and
design processes of organizations, ..".(p. 44). Other researchers point out that there could be
severe limits on the extent to which anyone can achieve planned organizational change.
Nicholas claims, for example, that the single most apparent finding of the research is that no
single change technique, or class of techniques, work well in all situations (Nicholas 1982).
He probably has a point. But again it would depend on what is meant by technique, work well
and all situations: For example, I do not share the view that no useful knowledge about
organizational change exists. On the other hand I think Mangham is fairly realistic when he
claims: 'There are great variations between the planned and the actual models of change, a lack
of congruence between what people claim to be doing in organizational interventions and what
they actually do, and despite an understandable proclivity towards concealment, a high
proportion of failures" (Mangham 1978). I, therefore, follow Friedlander and Brown (1974)
who claims that there is a continuous failure in developing a theory of change that emerges from
the change process itself. In reviewing the literature on organizational change and development
ten years after their statement, Pettigrew (1985: 10,15) makes a similar conclusion that "there is
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a paucity of research on change which actually allows the change process to reveal itself in any
kind of substantially temporal or contextual manner."
The thruth value of these statements can probably be disputed. This is not a subject area
characterized by broad agreement on "where we stand", what are accepted knowledge and
truths, ete. On the other hand I have not come across any substantial or comprehensive model
of change within a cultural oriented perspective that has been generated from (a) change
process(es). So, I rely on these views as indications that theory development generated from
change processes can contribute fruitfully to the existing body of knowledge. And that there is a
need for such a study based on a cultural perspective on organizing.
That is the kind gi contribution I am going to make, develop a model of reframing organizations
by exploring actual attempts at changing the way the members of the organizations define and
enact their tasks. This will be done by developing a conceptual model that highlights important
aspects of the taks of reframing organizations and proposing along which lines these aspects
could be dealt with.
The fiodin&s of the study are intended to identify what, in a sense, can be seen as a set of
strategic variables for the task of reframing organizations. These will have to reflect important
aspects of the reframing process. Furthermore, the results have to include insights about the
relationship between these variables. This will strengthen their applicability as well as their
fruitfulness for management practice and reflection as well as be a source for further research.
These findings will contribute to the general understanding of organizations and organizational
change. They have a special value by representing a practical application of a cultural
perspective to the problem of organizational change. Conceptualized as reframing, the
perspective will be operationalized as conceptual tools through the findings. These will
constitute tentative knowledge that can inform and assist further research in the area. The
elements of the model can be put to a test and the whole model further explored. Finally, the
findings should offer guidelines along which to seek solutions for managers and others
engaging in reframing endaveours.
The elements of the conceptual model will to some extent have to reflect the process by which it
is generated. The plan is to reveal critical issues by comparing aspects and incidents in relevant
change projects. These issues should reflect choices that have been made or avoided in
questions that matters for the prospects of a reframing to take place. By giving the issues
appropriate labels, they can be seen as a set of reframin& concepts. Building on these and their
normative implication, the next step will be to develop a set of reframin& propositions. Doing
so means drawing on academic speculation and other researchers' contributions. Even more so,
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I have taken a "creative leap" (Mintzberg 1977) when using the propositions as supporting
beams to put forward ideas for .a comphensive ~.
Plan of the thesis
One thing is the process of research, another thing is the presentation of the research and its
findings. In a piece of research like this, the presentation also has to demonstrate essential
aspects of the process. In this respect I shall emphasize the grounding of the reframing
concepts, and explain how the data was collected and analyzed and how the findings emerged.
Inpractical terms this means that:
Chapter 2. "Organizations as Framework," presents a deeper understanding of the key concept
and the perspective behind it.. The chapter has three agendas. It outlines a cultural perspective
on organizing as a basis for presenting the key concepts of framing and reframing. It presents
and explains these concepts as reflecting this perspective and as relevant and fruitful for
working with change. Finally, it outlines how it is connected to the empirical investigation of
the study.
Chapter 3. "Context, Data and Methods," outlines the design of the study. It presents the
research setting and the reframing agendas studied. The methodological guidelines are
discussed and their practical application is presented. The trustwortiness of findings produced
by the research design is also discussed.
Chapter 4. "Concepts for Organizational Reframing," along with the following two chapters
present the empirical study. It deals with the empirical generation of issues that highlight critical
and fruitful aspects of the process. The grounding of these concepts is demonstrated by
presenting and comparing empirical glimpses. The chapter suggests a set of concepts for
organizational reframing.
Chapter 5. "Counterforcing the Reframing of Organizations," deals with the issue of
organizations counterforcing change, helping to understand the nature of reframing
organizations. It presents a revision of the reframing task as one of gaining foothold for the
reframing idea in a period of "liminality".
Chapter 6, "Conditions for Establishing a Reframing Momentum," develops and suggests two
basic conditions for establishing a movement and momentum, underpinning areframing
process.
Chapter 7. "Propositions for a Model of Reframing Organization," is based on the fmdings and
the empirical grounding of the previous chapters. With this as a starting point, a working
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hypothesis and a set of propositions for reframing organizations are suggested.
Chapter 8. "Towards a Model for Reframing Organizations - Ideas for Further Construction,"
discusses the relationships between the propositions presented in chapter 7. Based on this
discussion, it suggests a more comprehensive model for reframing organizations.
Chapter 9. "Contrubution and Limitations," discusses the findings in retrospect. It seeks to
concretize the most important assests of the study and its findings. It also comments on the
limitations of the study.
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Chapter 2: Organization as Framework
The chapter has three underlying agendas. It outlines and specifies what is meant by a
cultural perspective on organizing. The key concepts of framing and reframing are presented
and explained as reflecting this perspective and as relevant and fruitful for working with
change. Finally, it outlines how the perspective and key concepts connect to the empirical
investigation of the study.
Some examples from a case study are used as foundation in the formation of the perspective.
It is not a longitudinal study, but it leads up to conceptualizations that are relevant and
helpful for the issue of change because they reveal forces of dynamism and stability.
The study was done on INC, a research insitute that produces knowledge and makes
analyses for oil search outside Norway (Hennestad 1988). It was originally formed by the
government to play a role in the Norwegian oil exploration policies. In that respect the
official signals seemed to shift quite often. At the time of the study the organization was in
fact market dependent, due to the fact that the institute had grown considerably on its own
initiative. Trying to understand the organization made us aware of "meaning" as in
organizations. It also seemed to reveal, and illustrate, to us various characteristics of that
phenomenon. Let us start at the moment we first arrived at the site.
Meeting an organization - an example.
After leaving the taxi outside a group of buildings in the outskirts of the city, we had to
choose between several entrances. In the hallway we spotted a modest sign picturing a snail
with the initials "INC" inscribed on it.. The snail proved later to be a petrified octopus.
Following the direction indicated by the sign, we traversed a corridor with a small post
office and a small bank and finally entered the door of what we beforehand knew to be a
highly successful market oriented research institute in the oil exploration industry. However,
as with the octopus, INC had its feet inside a lot of doors; buildings we later came to know
as the garage, the church building, the barracks and others.
Upon arriving, the scene changed dramatically, and we remembered how Maccoby (1976)
compared the sensation of being inside a corporation for the first time with walking into a
Mexican village for the first time. We were kindly and efficiently received, and people we
were set up to meet knew who we were and roughly why they should meet us. Everybody
seemed to answer openly and bravelyeven rather touchy questions. Meetings seemed to
take place in an open and straightforward style judging from the direct speech. This was
also underlined by the fact that during our very first days, we were immediately invited to ad
hoc meetings of a highly confidential nature. They were arranged because of government
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initiatives of crucial importance to the institute. The meetings were, however, thought to
represent a useful source of information to us. People as a matter of course even helped us
rearrange our schedule by cancelling interviews and making new appointments. All major
groups of the organization were represented in these meetings, and, during the assessment
of the situation and possible alternatives for action, the managing director seemed more like
an attentive listener asking follow up questions than being the one running the show. The
atmosphere was rather one of a collective seeking solutions in spite of minor confrontations
and disagreements.
The general impression from seeing how these meetings were arranged was one of vital
energies unfolding and forceful action taking place. We got the same feeling from formal
and informal discussions with members of the organization and from taking part in other
meetings. It certainly seemed a busy place at all times of the day, and night; week days as
well as week ends. Seriously, as well with humor it was also pointed out to us that being
busy was important; details are not to be bothered with, a desk top should be messy and the
relevant departure times for flights was something to be remembered by heart!
The members of INC also expressed mhk and sa! esteem on behalf of the company. They
emphasized that INC and working at INC was something really special. They also
expressed the view that it was an excellent company in its field; its researchers were
outstanding and the delivered products were good and better than those delivered by their
competitors - an opinion, it proved later, that was not always fully shared by their
customers. Not only was INC held to be an excellent company, but it was also seen as
performing a function that was an important one to the nation.
We were told continuously that it was a sad thing that the company was so scattered. It had
experienced rapid growth, and many people thought that there were too many employees
that they did not know and too many unfamiliar faces. After telling us about the relatively
substantial amount of organized spon activities and the numerous formal and informal
parties, people tended to reflect upon the importance of sticking together in view of the
continuous risks of being split apart that INC faced. Some of the members also told us
about the fun and hardships involved in the data collecting sea expeditions. The long-term
impact these expeditions had on interpersonal work relations were also emphasized. We
were told about "the building". The personnel had alway been scattered in different
buildings and seemed to think a building that could house them all would solve "all"
problems. We heard about "the clarification" which would make everything easier. This
expression referred to it that the government never seemed to amek up their mind about
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which role the institute should play.
The organization as an ideational system
In the first days, we sensed a group of people that were characterized by confidence in
themselves and who displayed a lot of vital energy within some kind of common frame, and
we knew that the company had proved successful in business terms. It seemed doubtful that
a pure formal perspective on organizations (Blau and Scott 1962) would help in
understanding better the dynamics of such an organization. The behaviour we observed
seemed to indicate that it expressed something. We found that this was a view supported by
for example Silvermans (1970) position that "action arises out of meaning". The same view
is nicely put by Geertz (1973) who said that social actions are comments on more than
themselves; that "meaning resides in the acts".
To make sense of the observation that what we observe means something more than the
pure act, we get some help from the writings of Kroeber and Parsons (1958). They suggest
that an analytical distinction has to be made between social system and systems m meanin&
(cultural system) (se also Pfeffer 1981).This view is now reflected in emerging literature on
management and organization. In different ways it is argued that there is an underlying
structure of meaning shaping experiences, channelling behaviour and thereby affecting the
performance of the organization (e.g. Dandridge et.al. 1980, Daft and Weick 1984, Jelinek
et.al. 1983, Wilkins 1983).
What is then the system of meaning in organizations? A system of meaning is a system of
collective interpretation. It offers models for interpreation and action, as it is also defined in
the literature on social anthropology (Hanssen-Bauer 1984). Naturally the concept has a
foot in a phenomological perspective advanced by Schutz (1972) building on Weber's
(1964) postulate of subjective interpretation. We can say that INC is made up of subjective
meanings held among organizational members. We must understand what we observe as as
socially constructed interpretation. This is in line with the view that "the essence of the
social world rests in those patterns of meaning that shape and sustain human action and
interaction" (Smircich 1983 b).
The subjective character of organizations have been highlighted in the fields of organization
and management theory. The functional character of symbolic aspects of rites and rituals
(Deal & Kennedy, 1983), organizationallanguage (Evered,1983), prevailing metaphors and
myths (Gahmberg, 1983; Pondy, 1983), organizational stories (Martin et.al., 1982), sagas
and dramas (Clark, 1972, Pettigrew, 1979) and material symbols (Dandridge et.al., 1980)
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has been emphasized.
While these highly visible symbols have been focused upon, less emphasis has been put on
the issue that subjective meaning resides in every aspect of everday life (Geertz, 1973). The
models mirrored in these acts play a role in the social construction of the organizational
reality, being both product and process as precarious factors in the ongoing social process
by which they are constituted. As pointed out human beeings might, however, forget their
authorship to the manifested meanings that play this crucial role in the ongoing process of
organizing. The socially constructed reality is apprehended as something other than a human
product (Berger & Luckman, 1967).
The point to make from this is that social organization depends on shared interpretative
schemes, expressed in language or other symbolic constructions developed through social
interaction. What was observed was the expression of local meaning. Smircich makes this
point by saying that it is through such schemes that elements in a potentially vast perceptual
field are differentiated from the wider context and interpreted, and that this process provides
the basis for coherent organization of perception and experience. "Such schemes are the
foundation in shared systems of meaning that allow day to day activities to become
routinized or taken for granted," (Smircich 1983: 160).
It is easy to understand that behaviour displayed to the organization members and its
observers basically reflects the human need for meaning when thinking like Geenz: ''There
is "an information gap between what our body tells us and what we need to know in order
to function, there is a vacuum we must fill." Pettigrew helps us by saying it a bit
differently: "People need a continuous sense of what the reality is all about" (Pettigrew
1979). The reality; the world external to the individual, has no meaning in itself, and people
therefore need something to help perceive, organize and make use of experiences - things,
actions and events that they are exposed to.
It is this gap between the raw data of life and our minds that has to be bridged by some kind
of models for perceiving, organizing and acting. This view has been stressed by many
(e.g.Goodenough 1961, Keesing 1981). Simmel put it this way; "aspects of reality can be
grasped only as possible objects of experience only if they fall under some constitutive
form" (Oakes 1980). But form here must also be understood in the sense of being
embedded in the external reality. By shaping and sustaining human action and interaction
these models or forms are enacted and in a way become the social acts and relations. This is
what is called the system of meaning.
To make the conception of an organizational system of meaning somewhat more concerete,
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an account of the one at INC is presented.
A tentative description of the system of meaning in INC
The epistemological problems of conceptualizing an organizational system of meaning for
exploration are considerable due to their elusive and taken for granted character (Bate 1984).
It is difficult to find a focus. Wilkins (1983) offers some help here by proposing that
assumptions about work means and work ends as well as reward assumptions are fruitful
areas to focus on for the purpose of capturing essential aspects of the organizational system
ofmeaning.
It is also suggested that a set of basic assumptions is tied together like sort of an
organizational paradigm by Gibb Dyer (1982) and Schein (1983; 1984) which builds on
work by Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck (1961). Categories that reflect important basic
assumptions are proposed to be such as about human nature, human relationships, the
nature of human activity, the nature of reality, truth, and the relationship to the
environment. The idea is that these kinds of assumptions reflect human problems for which
people at all times and all places have had to find solutions - also coined the "universal but
variable" thesis (Bate 1984). Every organization is, therefore, in principal, special or
idiosyncratic.
The interpreting process was built upon data from observing the staff in a variety of
situations, observing staff meetings and planning sessions, interaction with the members of
the organization through casual conversations and loosely structured interviews and through
the study of documents from the organization, company (external and internal) newsletters,
ete. The themes that were explored emerged through cycles in which data collection, data
analysis and feedback were interwoven (Glaser and Strauss 1968; Bråten et.al 1983;
Smircich 1983b). Nontraditional techniques like the use of animal metaphors (Berg 1983)
and the writing of a imaginary letter to a friend that should take over the job of the informant
were also employed to elicit assumptions.
From these cycles of data gathering and data analysis emerged the woolly contours of a
picture. It was not clear cut nor was it expressed in slogans as suggested in the management
literature. It is also doubtful that the models and concepts people use that are contained in the
mind are clear cut concepts ready for presentation. This is also pointed out by Eden, Sims
and Jones (1979). Neither would we expect the meaning embedded solely in words
(Marshall and MacLean 1985) to be the main medium of the researcher. We would expect
that is implicit in a whole range of symbolic means, as well as in the wholeness of the
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situation; meaning is "being in relation", as Linda Smircich puts it (Smircich 1983 c). The
content of the organizational paradigm and its set of basic assumptions are accordingly
based on "interpretations" of interpretations, but are grounded in the everyday world of the
organization members and are validated or rendered some credibility through feedback
cycles.
We did not fmd slogans that embedded the essence of meaning in the organization as, for
instance, suggested by some of the relevant literature. Neither did we fmd any evidence of
well known stories in which core values were implicit, the existence of which is claimed by
some researchers in the field ( Clark 1972, Martin 1983, Martin et.al. 1983). Meaning was
rather found to be elusive and implicit in the mundane, enacted and spontaneous realities of
the organization. This does not, however, exclude the existence of ritualistic functions as
performed by such things as meetings (Smircich 1982), feasts and celebrations (Deal and
Kennedy 1983), aspects we also found to playa role in forming and sustaining the system
of meaning. A pattern of assumptions which dimly emerged from our interactions can
loosely be described as follows:
The shaping of experiences and channelling of behaviour at INC seemed to rest upon an
assumption of INC and INC'ers as performing important lUlg. The knowledge produced
and the services delivered by INC are considered to be of utmost importance to the oil
explorating industry and consequently to the welfare of the nation. INC is, however,
operating in an enyiroomeM that is, according to prevailing assumptions, characterized by
latent and occasionally manifest hostility. Especially influential actors in the governmental
research systems do not share INC's perception of their own roles, and at times are even
considered to envy INC's success. INC'ers pretend they do not like, or at least are tired of
wars, but simultaneously they hold it to be important to master their own destiny, and that it
is possible to fight back.
When it is possible to master their own destiny, it is mainly because INC and INC'ers are
outstandim: in what they are doing. With excellent researchers as their crucial resource they
deliver high quality products that are better than those of their competitors. INC'ers consider
lY.W:k lQ ~ tim, that being busy is fme, and that there are no sharp division between work
time and spare time. It is the executing part of work that is appreciated; Wllni mtWt.r .tbml
plannine However, the performance and the results should correspond to high professional
standards of quality.
Results are achieved, to a large extent, because people are willing and able to ~ .Q!l
responsibility. This ability, and willingness is however felt to presuppose and justify
freedom - at least from the feeling of being checked and controlled. Furthennore, and partly
related to the assumptions about freedom and control, INC'ers do not take on responsibility
for the sake of others, unless others take the initiativ, and in that case "doors will be
opened." Therefore newcomers have to learn the hard way. It is therefore seen to be
important to give feedback, or to confront, when something is felt to be wrong. This
should, however, be done without screaming too loud, or being too nasty about it, even if
that is accepted from some people.
Although this description has validity in the sense that it channels the interpretation and
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consequent enactments of the members of the organization, it does not give a full and
accurate description of the interpretation system of the organization. This is especially so
because the focus of the account is rather general in character. The description of
assumptions as models of interpretation could have been more focused on certain types of
tasks and situations. However these would be related to, and within the logic of, those
presented.
One issue is the substance of the interpretation system these assumptions are supposed to
reflect. Another point they implicitly demonstrate is that organizations are unique. The
idiosyncratic aspect of meaning in organizations is demonstrated explicitly by Schein.
Seeing shared meanings in organizations as a set of interlocking assumptions he presents
the GEM companyobserved by Gibb Dyer (1982). It seems to operate on one set of
interlocking shared assumptions (organizational paradigms) which is different from another
companyobserved by Schein operated on a different paradigm:
GEM Corporation
- ideas come ultimately from individuals;
- people are responsible, motivated and capable of governing themselves,
however;
- truth can only be pragmatically detennined by "fighting things out" and
testing them in groups;
- such fighting is possible because the members of the organization view
themselves as a family who will take care of each other. Ultimately;
- this makes it safe to fight and be competitive.
"Schein Corporation"
- truth comes ultimately from older, wiser, better-educated, higher-status
members;
- people are capable of loyalty and discipline in carrying out directives;
- relationships are basically lineal and vertical;
- each person has a niche that is his or her territory that cannot be invaded;
- the organization is a "solidarity unit" that will take care of its members.
FIG. 2.1 THE BASIC ASSUMPTIONS IN 1WO ORGANIZA nON S
Schein points out that the manifest behaviour in these two organizations and the way they
tackle their tasks and challenges are different In the first case, one observes mostly open
office landscaps, few offices, open doors, a high rate of milling about, intense conversations
and arguments, and a general air of informality. In the second organization, there is a hush in
the air, everyone is in an office with closed doors. Nothing is done except by appointment
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and with a prearranged agenda. When people of different ranks are present, real defence
rituals are apparent, as well as obedience, and a general air of formality permeates everything
(Schein 1984).
The living history
INC' s system of meaning was presented as an unique set of shared assumptionS. There are,
however, several impressions and observations that makes us modify the conception of a
completely unified system.
IT WAS stipulated that the system of meaning was socially constructed by past actions and
interactions (Berger and Luckman 1967). Consequently, the symbolic forms of today
include the sediments of past interactions. The system of meaning was held to 1) provide
continuity, control, integration and identity to its members ( Louis 1983) and 2) offer
solutions to problems of external adaptation (Schein 1984). In INC's system of meaning
we could dimly recognize the struggles of early days. These days the company leads an
insecure existence, new threats pop up continuously and the company IS forced to change
locations several times. There also seem to be traces of the many other struggles against
integration with other institutions during recent stages of its history:
One of the previous managing directors put it this way; "INC has acquired the shape of a
raindrop always having to move against the stream. During the insecure existence of the
first five - six years of its life, INC moved to another town, but also in the following ten
year period its offices became scattered and the frequent change of some of its locations has
resulted in a desire for reunion in one house. The amount of parties and celebration, the
high degree of participation in organized INC sporting activities alongside the espoused
obsession of keeping together is seen as a reflection of these partly externally imposed
threats. All in all a phrase coined by Malinowsky seem to capture the situation: The system
we observe is "a piece ofliving history."
Creating and recreating forces
There are other aspects of INC that modify the picture of a unified system of meaning. In
one way INC exists as some kind of totality. As a company it is an institution by law, it
possesses structural arrangements which are enforced to varying degrees and these, as well
as management activities, serve as points of reference (Smircich and Morgan 1982) for the
development of native understanding. These features loosely encapsulate INC as a totality.
However, there is still an allowance for a variety of organizational situations to develop. The
common ways of perceiving and organizing experience can be seen as some sort of unity in
the foreground, whereas there are contradictions that to some extent exist "in the
background" of that unity. These contradictions are found in the various kinds of
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variations in the INC system of meaning which seem to be related to the different nature of
relationships that exist between different groups of members of the organization and the
system of meaning.
Variations in the system of meaning
Members of INC are for example at any time also products of and members of various
settings. This is wisely put by Sorrokin:
"It represents the coexistence of cultural systems - partly harmonious, partly indifferent,
partly contradictory to one another - plus the coexistence of many congeries that have
somehow entered the individuals local culture and settled there"
(Sorrokin 1966: 32,33).
INC'ers differ socially, educationally and geographically. They are parts of different
settings; unions, families and neighbourhoods again encompassing other members
inhabiting other complex realities. One variation at INC was constituted by underlying
assumptions in different departments. These probably derived from such factors as
differences in task and office location and also expressed themselves in different styles and
rituals. The most obvious to detect and identify, however, were those related to educational
and professional background factors.
Group differences are known to exist among researchers and product developers in high
tech companies (Gregory 1983). At INC there were two types of researchers; the chartered
engineer and those having a research degree from a univeristy. Both types are found in all
departments, fulfilling, generally speaking, the same kind of functions and occupying the
same kind of positions. But INC'ers are very aware of the differences between the two
groups. Indeed, they make friendly jokes about it A common attitude seems to be that the
chartered engineer is more readily able to adjust his or her ambitions and professional
standards according to the economy of a particular project, whilst the university type of
researcher is geared towards academic standards and finds it harder to adjust. The chartered
engineers are also more at ease with group work projects, whilst the other group tends to
prefer to work alone hwnorously pictured by others as the old fashioned geologist carrying
a rucksack with hammer and chisel in hand.
The marketing orientation sustained by the present top management and some of the most
influential old stagers, was also met by greater skepticism from the research oriented group,
who argued that the market orientation would easily result in a repetitive work situation and
a less interesting professional knowledge base. This argument was challenged by the view
that a marketing orientation would create an economic platform for the interest in
academically rewarding projects. Those supporting this stand were - apart from the
managing director - those acknowledged by others as the entrepreneurs, often with
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backgrounds as chartered engineer. This acknowledgement could partly account for the
contradiction between these different orientations which seems to represent latent rather than
manifest tensions, as there seem to be little heavy disagreement resulting in bitterness related
to the actual decisions in this area.
The veterans or old stagers, a group of researchers who have stayed with the company and
occupy a special status, constitute another type of group. They are mentioned - by name - as
good informants and as typical INC'ers by organizational members. To some extent they
are held to be different, as the newer members tend to state that, "things do not matter so
much to me as to them". With some frustration they are also said to operate as if the
company still had only 50 employees (it now had more than three times that number). The
old stagers are formally, and also through informal networks, heavily involved in the
management of the company. They possess important positions, for instance as heads of
departments, or perhaps even more importantly, they replace the heads of department when
they are away, which is very often. The old stagers tend to have a chartered engineer
background, their INC identity is very strong, and they are concerned with freedom of
action for INC, and are often in favour of growth. The adherence to the INC assumptions is
strongest in this group; which would correspond closely to what Martin and Siehl (1983)
have labelled an enhancing subculture with the exception that the authors assume this to be
an organizational enclave, whilst at INC, the members are scattered in several departments.
The individual and the system - beyond unity
When analyzing the issue of unity in the system of meaning, the relationship between the
system and the individual comes in quickly. This reflects one of the most basic issues in
social science. It is, however, also quite clearly reflected in the observations. Some
examples will be given initially, then the issue will be discussed in relation to some of the
relevant literature. Various modes of integration between the individual and the system were
spotted when tapping into the variations in the system of meaning at INC. At INC the old
stagers could - by exaggeration - be characterized as "cultural replicates", somewhat like
Whyte's Organization Man, or Maccoby's Company Man.
On the other hand those members of the organization that perform supportive or help
functions, secretaries, technicians, laboratory assistants and the like seem to relate to the
system of meaning in a different fashion. To a large extent the INC'ers occupying these
kinds of positions espouse the same assumptions and share the same overt behavioural style
as the above mentioned. They do, however, tend to talk about INC and related issues in
more rarefied and distant terms. It is also particulary among these people that one finds the
emphasis on a typical INC'er being a researcher. Furthermore, it is organizational
members from this category, especially their most vocal spokespeople, that point out that the
work environment at INC can be rather tough, and one of them stated that working at INC
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was "no ... Sunday school".
When thinking conceptually about the issue of various modes of integration between the
system and the individual, this issue seems closely related to the one concerning the location
of culture. This has been a matter of basic dispute in the social sciences. Is culture located
in "the system" of the individual? Goodenough, a leading anthropologist in ethnoscience of
the cognitive school, for instance holds culture to consist of whatever one has to know or
believe in order to operate in a manner acceptable to society members, and defines it as "a
system of standards for perceiving, evaluating, and acting" (Goodenough 1971:41).
Clifford Geertz, a leading anthropologist in the symbolic school, however, strongly
opposes the idea that "culture is located in the minds or hearts of men", a view he holds to
be "the main source of muddlement in contemporary anthropology" (1973:11). "Culture is
public, because meaning is" .."it does not exist in someone's head", is an arguments he puts
forward, emphasizing that meaning is public, not private (Geertz 1973:10,12). Following
Weber, Geertz states that "man is an animal suspended in a web of significance he himself
has spun".
Other authors in the field point out that Goodenough has a conception of culture as a
composite of what is shared and public (Keesing 1973:85) and will not acknowledge that
the difference between the two is significant as claimed by Geertz (Sanday 1979). One says
for example that "Culture must be thinkable and learnable as well as livable" (Keesing
1987:86). In suggesting a framework for the study of organizational culture, Allaire and
Firsirotu (1984) chose a way around this epistemological problem; they rely upon a
symbolic perspective, but compromise by proposing and emphasizing the (Goodenough)
term "cultural competence" to connote the various modes of personal integrations of the
public system of symbols. The complete lack of such competence would indicate some
kind of cultural alienation.
Looking again at the type of INC'er who would say that INC was no Sunday Schoolone
could ask whether they had a estranged relationship to the organizational system of
meaning. I think not. Their espoused theories and overt behaviour were the same.
Furthennore it is a point that there does not exist any vivid alternative; the subgroups seem
more or less to reflect variations of a theme (Martin and Siehl 1983). Furthermore,
important features are being imposed by dominant members of the organization who operate
a kind of model monopoly (Bråten 1973). However, it should not immediately be inferred
that the individuals relationship to the system is straightforward.
One example that might serve to illustrate this is of a technician who was a union spokesman
and who had served a relatively short time with INC. He was amongst those most critical to
the values and ideas he saw as representing INC, emphasizing that it was a researcher
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oriented culture, and that it had a dark side with many negative factors. Shortly afterwards -
on a very nice spring Friday - we found that on his own initiative he worked overtime until
nine o'clock in the evening before visiting a friend in another town by plane. He had to
finish some important work!
Another puzzling problem was the relationship between meanings and their manifestations.
The researchers at INC had, for example, adopted a seemingly easy going "style"; a bit
messy and woolly, but extremely hard work periods during times of a project deadline. It is
possible that this rhythm, or lack of rhythm, follows from, and also suites, the nature of
their work - creative periods at times, but more straight forward and routinized at other
times. However, some, but far from all, participants in other occupational groups adopted
the same behavioural style. It is doubtful whether this had the same meaning to them as to
the researchers. Possibly they adopted this behaviour because it attracted them, or doing so
made the work here different from that of other organizations. However, even if this style
might suit the work of a researcher, it did not suit the work of the administrator. And to
some extent this also seemed to be a source of strain.
In INC it seemed to be the old stagers who had the most integrated relationship to the
systems of meaning as described. It reflected their own history, and there seemed to be
some sort of congruency between the models they used and those that were embedded in the
artifacts of INC. What we see here is a representing of an issue that shall be dealt with in
more detail later on. The system of meaning is the source for the search for solutions to
problems. In a sense that means old solutions to new problems if the sources of problems
change.
The old stagers did not for instance seem to realize the need for a formal administrative
structure in the shape of better management information and control systems. This was a
need underlined by management as a consequence of heavy growth and some cases of over
expenditure on several projects. The growth in size was realized in terms of rational
understanding, and therefore, an understanding of the need for such systems was espoused.
New systems were, however, met by a ritualistic sort of reaction and ways were found
around them. The younger generation on the other hand, seemed to be more understanding
of the needs behind more formality when it came to the use of resources. Some of them also
expressed the view that the old stagers thought and operated as if INC still had only 50
employees, but now the actual number had increased to three times that much.
Another side of the issue of not seing new problems evolved around the assumption of
being good and better than the competitors related to what the customers tended to think.
Whereas this established assumption seemed coincident and stable, the customers gradually
seemed to be more critical. obviously this would create a problem sooner of later if allowed
29
to develop. This problem will also be discussed in the section on "unity and variation".
Structural system and system of meaning • contradiction or congruity?
The issue of the old stagers, as opposed to the younger generation, now seeing the need for
tighter administrative systems connects to the INC assumption of, "Taking on responsibility
justifies freedom". It also relates to another issue concerning the degree of unity in and
around the system of meaning. New management information and control systems were
supported and enforced by an outsider hired as Administrative Manager, and even the old
stagers espoused support for the aims of tighter controls, but in actual practice organization
members did not seem to consider controllegitimate. The filling in of forms, and accounting
for minor expenses explaining the need for this and that, were rather seen as an insult.
Organization members felt that they were productive, clever, profitable and hardworking
and therefore were entitled to be seen as responsible persons capable of making judgments.
This situation was creating manifest, as well as latent, tensions in the organization.
This observation throws light on the claim that the social system and the system of meaning
are conceptually separate. In this case there is a tension between them. This is in line with
Geertz saying these systems are capable of a wide range of modes of integration of which
the simple isomorphic mode is but a limiting case (Geertz 1973: 144). Others have taken this
further by suggesting that the relationship between them can be characterized by degrees of
tension or legitimation. The social structural system can for example be or not be legitimized
by the system of meaning (Allaire and Firsirotu 1984).
In the INC case there was a tension between these systems. Even if the study was not a
longitudinal one, resilence of the system of meaning could be spotted by focusing on this
tension. At the time of the study the administrative procedures to some extent seemed to be
developing towards something one did because one had to. In other words, the point was to
fill in the forms rather than to have them reflect something correct and important. The
resilience and power of the established assumptions seemed, however, to lead to enactments
finding the way out of the basis organization and into the project organization. By this is
meant that the various reseach projects had their own budgeting and control systems and the
employees found ways to use these in a more flexible way.
Unity and variations • stability and change
So far a coinciding system of meaning have been described and some factors that modifies
the conception of a static unified system have been pointed at. It has been demonstrated
how it could be seen as a piece of "living history" and showed how the image of unity and
homogeneity should be understood towards a background of variation and differentiation.
This is observed from several positions; there were various group variations, and there
were tensions between the structural system and the system of meaning, ete.
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It would seem that these tensions and variations would create some kind of change and
development. Tensions could be seen as constituting the organizational vitality by
representing, for example, a latent interpersonal dialogue (Bråten 1983) as well as an
individual reflexivity (Winch 1958). On these grounds new perspectives could emerge and
new paths be discovered and from these the organization might develop some kind of
requisite variety (Ashby 1968).
What is striking, however, is the perceived stability of the system of meaning in spite of the
before stated possible prospects for change. There was an impression of persistence in the
system of meaning. This was to some degree implicit in the sense that what was
communicated to us as MW ii,was simultaneously communicated as MW hu ~ When
people explained the situation to us this was almost always done through some sort of
historical glimpse"; "this is how it is" was illustrated with examples reflecting that it had
been like this for quite some time. The situation today is not only the living history in the
sense that it reflects past experiences, but also in the sense that it lives on.
This point must also be understood against the background of the organization going
through a considerable degree of change over the last years. It moved for example in a few
years from being totally government dependent to being self reliant, at the same time as it
increased the number of employees by at least 60 %. Quite clearly some of the variations
described increased in this period. Still the system of meaning seemed resilient. Old
practices found, for example, new ways when new administrative systems made the
established ones "impossible".
There is a general and psychologically inspired understanding in the organizational sciences
that organizations develop several mechanisms that escalate commitment to a (organizational)
course of action (Staw 1981). The existence of an organizational system of meaning is one
more reason for organizations tending to keep to the established direction. The system of
meaning offers solutions that have developed in response to previous problems. This
becomes a barrier to change. The system of meaning appears as conservative (Starbuck 1981,
Lorsch 1985) and self-prohibiting in nature (Argyris and Schon 1978, Herman-Taylor
1985). The collectivity of organizational models implies predictability, but that predictability
implies, on the other hand, conservatism. Channelling the way collectives interpret and enact
their environment in a sense also means having "blinders" on. "Seeing is also not seeing", as
it is said.
Organizational frames
It is at this point that there is a need for a term. The notion of organizational "frame" seems
handy to focus on the objective. That is, to relate the outlined theoretical perspective to the
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problem of organizational change. And to do so in a way that captures the implications of the
perspecitve for the problem in question. "Frame" is usually understoond as giving shape to
something at the same time as it is the borderline between that something and other things. It
includes and excludes. At the same time frame is also understood as something that is rigid
and does not vanish easily. Organizational frames connotes the organizational quality of
channeling attention and energy in a persistent way, as per the following explanation.
By using examples from INC I have developed and explained a perspective on organizations
focusing meaning as an important aspect of organizations. This means that organizational
actions can be seen as being rooted in some kinds of "models" of tasks, conditions, problems
and relationships in the environment. These models allow people to pose questions and obtain
tentative answers before the external world is acted upon. It is essential to note that meaning
is taken for granted, meaning that people to a large extent do not realize which meaning they
attribute to the language, body language or behaviour style they are confronted with. They
"just do it". The phenomenon might be illuminated by the old Chinese saying: ''The fish is the
last one to discover the water". A substantial amount of people's actions and interactions are
carried out as if they are on automatic pilot. This is possible because people to a large extent
~ models with others (Geertz 1973, Schein 1985).
This constitutes a paradoxical phenomenon: By providing interpretation the system of
meaning comprises preconditions for human creation and activity. However, they also
constitute a barrier on learning, self reflection and consequently on peoples (inter)actions.
This is so because it is shared, taken for granted and embedded in social patterns. "To see
is also not to see." We can now return to the beginning of this section, because this is the
main reason for choosing the notion of organizational frames. The interpretation models of
the organizational system of meaning actually frame organizational thinking and acting and
thereby organizational processes.
Organizational frames is therefore defined as collective models of and for organizational
action that channel interpretations and enactmentments of situations. Organizational frames
become embedded in the social structures of the organization. Organizational frames provide
meaning and direction, but are also barriers to change.
Before relating organizational frames more clearly to organizational change, I want to
discuss two issues. First, how do we conceive of an organization characterized by
organizational frames? Second, what is the relationship between frames and the
organizational territory.
Organizations as frameworks
Now, what is the conception of an organization? Does the view presented imply that
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organizations are something one wouldn't find by looking for them; that "organization" is a
myth, somewhat like when Weick describes organizations as "bodies of thought" or "sets of
thinking practices"(Weick, 1979)? In a way it is. I would, however, like to add a few
points. First, it is important to realize that the organization is a collective undertaking created
and developed through human interaction, where both knowledge and the environment are
created by the participants interactively. An organization exists as meaning that is enacted in
a setting of other enactments.
As has been pointed out, meaning resides in the prosaic (inter) actions constituting the
ongoing pattern of organizationallife. The frames mirrored in these acts play a role of both
product and process as precarious factors in the ongoing social process by which they are
constituted. As pointed out, man might, however, forget his authorship to the manifested
meanings that play this crucial role in the ongoing process of organizing. The socially
constructed reality is apprehended as something other than a human product (Berger &
Luckman, 1967)
It is important that this idea is not to be understood in the sense that the organizational
frames exists as perfect and total replications in the individual. In the creation of these
frames there is dialogue and reflexiveness involved. People's personal and social
backgrounds and their participating in other "organizational territories" matters. But we see
historical processes of interaction in and outside the focal organization are most important.
Actions, events and things in this context constitute " the point of reference" (Smircich and
Morgan 1982) for the development of organizational frames. The way newcomers are
socialized into the organization is important for the degree to which frames become shared
(Van Maanen, 1977; Louis 1981), and length and intensity of the common experiences of a
group, as well as homogeneity and stability of group membership also seems to be
important factors in this respect (Sathe, 1983; Schein, 1985).
Against this background the mode of integration between individual and organizational
frames is seen as what Allaire and Firsirotu calls partial replication (Allaire and Firsirotu
1984:212). This means that there evolves and subsists a communality of frames among the
various organizational actors. This facilitates their interaction and serves to make sense of
their situations. And, the communality is strong enough to conceive of them as
organizational frames.
In the case of INC, there is another phenomenon of relevance here. It was pointed out that
differences in frames existed between different groups. What was observed was
characterized as variations of a theme. In other words, that the mentioned partial replication
varied between different groups. This is the most common case. It can, of course, also
mean that groups have frames related to issues that reflect subject matters that are not
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relevant for other groups. But in that case they must relate to the shared one in some logic
or supportive way. The possibility that there are "countergroups" in an organization can not
be excluded. That would quite obviously create a special issue for the organizational
dialectics. A few would even argue that some organizations are so loosely coupled that the
group rather than the organization would have to be the main unit of analysis. That would be
a case of exception.
It should be underlined that the conception of organizations characterized by organizational
frames should be understood against the background of these sources of tension and
variation. Previously it was indicatedthat there was a tension between the system of meaning
and that of social structure, and this shall be discussed in more detail in the next section. It
will now be suggested that the idea of organizational frames points towards the idea of an
organizational framework. The term "living metaphor" has been used in relation to
organization. It is supposed to connote that there, in a sense, is no such thing as an
organization (Berg 1983). At best, it is said, the term organization applies to the state of
organizational processes at a particular point in time.
Organizations should for many purposes rather be understood as "organizing" (e.g. Weick
1978). On the other hand, essential aspects of these processes are constituted by
organizational frames. "Organization as framework" is suggested to connote that
organizations are constituted by a variety of frames. Framework implies the channelling
aspect discussed related to frames. It also suggests that these frames fit together in a
supportive system.
It is necessary, however, to discuss how the system of organizational frames relates to
change. Especially becauseit was indicated that variations and tensions could be a source of
framework change. A special issue of relevance is the relationship between "the map and the
territory", which needs discussing before focusing on change.
Organizational frames and the territory
What does the subjective character of organizations imply for the relationship between
meaning and the social system. It has already been claimed that meaning become embedded
in the social patterns of an organization. In fact a strong argument for choosing the notion of
organizational frame was made. What does this mean for the epistemological meaning
attributed to that notion?
Does the concept of organizational frames indicate that Thomas is completely relied upon in
the assertions about the relationship between "the map and the territory ? Thomas phrased it
like this: "If people define situations as real, they become real in their consequences," a
statement having an obvious relationship with Mertons concept of "self fulfilling
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prophecies". The territory is neither subjective nor objective in the ususal sense. This is
implied by the suggestion that meaning is created ineractively, which was suggested earlier
on. Let us still consider the question of status of the means of interpretation. Weick has
been concerned with this issue, arguing that it is not the environment as such that constrains
actors and organizations, but enacted environments created by the organization. He holds
maps to constitute essential vehicles in the creation of reality and suggests that.
"Maps do structure the territory sufficiently so that someone can initiate activity into that
territory, activity that may introduce order ..."
He goes on to comment on Hayakawa who rejects Thomas in his statement that "the map is
not the territory". Weick's view is that in spite ofthere
"...being grains of truth in the display confronted by the member, ...additional objects of
thought include maps of the organization that are treated as if they were territories, beliefs
through which people see the organization, and acts that provide the pretest and raw material
for sense making."
"(Weick,1979:46)
This means that people are confronted by a complex fabric of physical objects, events and
actions, where meaning is embedded in this "display". These meanings, or more specificly,
these frames, result from historical processes of interaction and represent seeds for new
maps. In the next phase, it is these maps that shape, or bear upon, action and interaction.
From this one can also understand that following positions like "the map is the territory if
we treat it as such" (Ball, 1972), or conceptions of organizations as "artifacts of individual
ways of representing organizations" (Argyris and Schon 1978), does not imply that
organizations are just "projections of peoples thoughts".
Using popular terms one could turn the old saying "I'll believe it when I see it" upside
down: "I'll see it when I believe it". To keep to their terminology, the map is an important
part of the territory, and the territory is often adjusted to the map, rather than the other way
around. Organizational frames are frames also in the meaning of being embedded in the
"territory".
Still, it must be remembered that the system of meaning is conceived of as conceptually
separate from the actual network of social relations. This is both difficult to grasp and
express. It means that organizational frames are both embedded in the social patterns, but
are still conceptually different from them. This results from the fact that there are also other
factors influencing the social system. The environment can act on behaviour and groups so
that their actions are other than what would follow from their frames. In organizations this
can for example happen as a result of formal structure or some sort of coercion. (Although
this does not mean that those forming structure or using coercion can "program" the
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behaviour they want).
Meaning is seen as lying behind the realm of observable events. Still this should be
understood in light of the possiblity that discontinuities can exist between the system of
meaning and the social structure of an organization. The fonna! organization is a formal
setup that can be manipulated and influence organizational frames that develop over time. It
will, in different ways, function as a point of reference for their construction.
The nature of framework change
It has been argued that organizations channel interpretation and action, and it has also been
suggested that variation and tension are characteristics of organizational processes. What
then is the nature of change processes inherent in the framework? This is a relevant question
since variation can be seen as playing an important part in the organizational dialectics: The
dialogue can be held to be the basis for conscious processes (Mead, 1934). Accordingly, the
crossing of frames, rather that the monolithic situation, is held to constitute the basis for
organizational vitality (Bråten 1983).
Participants' enactments have been described as partly automatic responses and partly
reflexive actions based on actors frames. Participants frames as important factors in the
social process of organizing are also seen often to be hidden or taken for granted.
Furthermore, there is also often a discrepancy between the theories people say they use and
those that actually govern their behaviour (Argyris & Schon 1978). This could call for a
conception of a double character of organizational life (Hennestad 1990). An illustration of
on aspect of this conception is beautifully illustrated by Meyer's and Rowan's (1977)
already classic article "Fonna! Structure as Myth and Ceremony". They demonstrate how
formal structure might be decoupled from technological requirements but fulfil ritualistic and
legitimizing external and internal functions; rational arguments are put forward to account
for structural requirements - people say what is expected of them.
Therefore, it can be argued that organizational processes in a sense tend to take place behind
~ ~ of the participants (Hennestad 1987, 1990). There is, therefore, a tendency for
organizations, in spite of rational attempts, to develop rather by accident. There is no real
crossing of perspectives. New challenges, problems and ideas are met with solutions and
reactions drawn from the reservoir of yesterdays problems and solutions. People do not
realize, however, that this is the case.
This seems to bear similarity with other authors who have conceptualized in various ways
that organizational processes tend to remain within ~ ~ Wi& .lQgk (e.g. Watzlawick et
al. 1974 and Argyris & Schon 1978, Starbuck et al. 1978). In practical terms this is
illustrated by the saying that it is (in spite of everything) easier to learn to "do things right
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than to learn to do the right things". This self-sealing dynamic is also hypothesized to be
amplified by mechanisms of model monopoly. The theory of model monopoly draws
attention to the power of mental models. It suggests that when a model weak actor interacts
with a model strong actor about a certain agenda, the model strong will increase its control
over the other, even if both parties wish to reduce the differences between them (Bråten
1973).
The conclusion is that organizations as a framework tend to reject change that exceeds the
existing basic organizational logic. The organizational frames tend to remain the same, or
making it clearer, what does it mean that organizational processes tend to remain within the
same logic? How does that relate to the issue of organizational reframing?
Reorientation and reframing
Organizations relate to their environments and perform their tasks in differents ways. The
way they do this is essential for their quality of performance and degree of success. A loose
term for this inclination to cope with tasks and subsequent problems in specific ways is
known from popular use as well as the literature as orientation (e.g. Nystrom, Hedberg and
Starbuck 1981). The term implies that the organization provides specific ways of
interpreting things, events and actions and enacts those interpretations. For instance one can
say that a particular organization are market oriented or production oriented. Or one can
more explicitly describe the orientation of an organization as like this or that This suggests
that the organization follows a special direction, but orientation also suggests that the
organization has certain biases and emphases when choosing actions that adds up the
direction.
The phenomenon of organizational orientation is clearly related to the framing properties of
organizations. It is the channelling quality of organizational frames that creates
organizational orientations.This is important because changing the tasks of an organization,
or the way an organization copes with this, implies that foci and priorities must be altered;
again implying the members of the organization must reorient their collective interpretations
and enactments. The problems related to the task of managing this is then related to the
nature of such organizational orientation(s).
It is, however, organizational frames that are channelling the way organizational situations
are defined and enacted. This implies that the organizational framework is "producing" the
organizational orientation. I suggest that the organizational orientation is continously
produced and reproduced by the fact that organizational frames are channelling
organizational processes. Reorientation of organizations will consequently be dependent
upon the organizational framework to change.
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The thrust of the argument has up to now been that organizational frames not only channel
collective understanding and action, but also that organizational frames are inherently
conservative, a feature that is reinforced by their taken for granted nature. Organizational
frames are enacted, and in the words of Clifford Geertz, frames "reside in the acts" of the
organizations. Not only is this seen as the situation where the pattern of action confronting
people reflects the established framework, it is also embedded in and reflected by
organizational features like structures and systems. For instance, reward and information
systems influence the way people think about and actually cope with their situations. This
makes a reorientation .wk .il reframin& problem. The organizational framework has to be
altered in order for reorientation to occur.
As outlined in chapter one the term reframing is known in the literature. Within the Palo Alto
school on system-oriented psychiatric treatment it is used as a metaphor for enforcing a
change on a particular kind of a situation in order to break up the implicit reciprocal
expectations that causes a viscious circle in communication (Watzlawick et al. 1974). When
using the term here, it is used slighly differently. Whenever, and for whatever reason, there
is a need for reorienting organizational processes, the organization is faced with a situation
that the established organizational framework will enforce the established orientation. This
means that when management makes an effort at reorientating the organization they are, in
actual fact, up to a reframing task as the established framework will "reject deviating"
organizational thinking and acting. Organizational change, in the sense of reorienting
organizational processes, is therefore a case of reframing the organization. The issue at hand
is, therefore, how to accomplish reframing of organizations. The situation can be seen as
follows:
Organizational-o-o->-> Organizational->->->-> Organizational ->->->->-> Organizational
Framework channelling Orientations producing Actions. systems ete. fulfilling Functions/l'asks
;<-<-<-<-<-<-<-<-< reinforcing -c-c-c-c-c-c-c-c-c ,
Fig.2.2 ORGANIZATIONAL FRAMEWORKAND ORGANIZATIONALORIENT ATIONS
Organizations develop a persistent framework of organizational frames. By channelling
interpretations and enacted understanding these frames form or produce the organizational
orientation(s). By this is meant that the collective thinking and acting related to the
organizational situations is created by the organization trying to accomplish its task(s). In
doing this the organizational structures, systems and patterns of actions are produced, again
strongly conditioning the degree to which the organization is fulfilling its functions and
task(s).
Organizational reframing is defined as a change in the organizational framework - understood
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as the system of organizational frames - in order to accomplish a reorientation of the
enterprise. The problem is the lack of a "feed back loop" from the fulfilling of functions and
tasks. As we can see from the figure that would demand a needed change in the task as
reflected in ideas for new frames. It would also demand a breaking up of the reinforcement, or
reproduction, of the established organizational frames.
Towards an understanding of reframing organizations.
This is a study of the management of change in order to accomplish a reframing of the
organization. How can the issuse be dealt with? What are the relevant and fruitful issues in
this matter? We know that writers in related fields of interest have suggested, for instance, a
focus on specific aspects in order to influence the processes of meaning production. It has
been suggested that the system of meaning could be influenced by myth making, since myths
defme reality (Boje et al. 1982), by introducing language or producing stories for the same
reason (Martin 1982, Evered 1983) or by collective self reflection (Marshall and MacLean
1985).
Attention has been drawn to the symbolic aspect of management by suggesting, for example,
that managers are important role models (peters 1978, Pfeffer 1982). Others have pointed
towards the routines and standards of the organizations, suggesting, for example that the Rites
de passage(s) constitute a medium for changing organizational interpretation (Trice and Beyer
1985) or for influencing the foci and priorities by manipulating the reward system (Sethia and
Glinow 1985).
Such contributions reflect specific and interesting issues, but do not yield much help when
considering the problem of developing a model for reframing organizations. Furthermore,
looking at it from the practical side, I have over the years observed various kinds of measures
taken to reorient organizations. I have seen managers relying on informing about change
needs and appealing for renewed and changed action. This has been seen this in the form of
pamphlets and papers, pep talks and kick-off seminars signalling and pointing out a new time
and a new course, as well as videos and internal TV used to spread the message. "Change
and culture meetings" aimed at getting people involved in the ideas of a new course -
sometimes also in giving it shape have been observed, as has the use of change groups
formed to drive new solutions to the foreground as well as special sessions in established
meetings focusing on new needs. Furthermore, the optimistic approach of redrawing the
organization chart in order to create a new orientation has been observed. Surely, a combined
selection of these measures can be observed, as well as new ways based upon top
management judgment solelyor upon various degrees of local involvement and dialogue.
Against this background the challenge seems to be one of finding a rationale for what and
where to focus given our problem and position. One can of course think of particular questions
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to ask, like, what kind of messages should be sent to the organization, and in what fonn? What
kind of analysis should be carried through? What kind of change organization should be set up?
What kind of groups should it consist of, etc.? The kind of change processes we referred to are
complex processes where results are hard to predict, if possible at all, and there are probably
" ..a high propostion of failures" (Mangham 1978) or a lot of changes that "did not happen"
(e.g.Frank and Hackman 1984, Hennestad and Janssen 1989). Such questions therefore tend
to be rather limited considering the overall problem.
There is some help, however, in the simple fact that what change efforts have in common is that
they, in a sense, are external to the existing and on-going organizational processes (although
they might influence and in some sense become part of them). Change efforts can aim at
making the enterprise function differently. They can aim at producing other results by
restraining (socio) structural aspects of the organization. Or, they can influence peoples ideas
about what they do. In all cases they deal with the issue of redirecting organizational processes.
Change actions are external to organizational processes and they are launched to change these
processes internally.
This is a concept that is in line with the observations made by Fiol and Lyles (1985). They
argue that a distinction should be made between organizational adaptation and (change)
learning. Adaptation is seen as pure behavioural change with no associated learning. Learning
presupposes cognitive (associative, knowledge) processes. This is taken to mean that
adaptation can happen and be sustained as a result of external contingencies as, for example, a
structural pressure of force. Learning, however, implies that cognitive changes over and
beyond mere adaption has taken place. In the terms here this means refraIning. To realize this,
the external change activities must result in internal effects in line with the intended new
orientation.
This analytical distinction is naturally more complex in the empirical reality. It is, however,
useful as a loose guideline. Change efforts, as well as the enforced adjustments resulting from
them, are seen as external processes. Organizationallearning accomplished by them is seen as
the internal aspect of the process. The foc~s of the study will consequently be on the
relationship between external change efforts and the established organizational processes.
What happens when efforts are made to influence and (re) shape organizational frames? What
issues capture critical factors in this relationship? The aim is to identify some sort of strategic
variables conceptualizing such factors.
Summing up, the organizational framework is seen as fonning the organizational orientation.
Reframing is necessesary for organizations to change their orientations. The focus of the study
is therefore the relationship between change efforts made to accomplish reframing and the
established organizational processes. It is an endeavour to identify and conceptualize issues that
40
are of strategic importance when engaging in a reframing attempt . This is the first part of the
problem. The other part of the problem is to propose guidelines for handling these issues, and
to see how these propositions relate to each other and the task of reframing organizations.
In the next chapters, the approach to the first part of the problem, the development as well as
the content of the findings are presented. The second last chapter develops and presents
propositions and in the last chapter some ideas for how the propsositions relate in a model of
four modes of reframing organizations are put forth.
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Chapter 3: Context, Data and Methods
The aims of this chapter are to present and discuss the design of the study. The setting of the
study is first introduced and then the choice of appropriate methods is outlined and discussed.
The choice of methodological guidelines are discussed before demonstrating how these were
used in the actual collection and analysis of data. This is followed by a discussion of the issues
of trustworthiness raised by the design of the study
The design of the study should reflect its purpose. To develop a model of and for reframing
organizations should be understood in line with what Normann (1976:19) and Brunsson
(1981:105) see as the innovation, creation and construction of concepts and language which
should be fit for relating to and changing the social reality. This means that it is a problem of
generating rather than testing theory. The conceptual knowledge the study seeks to develop
should also consequently be empirically grounded in the sense of emerging from the empirical
field.
It is necessary that the concepts and the following model that is developed are fruitful both for
understanding and working with organizational refraIning. They should be valuable for further
research as well as for the actual task of reframing organizations. This is to be understood in the
sense of highlighting fruitful issues to observe, suggesting guidelines to follow in approaching
the problem, and tentative questions to ask, rather than giving stepwise instructions for "how to
do it".
This is a problem because many organizations need to change the way they operate. For
organizations to do so, their members must define and enact their tasks in new ways. When
organizations identify and face a need for a major change, like a reframing task, they tend to
define it as a change project, as an issue of priority, etc. Very often, but not always,
management of organizations see a need for external help in cases like this. The reason for this
is because of the lack of resources and/or competence. In both cases the task is seen as
something extraordinary. This was also the situation in the cases of this study.
The setting
Management in these organizations had identified a particular need for change and they had also
seen a need for extraordinary efforts to be invested in that task. They had consequently defined
that as a change project and also called for external (expert) help by contacting a consultancy
firm. This means that this is a study on the sort of reframing process which involves external
(consultant) help. This is a fairly common sort of situation as external help is very often
involved when facing change needs of different kinds. In principle this implies that the model
generated from this setting is one which concerns reframing organizations with external
consulting help. This kind of situation is probably not that qualitatively different from one
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characterized by the lack of external help in terms of what critical issues confront the reframing
endeavour. This will be discussed later.
This sample of cases can be characterized as purposeful rather than random. They can be seen
as yielding fruitful information about the problem challenged by the study. A purposeful, or
theoretical, sample is generally seen as most suitable since the purpose is one of generating
rather than verifying theory (Patton 1980:105, Glaser and Strauss 1967:48). This particular
sample is purposeful since the cases are characterized by serious change attempts relevant to the
problem of the study. They are also purposeful considering the fairly general character of the
problem. Relating to this there is nothing extraordinary or very special about these
organizations that would make the issue of relevance for other settings particularily problematic.
The sample is composed of business organizations of different sizes and industries, etc.
Another criteria for choosing the sample is the somewhat pragmatic, or convenience, element
involved. The cases were actually available for research. This is due to the fact that the same
consultancy finn assisted in all the cases. It supplied a consultant as project leader, one for each
organization, occasionally assisted by other consultants. The meaning of the notion of project
leader would vary in the various organizations, but in all cases they were supposed and
expected to fill a central role in the project. And in all cases their role as project leader in one
firm occupied most of their time. The project leaders were integrated into the change efforts,
activities and functions in each particular organization. As such, they were actors of the
organizational field.
It is also essential, however, that they took part in the learning activities of the consultancy
firm. It had laid down a policy of establishing a collective process of learning and knowledge
development. That the consultancy firm constituted their professional platform and network
also had attracted some of the case organizations. Both the project leaders and the other
consultants had a responsibility in contributing to this process and also to using the experiences
and knowledge produced in their work.
It was the role of the author to organize, assist and push this process for a period of slightly
more than two years. In the first phase, four consultants were assigned half time to assist the
process. In the second phase, that is most of the time of data collection, one consultant was
assigned full time for the same purpose. The data was collected and analyzed in collaboration
with the project leaders and other consultants. It was in a sense an interactive study. The
process of research was designed to have new understanding evolve in the interaction between
the researcher and the actors of the field. This issue will be discussed in further depth in the
section on ecological validity.
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Before going into detail about the principles and procedures used for collecting and analyzing
data, however, what is called the "reframing agendas" shall be introduced. By that is meant the
change needs and intentions of the various case organizations. This is to help in understanding
what kind of change endeavour is reflected by the examples and quotations that will be used in
generating the reframing concepts in the next chapters.
The reframing agendas
The kind of changes the firms wanted to achieve are described below. We have used the term
"reframing agendas" to label the various change aims and ambitions. We have tried to give a
presentation of the essence of what the firms wanted to achieve. The labels used in the firms
for this vary. The notion of reframing was used very rarely by the members of the
organizations. The reason for using the headline "reframing agendas" is that the change
ambitions that management aimed to achieve implied a reframing task. This follows from the
discussion in the previous chapters. The various reframing agendas and situations drawn upon
in the empirical search can be described as follows:
GUaranteed delivery at Transport: The reframing agenda in Transport was to change the
company from being characterized by inward orientation (move tons) towards a customer-
oriented situation offering guaranteed transport services. Being able to deliver such services
presupposed a change in focus and priorities at all levels supported by substantial structural
alterations in the production system, the division of labour, responsibility, as well as other
aspects of the organization.
The company was doing well at the beginning of the reframing project, but they then had to
fight for short-term survival due to a significant drop in the market.
Order orientation at Furniture: The reframing agenda in Furniture was to change the company
from being characterized by a traditional production oriention towards a situation with a higher
degree of flexibility in the delivery/marketing system. The production had already shifted from
traditional mass (series) production towards more order-oriented production. It was
acknowledged (by management and union officials) that cultural, rather than structural or
technical issues, constituted the main hindrance for making this shift effective; there was what
we could call a "culturallag".
When the change effort started, the aim was towards solving future problems as the company
held a strong market position and was doing quite well. Mter some time, however, the market
changed considerably and the company found itself facing a crisis.
Local responsibility at Airline: The reframing agenda in Airline was to change the company
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from being characterized by segmentation, centralization as well as functionalized orientation,
towards a situation focusing on a higher degree of quality emphasizing responsibility for
results and customer needs at all levels.
When the change efforts started, the driving force was future oriented in the sense of continuing
current improvements in the company's situation which had been accomplished by strategic
market actions. This changed, however, as the market dropped, competition increased as a
result of change in government regulations, and costs increased more than had been estimated
and more than were bearable.
Customer QJlality at Car Retailer: The reframing agenda in Car Retailer was to change the
company from being characterized as "hard selling" towards focusing on customer quality. In
more practical terms this meant going from pushing sales to developing an image based on a
new organizational orientation of taking care of the customer after the sale. To do so would
demand another orientation from the sales as well the service staff. It would demand an overall
increased concern with long-term customer needs as the basis for new sales, and also increased
revenue from services.
When the change efforts began, the firm was in a strong market position which it wanted to
improve. The market had, however, started to drop considerably, a development that continued
and got worse. This became particularly critical for several (geographically spread) independent
sales and service units, whereas the central import unit to a larger degree adjusted its costs to
the actuallevel of activity.
Production flexibilityfmtemtion at Electric Industty: The reframing agenda in Electric Industry
was to change the company from being characterized by a traditional hierarchical production
(technological) oriention towards focusing on a higher degree of integration of production,
maintenance and planning. An important motivation for this was to reduce costs caused by
fluctuations in demand.
The need for this was emphasized by an anticipated change in the almost monopolistic situation
held by the firm which was now being threatened by an anticipated rationalization in the
structure of this particular business sector.
Collective orientation at Money Market: The reframing agenda in Money Market was to change
the (part of the) company from having an individualistic orientation characterized by ambiguity
and myths concerning what and who created costs and income. Instead they wanted to create a
more collective orientation characterized by consciousness and clarity about what and who
caused, and were responsible for, costs and income.
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Money Market was under significant pressure to reduce costs considerably.
Line orientation at Bankin&: The reframing agenda in Banking was to change the company from
being characterized by a focus on centralization combined with a strong staff underpinned by a
routine and procedure orientation rather than goal orientation among its members. They wanted
to create a situation characterized by market orientation, profit orientation and change orientation
at all levels. Within the established frame, market orientation seemed to mean "what the central
marketing department does", profit orientation meant ''for which only the æo can be held
responsible" and change was seen as something which could only be initiated from the top.
When the change efforts started, the company was troubled by heavy losses.
Methodological guidelines
A context of discovezy
The choice of methods for studying these reframing endeavours should reflect the theoretical
perspective and the problem that is researched (e.g. Alvsson 1989). The problem of developing
a model of reframing organzations is similar to what. in evaluation research, is called the black-
box problem (Mehan 1979). Variables that can be defined in simple terms in advance tend to be
so rough that they in a way would inherently conceal important issues and problems.
The problem is also characterized by being in the context of discovery rather than verification
(Stamn et al. 1984). The aim is to discover or generate concepts that are able to highlight and
distinguish relevant and important aspects of reality when engaging in a reframing endeavour.
The foci and emphases are therefore qualitatively different from the kind of studies which aim at
verifying concepts and testing propositions. The approach of the study and its choice of
methods must reflect that it is within the context of discovery.
The choice has therefore been to have the focus on the process of generating, constructing and
suggesting theory. The focus has been on the identification of important phenomenon and
conditions when trying to accomplish a reframing of organizations. The identification and
grounding of patterns have been emphasized in favour of the provisional testing by, for
instance, constantly confronting the findings with negative cases and provisional testing of the
findings. This means that the design has relied more on grounded-oriented research than other
inductive approaches for theory development (Glaser and Strauss 1967:104).
Other ways of looking for what did not hold up can be integrated into the process of research.
First, concepts suggested during the process of research should be dropped when they do not
demonstrate empirical grounding when inspected further. Second, when patterns are identified,
the understanding of them can be increased by considering in what way instances diverged
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from them (patton 1980: 328). This is in line with the recent view held by Strauss, who states
that the focus when looking for what does not hold up is on qualifying questions and
statements of relationships thereby adding variation and depth of understanding (Strauss and
Corbin 1990:107-8). The various distinctions of the reframing concepts presented in Chapter
Four were, for example, generated in this way. Third, as will be outlined in the section on
analyzing the data, the research procedures included various forms of practical validation that
will be outlined in the section on analyzing the data. The scrutiny following from the
confrontation between observations, working concepts, etc., and potential users with field
knowledge and experience filled, to a degree, the same function as the search for negative
evidence would have.
When designing a study in the context of discovery, one should bear in mind that the planning
of the study has to be present at all stages and it must be a reflexive process (Hammersley and
Atkinson 1947:49). It must more or less continuously reflect the preliminary findings.
Collection and analysis of data must be strategically governed by the emerging theory. This is
what is called an emerging design in naturalistic inquiry (patton 1980, Lincoln and Guba 1985
and Lincoln 1985).
The parallel drawn to this approach is also quite relevant since it deals with evaluating human
interventions as they naturally appear. The change programmes explored in this study are such
interventions, and the study evaluates, in a sense, what are important issues and variables in a
natural context of managed organizational change. The study is naturalistic oriented in the
sense that a situation is sought were the processes studied are not set up or intended to be
influenced by the researcher. The methodology chosen should not demand concentrating on a
restricted or small number of variables, a demand also considered a prerequisite for ensuring
ecological validity (Hammersley and Atkinson 1987:27,31).
The meaning of an emerging design, however, is not that it is performed in a completely
pragmatic manner. It should be directed by basic guidelines reflecting the characteristics of the
problem and the theoretical perspective as well as the emerging fmdings. It has already been
argued that the problem reflects a need for the generation of empirically mmnded concepts. It is
implicit that this means the application of inductive analysis in the sense that the findings should
emerge from the data. Furthermore, these guidelines, together with characteristics of the
setting, seem best served by an emphasis on QW1litativeoriented methods. What is meant by
these three interwoven and overlapping guidelines is discussed below. Their practical
application will be outlined in the sections on collecting and analyzing data.
A Q!laJitatively-oriented approach
It is generally acknowledged that quantitative and qualitative methods have different advantages
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(e.g. Jick 1979), but also that they can supplement and support each other. Qualjtative methods
were chosen in this particular case with key informants as the main source because they seemed
best suited to capture what the study was after. The raw materials of qualitative research are, as
Van Maanen puts it, "generated in vivo, close to the point of origin (Van Maanen 1979:520).
Given the quest for unknown variables in a set of different organizations, a qualitative approach
seemed a natural choice, best suited for grasping aspects of unstructured situations in relation to
their wholeness (e.g Enderud 1984).
Lincoln and Guba argue that humans have properties that makes them particularly well suited to
the task of being the major research instrument in a research like this one (Guba and Lincoln
1981:129-150). Human responsiveness and adaptability in relation to the particular situation
being researched, the ability for holistic emphasis, the ability to make use of tacit knowledge
(polany 1966), and the possibility for using and following up their own knowledge base are all
mentioned. These all seem valuable qualities for making use of the research setting in question
with the purpose of discovering what are critical issues in the reframing endeavours, especially
because many of the infonnants were, as is outlined in the next section, more than SOUIreS in
the limited sense. It was continuously possible to utilize their human assets due to the meetings,
in-depth interviews, informal contacts and prolonged engagement.
The choice of putting the stakes on a qualitative-oriented methodology is not a principle one in
the sense of excluding that quatitative techniques could have been made use of, for instance, in
pursuing particular problems in more detail and depth. The choice must be seen as closely
related to the whole of the design issue, the other guidelines as are presented below, and the
priorities that had to be made in view of these and the overall possibilities of how much it was
possible to do.
An inductive and &rounded process of research
Inductive analysis is used as a term in different approaches (Znaniecki 1934, Hammersley and
Atkinson 1987). In this study it is used in line with how it is applied in modem evaluation
research as mentioned above. In this kind of approach it is applied as it relates to the ideas of
Grounded theory research. Following these two guidelines therefore means that the analysis is
moving from data towards sensitizing categories and working concepts or hypotheses. This
process aims at developing constructs which, in the words of Glaser and Strauss (1967:3), are
intended to "fit the situation being researched, and work when being put into use". The study
starts with observations that key informants find interesting. These are then, as shall be
outlined in the next section, compared to other observations. Through this process reframing
concepts are generated. They are grounded in the sense that they are induced from data and also
because procedures are followed in order to secure that they fit the situation being researched.
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This means that there had to be a mutual intexplay between the collection and analysis of data.
The data collection should, in a sense, be strategically governed by the emerging theory. Glaser
and Strauss (1967:43, 109) held the opinion that collection, coding and analysis of data should
be done together as much as possible. They saw a definite separation as hindering the
generation of theory. The procedures, for example, fed back to the key informants allow for
both new interpretations to emerge and new data to be collected. This implies a sort of funnelled
shape process in which the concepts develop from being sensitizing oriented towards being
more clearly defined (cfr. Blumer 1954). This process .Qf research. in line with Glaser and
Strauss (1967:6,3), not only means that the concepts emerged from the data, but also that they
were worked out to "fit the situation being researched and work when being put to use".
The procedures used in the process of research were also designed to secure ~ credibility of
data and interpretations. Tentative interpretations were confronted with key informants in
meetings and interviews. These procedures were intended to be social tests (Enderud 1983) or a
sort of practical validation (Arbnor and Bjercke 1977). They aimed at ensuring face validity,
fruitfulness or merit (Lincoln and Guba 1978) as well as fit with the relevance system
(Normann 1976). In other words, along the lines of Glaser and Strauss, they fit the situation
and also could be used to improve understanding (Brunsson 1981). It was also intended that
the procedures should add variation and depth to the conceptual understanding (Strauss and
Corbin 1990) as well as constitute an opportunity for critical examination and reinterpretation
(Hagg 1981).
Outlining the various forms of data collection will demonstrate that they involved some sort of
triangulation as data were collected from different sources, by different methods and by
investigators, thereby strengthening the credibility of the study (e.g. Kalleberg 1982). As you
recall, the study involved a long-term engagement with the field This was a prerequisite for the
patterns described, and it allowed for funnel-shaped cycles between data collection and data
analysis integrating the reinterpretations emerging from validation procedures as implied by
grounded theory and recommended by, for example, Hammersley and Atkinson (1987).
Although the processes of data collection and data analysis therefore overlapped and were partly
integrated, we shall present the two aspects of the process of research separately so it will be
possible to understand the research process in practical terms.
Collecting the data
The data were collected over a period of a bit more than two years. Five of the projects,
Airline, Transport, Furniture, Money Market and Electric Industry had been in progress for
about six months when the study began. The Car Retailer and Banking projects began some
months after the study had started. The Furniture project was terminated a bit more than a year
after the study started, the Money Marked project some months before that as was the Electric
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Industry project. In the Furniture case this was because the manager got into some problems
and had to leave. In relation to Money Market the consultancy firm preferred to work with a
competing enterprise, and the relationship between Money Market and the consultancy firm was
terminated in mutual understanding. In Electric Industry there proved to be a different
understanding between the consultants and the mo on the degree of involvement needed by
the CEO in the project.
Data collected from the project leaders in the various projects was the crank in the process of the
research. Data was, however, also collected from other consultants working on the particular
projects. In some cases data was also collected from key personnel in the various organizations.
There was a sort of cybernetic relation (Bums 1967: 155) between the author and the researched
which was both complex and interactive; a relationship termed by some as clinical rather than
analytical (cfr. Berg and Smith 1985). The presentation of the practical ways of collecting the
data will make this relationship clearer.
Main foci in the two phases of dara collection
The process of collecting data can be seen as having .twn phases. In the first phase, which
lasted about four months, four employees (one was responsible for two firms) with some
research experience cooperated with five project leaders to collect the project history because the
projects concerned had been started before the research policy was launched. They were
supposed to work half time for this purpose and half time assisting the project leaders. The
strategy for data collection was changed in phase two, with a focus now on the present. One
full-time employee was assigned to the author in order to help organize and carry through the
data collection and analysis described in the following. Additionally, all other consultants were
expected to take part in the process.
In the .firu~ the focus was on describing the initial situation of the firm as well as change
activities and effects so far. This task was conducted by the consultants assigned to the
research activities interviewing project leaders and all consultants that had been involved in the
project as well as key people in the organization. Written material from the change activities and
relevant management meetings, etc., were also examined To a certain extent these consultants
also were integrated in the organizations by assisting the project leader, so they could also use
observational data. The group of people collecting this kind of data had regular meetings headed
by the author to discuss methodological issues as well as to explore their observations and
other pieces of data. In figure 3.1 we call this "Historic Data".
In the second ~ information provided by the project leaders constituted the main source of
data. Every second or third month each project leader wrote an observation report. When other
consultants had been involved in the project in that particular period of time, they took part in
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procuring the report. The report was supposed to give insight into challenges, problems, and
progress of the project with a special emphasis on what was puzzling and creating after
thoughts. They were instructed to keep a diary as a basis for their reporting. The project leaders
were under heavy pressure, and they easily could have become victims of Gresham's Law; that
the here-and-now activities tend to win over the long-term aspects. The notes were always
produced although they were sometimes somewhat delayed. The exception was Banking. Due
to several factors, such as a shift in project leaders, the reporting was poor in that particular
case.
Meetings between leaders of the various projects provided another source of data. In these
meetings the reports were presented for assessment and discussion in a meeting consisting of
all the project leaders and supplemented by other consultants involved in the particular project
that was discussed. These meetings served the joint purposes of learning from their own as
well as others experiences and allowed the project leaders to get advice on how to perform
better. They represented a forum for joint exploration. The other project leaders confronted
what was presented with their own experiences, they asked for clarification and questioned
when they did not understand or agree. The author participated in the discussions as a resource
person, presenting tentative interpretations as well as synthesizing the discussions.
Notes from these meetings, together with the project leader reports, formed the platform for
more focused in-depth interviews with the project leaders. The theme of the interviews were the
concepts that emerged from the reports and subsequent discussions. The focus was on
confronting them in more detail and depth with the different projects in order to produce or
check empirical examples.
Additional Sources of data
The collective meetings where tentative and suggestive conceptually-oriented papers were
discussed were another source of data. The focus was on confronting reflections, issues and
concepts with the experience of the whole group of consultants. Additionally, tacit knowledge
acquired by the author as a member of the group of consultants was valuable to the
understanding, interpretation and analysis of data. Taking part in the data collection in the
diagnoses outlined below was valuable for the same reason. Sporadic formal and informal
contacts with the field also provided such information. They occurred because people from the
various case organizations dropped in, took part in meetings and seminars, etc., and also
because some members from several of the firms took part in a managment-development
programme run by the consultancy firm. In figure 3.1 we call all the above kinds of data
"Process Data".
U seful information was also provided by two organizational diagnoses that were carried
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through primarily to support the change actions. This was done in Car Retailer and Banking for
the purpose of identifying various barriers to change and where resources had to be
concentrated in the change work. The author was involved in the designing and planning of
these and also took an active part in the project group carrying one of them through. The
descriptions and accounts provided by these diagnoses were helpful and fruitful in the further
process of research. In figure 3.1 these have been called "Initial Diagnosis". This is because
"Closing Diagnosis" also was produced fed into the process of research. In Transport and
Airline these were carried through when the project formally were closed as projects with
external help (some minor activities were continued in Airline). The author drew up the
guidelines and took part as a member of the project groups carrying these through. They
focused on identifying what sorts of effects had been produced by the reframing efforts so far.
A special sort of Closing Diagnosis was made at Furniture. This project was terminated
unexpectedly. This was due to a particular and, in as sense, unfortunate episode. The manager
implemented some structural changes that caused riot among the employees, and the CEO
decided to sack him. The diagnosis was based on interviews and a meeting held with the major
actors involved in order to analyze and assess the processes leading up to the incident.
This means that some sort of initial organizational diagnosis existed for all projects; The
Historic Data included a minor organizational diagnosis. This was more extended at Furniture
which we have indicated in the figure. A closing diagnosis exists only from two of the cases.
These all provided valuable background information that helped in understanding and asking
questions about other pieces of data, and also provided descriptions of incidents and situations
that were used in the generation of concepts.
Historic Process
data data
Airline x x
Transport x x
Furniture x x
Money Market x x
Electric Industry x x
Car Retailer x
(Banking) x
(x)
Closing
diagnosis
x
x
(x)
Initial
diagnosis
x
x
FIGURE 3.1 TYPES OF DATA FROM TIlE CASES
We have indicated that "Banking" played a minor role in the study, and only a few examples
from here are drawn upon. This is because data, as mentioned earlier, was scarce. The Airline,
Transport and Furniture cases are those used most in the development of concepts. This is
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because data that exists from these cases are the most extensive, due to such factors as the
length of involvement, the degree of dedication from the project leader, special diagnosis and
degree of collective attention in the consultancy fum. The (few) examples from Electric
Industry reflect that there were problems in getting the project started.
Analyzing the data
The overall logic of analyzing the data was, as already mentioned, that themes and issues
emerged and were adjusted, changed and integrated in a spiralling process between (data)
reports, meetings, seminars, in-depth interviews and, of course, reflections. Issues reported as
puzzling or important were compared to situations in other cases. What was done was very
much along the lines suggested by Glaser and Strauss;
"In discovering theory, one generates conceptual categories of their properties from evidence,
then evidence from which the category emerges is used to illustrate the concept By comparing
where the facts are similar or different, we can generate properties of categories that increase the
categories' generality and explanatory power."
(Glaser and Strauss 1967:23/24)
In comparing the incidents and situations that were reported the focus was on identifying and
establishing patterns that could be worked out as concepts. When similarities and differences
discovered in this process seemed important for the prospect of the project to succeed then an
issue, in a sense, became distinct.
Theph~sofanruynn&~
The process of analyzing the data is interwoven in the process of collecting them. In the .fial
~ several consultants were assigned the job of collecting and analysing data. The analyses
were presented in papers on the project history of the five firms. The guidelines for the analyses
were, however, laid down in research meetings chaired by the author, who also supervised the
production of the five papers. These formed the basis for investigating all of the data from all of
the firms. Differences and similarities in the different projects were searched for in order to
discover any problematic issues or foci. The issues that emerged from this process were
thereafter presented and discussed at workshops where all the consultants participated. The
reactions and discussions qualified, supported and enriched the observations, interpretations
and issues that were presented.
In ~ ~ the dominant procedure was based upon the reports from the project leaders. The
issues from phase one gave clues to what to look for in addition to giving a more general focus
on what caused problems, what seemed surprising, etc. The author, assisted by one of the
consultants assigned for such purposes, studied reports, reflected on them related to previous
reports and reports from other projects etc. Based on these tentative issues, concepts,
questions, etc, were noted and to some extent focused the attention in the further analysis as
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well as they were compared to accounts given byother, for example in the project leader forum.
In that forum the reports were discussed with a fairly open agenda to see what was catching
attention, and also with particular themes from the report focused on because they bore
relationships to themes that had been observed in other cases. Based on the themes and issues
from this process, the project leaders were interviewed in-depth about their report. In this
process comparisons were continuously made across reports and projects. The analytical points
were in confronting the issues in more detail and depth with the different projects and to
producing or checking empirical examples.
On this basis notes were written outlining issues and categories that seemed to be fairly well
grounded. These were again informally discussed as well as discussed and scrutinized in
collective seminars. These seminars were, in other words, more conceptually oriented than the
project leader forum, which had an emphasis on a particular project. The point was therefore to
have a broad social check on the concepts presented to see if they made sense and seemed
relevant in relation to the organizational realities of the various participants.
Intemted scrutinizin&
The collective seminars offered the sort of forum where researchers would have been quite
clearly told if the observations did not seem interesting or in any way attention catching, and
they would probably have lost the engagement if this happened repeatedly. This corresponds to
what Arbnor and Bjercke (1977:219) call practical process validation. These people would also
tend to yield to what Arbnor and Bjercke call practical result validation. In other words, they
would judge the usefulness of the tentative concepts for their work in the field as change
agents. What is presented in this report are refmements of what escaped these processes, to a
certain degree also providing new, and perhaps modifying or enriching, examples.
All in all this implies a spiralling process of reflection, an identification of issues and a
confrontation between the reports, meetings and interviews. Issues were found not to be of
interest or valid, or they were adjusted and enriched and formed and labelled as reframing
concepts. The research process aimed at identifying patterns. Still, the process of research
would mean scrutinizing the interpretations in several ways. The process was inherently a
social test for face invalidity. If issues did not prove to have empirical support they would in a
sense just disappear from further research. The issues that were judged valid were tested for
ways they did not hold up in a sense that added variation and depth to the understanding, an
important aspect of the search for negative evidence in this kind of research (Strauss and Corbin
1990:107-8).
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Presenting the analysis
What is presented in the next chapters builds upon the process of research outlined in the
previous sections. In a sense it is a phase three in the analysis that is presented. It utilizes what
was developed in this process and draws upon written documentation from the various research
activities presented. The choice of issues presented is consequently infonned by the process of
research described above. The above description outlines how the reframing concepts presented
in this study emerged. This process is only to a limited extent demonstrated in the following
chapters.
These chapters present the final analysis which builds on the process of research described.
Chapters Four to Six demonstrate how the reframing concepts were grounded. Data are
presented, to paraphrase Van Maanen (1979:520), by figuratively putting "brackets around a
temporal and spatial domain of the social world to demonstrate the grounding of the various
issues". This makes it possible for the reader to follow the learning process of the author,
which by some is considered crucial for the issue of trustworthiness (e.g. Normann 1976:66).
In doing so, however, the content of the concepts are also explained as well as their grounding
demonstrated. There is also a confrontation of the concepts with the data to see if they fit. In
spite of this being two operations it appears in the report as one.
The empirical glimpses are examples from episodes or are limited parts of a change effort
presented to show how the concepts are generated and grounded. They are grounded by the
means of quotations from the participants, who are, as is evident from the above description,
mainly the project leaders and other consultants. To some extent there are also quotations from
other actors from the field. Two to four empirical glimpses, usually three, are presented
because they demonstrate similarities or differences, and because these seem to reveal issues of
central importance to the effects of the reframing efforts.
A set of empirical glimpses is presented as we explain how these, and the relationship between
them, develop and ground one or more reframing issues. Sometimes a set of related issues are
developed in sequence. This logic of presentation is somewhat deviated from in Chapter Five
"Counterforcing Reframing Organization". This is based on empirically-grounded participant
speculations combined with theoretical and conceptual contributions from other authors. This
chapter is written to meet a felt need for a conceptual clarification of the nature of the task of
reframing organizations. This conceptual understanding developed in parallel and is related to
the development of the reframing issues. By helping making more precise the understanding of
the kind of situation from which the "reframing issues" emerge, this conceptual understanding
assists in the overall ambition of developing a model for reframing organizations.
The beginning of Chapter Seven is a bridge between the empirical analysis in the previous
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chapters and the more theoretically oriented analysis follow in Chapter Seven and Chapter
Eight It starts by summing up the findings of the study so far and then ties back to the initial
theoretical perspective. Whereas these findings are well grounded in the empirical field, it is
now time to move a step forward and (under)take what Mintzberg calls a "creative leap" from
the platform of the "detective work".
A working hypothesis will be suggested, followed by a set of propositions. The relationship
between these will be analyzed in Chapter Eight. The discussion will be geared towards seeing
how they relate to each other and the task of reframing organizations. The purpose is to sum it
all up in a tentative model for reframing organizations. In order to do this as well as to work out
the propositions in Chapter Nine, it will be necessary to analyze, reflect, speculate and look to
other authors. The basis, however, is the grounded reframing concepts which then should be
embodied by the ideas put forward in the last two chapters.
Issues of trustworthiness
Research is always a search for knowledge and truth. Of course there can be disputes about
what is truth, and what kind of truth is attainable, in fact it is probably the dominant issue in the
philosophy of science, and of course truth is a different matter in the context of discovery than
in the context of verification. Still it is a unavoidable issue. Good research must have some kind
of truth or truth value attached to it The question is what is the quality of thruth produced by
the application of this design?
The study has been in the context of discovery. The aim, and the consequent choice of
methods, has been on developing a conceptual model that is fit for relating to and changing the
world as a social constructed reality. The focus has not been on picturing or measuring the
"true" organizational world. How valid, or rather trustworthy (Lincoln and Guba 1985:290),
are the results given the aim and ambition of the study?
The core of that issue deals with how credible the findings are. That is a question of
establishing confidence in the truth of the findings of the inquiry for the subjects with whom the
inquiry was carried out (Lincoln and Guba 1985:290). It is a question of how well the data,
concepts and propositions, to use the words of Glaser and Strauss (1967:3), fit the situation
being researched and how well they work in practice. The general aspect of how credibility was
ensured, as well as some specific aspects of this issue, will be discussed on the following
pages. Trustworthiness is, however, also a question of applicability; (how) can the fmdings be
transferred to other organizations? This issue will be dealt with at the end of the chapter. It is,
however, conditioned by the degree credibility. Findings that are not credible cannot be applied
in other settings.
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Ensurin& credibility
The procedures for collecting and analyzing data were set up with credibility in mind. The
research engagement took place over a considerable span of time to get to know the field(s),
and also to be able to establish a dynamic perspective. In addition to the contact with project
leaders and consultants this was ensured by the various forms of diagnoses in addition to
informal contacts with the field Various forms of "social tests" (Enderud 1983) and practical
validation (Arbnor and Bjercke 1977) were employed by means of the various discussions and
meetings. There were "member checks" meant to check for face (in)validity (e.g. Cook and
Campbell 1978), as well as the fruitfulness, merit (Lincoln and Guba 1978) or relevance by
confronting the preliminary findings with the relevance system (Normann 1976).
One possible threat to the credibility of the study is, however, that there is a lack of systematic
social tests or member checks with other audiences in the organizations than project leaders and
other consultants, except in case of the diagnoses. It was not possible to arrange such sessions.
It was one trade off that had to be made in order to get access and arrange a practical realistic
situation for getting hold of the data. From a practical point of view such checks were seen as
interfering in the change process in a possibly diverging way, and also it was simply seen as
taking up too much time in a stressed situation. The research activities had to comply to this
view whether right or wrong.
An emphasis on procedures for this purpose could, on the other hand, possibly have weakened
the degree of ecological validity, an aspect to be discussed in a later section. The lack of formal
procedures in this area was furthermore partly outweighed by the fact that such checking was
done on an informal sporadic basis, and that there was an element of indirect checking due to
the project leaders and consultants starting to use the emerging conceptual knowledge in their
cooperation with others in their respective host organizations. The implications of these
possible weaknesses must, however, be reexamined when discussing the possible fitness or
applicability of the findings to other settings.
Credibility was further supported by the use of a variation of methods. Triangulation has been
recommended by a large number of methodologists in qualitatively-oriented approaches
(Kalleberg 1982). Triangulation of methods is seen to increase the degree of validity (Weller
and Romney 1987). Its most common use is with the combination of qualitative and
quantitative approaches. It is, however, also used when referring to combinations of sources,
methods, investigators and theories (Denzin 1978). As outlined above this study employed
different data and methods from different sources like project leader reports, interviews with
project leaders, project consultants, full-time employees, data from discussions and meetings,
written documentation from the change projects, data from observations in the, field, etc. This
kind of triangulation is given a dominant role by several researchers in the quest for credibility
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(e.g. Patton 1980). All in all, these measures allowed for and involved a continuous
examination of observations and findings strengthening the credibility of the final fmdings
(Hagg 1981).
All in all the credability of the study is seen to be good. There are, however, reasons to focus
separate ly on some specific but interrelated issues of relevance. First, some aspects of the fact
that the principal research instrument is made of "flesh and blood" and, second, how to handle
the claim for objectivity of neutrality. Furthermore, how can one be sure the findings are
correct, what has been called the replication problem. Finally, by using the notion of ecological
validity it is discussed whether the results are produced by the research situation as much as the
change situation.
The issue of human instrumentation
On the list of possible threats to internal validity we find the issue of instrumentation (Campell
and Stanley 1963). This is found to be particularily relevant for the discussion of credibility
since it would influence whether the various measures mentioned to secure credibility would
work according to the intention. The single most important instrument in this study is the
human one. Human beings mean human problems like fatigue, variation in experience, shifts in
concentration and focus, etc. Guba and Lincoln (1981: 113) find that "this loss of rigour is more
than offset by the flexibility, insight, and ability to build on tacit knowledge that is the peculiar
province of the human instrument".
There is, however, one aspect that deserves particular attention and which also connects to the
issue of neutrality in the study. Guba and Lincoln themselves mentioned cooptation as one of
the possible weaknesses attached to the human instrument For example, Myrdal (1970) takes
this further by suggesting that objectivity as such in research is unrealistic since interests and
perceptions are involved in every aspect of life.
There is one question related to this particular design that follows from this view: What kind of
weaknesses could be inflicted by the fact that the project leaders as well as the other consultants
are both actors of the researched field as is the consultancy firm? Could the fact that the latter is
a political system bias their reporting in a way that weakened the credibility? Credibility is not
understood as reflecting what is objectively true. Still, it is understood as what in a sense is
locally true. Could it be that the consultants reported in way that was intended to strengthen
their position at the consultancy firm by deducting or adding to what they actually observed?
And would that in any way weaken the credibility?
On the one hand they had an interest in increasing their own status in the consultancy finn. It
cannot be ruled out that this could make them bias their reporting. On the other hand, the
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reporting was not to be on measurement of achievement and results, but rather on important
incidents and situations, etc. This probably diminishes the potential risk for strong biases due to
opportunism. There was also an incitement for being a good informant or reporter as this was
company policy. This could, however, also have a potential risk for opportunism by them
reporting more than they had seen.
These problems are, however, not found to be significant for at least four reasons. 1) The
reasons for opportunistic bias were not very strong given the nature of the task. 2) If it occurred
it would be outweighed by the social tests and scrutinizing procedures that were followed. 3)
The various conceptual findings do not seem to be of such a kind that they would be created if
this kind of behaviour was common. 4) Finally, the author's personal knowledge of the people
and the field does not raise any suspicion about opportunism taking place in this issue.
The issue of neutrality
Even if the collection and analysis of data are neutral in the sense of not being biased by the
kind of opportunism described above, there are reasons to take Myrdals point seriously.
Asplund (1972 ) also argues, for example, that data is as much constructed as collected due to
such factors as the perspective(s), pre-understanding, concepts and methods used in the
research process. If that is the case it is also impossible to be faithful to the ideals of Glaser and
Strauss and to start the research process completely from scratch with no preconceptions. All
conceptions should emerge from the process of research.
The notion of theory-independent ways of constructing theory is held to be more or less
impossible by many scholars (e.g. Revang 1981:20, Kuhn 1970:206). Naturally it is an ideal to
reach for neutrality, to try not to let your own interests, attitudes, preconceptions, etc., bias the
research. But a research problem and a research process are always approached from a position
of an understanding of reality. Other positions would have yielded other conclusions and
choices in the research process.
At the end of the day, the most important thing is probably to be clear about what you do and
why. In this study this issue was handled by outlining the perspective by which the author was
guided in defining the problem and conducting the study, in addition to being explicit about
perspectives, assumptions, research steps and procedures. This is also the major solution
suggested for handling the neutrality or objectivity issue in this kind of research because it
allows others to evaluate the premisses on which the findings are built (Guba and Lincoln
1981).
The re.plication problem
For an observation to be true, it is considered that other people should make the same
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observation under identical circumstances. This kind of reliability, or constancy, is hardly
possible in this kind of research. Replicating the research process in a literal sense is not
possible. It is not possible to find identical cases under identical contexts like the ones
researched in this study. Too many things change as time elapses. And even if that was
possible, it is in the nature of this kind of research that the research process might have
produced other foci with other researchers. The consistency problem can, however, be coped
with in several ways (Lincoln and Guba 1985).
The issue is to ensure that sensible choices and interpretations have been made during the
process of research. In practical terms this boils down to much of the same thing as the issue of
neutrality, namely being explicit about what has been done and choices that have been made.
This makes it possible for the audience to assess the sense of what has been done. In
naturalistic research it is even suggested to integrate an audit of this into the study itself.
The same function can, however, to a certain degree be fulfilled by integrating into the research
procedures overlap methods or stepwise replication; parallel research teams. Resources did not
allow for the latter. An example of overlap methods used in the study, however, are the
researcher reports with the subsequent presentation, questions and discussion in project leader
meetings followed by interviewing the project leaders. In effect, overlap methods represent an
aspect of triangulation. This shows how integrated the various principles of rigour are in this
kind of research. The various aspects of credibility must therefore in practice be seen as a
whole.
The issue of ecoloeical validity
The human instrumentation issue was discussed as related to the problem of neutrality. It also
raises another problem which, for instance, is brought to the surface by the notion of
ecological validity (Brunswick 1956, Brach and Class 1968). Observations made from
"artificial situations" created by, for instance, experiments, the interview situations, research
procedures and instruments may be difficult to transfer to real-life situations. The research
situation does not represent the kind of a whole(ness) one wants to say something about In
that case the findings are not characterized by ecological validity, a prerequisite for credibility of
special relevance for the issue of applicability of the findings to other settings. The notion
focuses in a sense the bridge between credibility and transferability.
This seems all very logical and unobtrusiveness is consequently held to be an esteemed quality
by many researchers (e.g.Bogdan and Taylor 1975). Obtrusiveness can and should be
minimized by the choice of sources, techniques and thorough training of observers. Others see
this as problematic. There often are ethical problems related to those methods that are
approximately unobtrusive like contrived observations. Observing something is seen as
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influencing what is being observed. When people in the organizations know that they are
studied, their perception of what the study is all about is likely to influence what they
communicate to the researcher(s). For instance, fear of what is going to happen, interests in
potential courses of action, etc., might colour their message. One view of this is clearly
formulated by Lundin and Wirdenius (1990): " ...the researcher cannot undertake an active
research in a system and at the same time avoid being part of that system." Their point is that
researchers are part of the dynamics they want to study, and that this is a natural son of
situation. As Lincoln and Guba (1985:94) say, " ...knower and known are inseparable." "The
investigator and respondent jointly create the data of research". The conclusion is that one
should realize that research is interaction and act accordingly.
This study was based on a collaborative-oriented process of interaction with the field. It was
collaborative in the sense that the author and the consultants cooperated in a search for
knowledge and insight. It was interactive in the sense that this meant interaction with the field.
In this case this is somewhat particular since the consultants were both actors of the field and
the learning environment of the consultancy environment. They were key informants
collaborating with the researcher in a joint exploration of data provided by them.
This was therefore interactive research in the sense of designing for allowing the understanding
to evolve in the interaction described, but not in the other sense recommended by Lundin and
Wirdenius (1990) of making a point of capturing the changes that was caused by the interactive
research. Clearly, it is likely that the consultants were influenced also as actors in the field by
the process of research in which they took part. In fact that was more or less intended by the
learning policy of the consultancy firm. Since there was no focus on capturing this particular
aspect of the change, the question is what this means for the nature and quality of the findings.
First, what is the general feeling of being studied in the organizations. The answer to that is that
although key personnel to a varying degree would know that the consultancy agency had
"doing research on their processes" as their policy, the idea about what this meant would be
very distant and vague. It is not very likely that it would raise any particular reaction. Second,
on the other hand the different project leaders participating in the research process could be
infectious, or would their behaviour be inobtrusive from the perspective of the research
objective? This aspect of their work was seldom if ever on the agenda. They used little or no
instrumentation related to the research interest So, this kind of effect would primarily be related
to their general project leader and consultant behaviour.
It is, as stated above, quite likely that this behaviour was influenced as a reflection of research
interaction. It is likely that the consultants expanded and clarified their conceptual tools and also
became more conscious about what they did and the situations in which they took part. In terms
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of how this would influence what was studied and thereby the nature and quality of the
findings, the question is whether this did anything else than make them better change agents.
Since the quality of change agents, like for instance project leaders, always will vary in
different ways, it is difficult to see that this kind of influence was significant for the nature of
the fmdings.
In other words, the degree of ecological validity is in principel weakened by the project leader
and consultant behaviour being influenced by the research process and by the fact that there was
no explicit focus on capturing the nature and effect of these influences. In practical terms,
however, this probably meant little to the nature of the fmdings. In faet, it seems that the issue
of ecological validity has been handled in a fruitful way. The research process took advantage
of the point that it intervenes in the system studied but isolates the visibility and reduces the
negative effects.
Alwlicability
All in all, various member checks, triangulations and corrobations as well as phenomenonal
recognitions that have been described and discussed are judged to provide credibility. This is a
good basis for discussing how useful the findings are. In addition to dealing with a useful
problem in a credible way, the findings have to be relevant for other settings. The problem
initially was identified as of being of public interest, and the question remains whether the
findings can be applied to other settings. This question now seems a bit unfair. Cronbachs
view that, "When we give proper weight to the local conditions, any generalization is a working
hypothesis, not a conclusion" (Cronbach 1975:124-5) is naturally particularly relevant since
the aim of this study has been to generate rather than to verify theory. Still, there are at least two
ways of discussing whether theory that has been generated can be applied in other settings.
First, the possibilities for transferring the findings of a credible study to another setting and
applying them there is in principle an empirical and relational question. The applicability can not
be established without knowledge of both settings and their characteristics. The establishment
of applicability consequently demands a fairly good description of the characteristics of both the
sending and the receiving setting. In this case the study has relied on bracketed examples and
empirical glimpses. Good conditions for the future establishment of applicability or not are
composed of thick description (Geertz 1973, Guba and Lincoln 1981:327). In this case this
exists at best within the limits of these glimpses, so in a sense it is a lack of empirical depth
when considering the ideal wish for possible judgment of applicability.
This is a consequence of trade-offs made to make it possible to pursue the problem of the
study. According to Thorngates discussion of his postulate of commensurate complexity, it is
impossible for a theory of social behaviour to be simultaneously general, accurate and simple
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(Thomgate 1976:406). The more aecurate a general theory, the less simple it is, etc. The study
was not intended to be another story of details in organizationallife, but was aimed at pursuing
a more general problem. To improve the conditions for assessing the transferability the study
would have had to be more focused on accuracy. According to Thorngate that would have made
an even less simple model. On the other hand, the restrictions on possibilities for assessing the
applicability constituted by the degree of accuracy - the degree of general merit - can be seen to
be counterbalanced by the degree of generality of the problem as such.
The other possible way of assessing the degree of applicability is the logical rather than
empirical way related to the kind of setting that produced the findings. Can it be characterized as
typical for the kind of setting the study is intended to say something about? This issue is related
to what kind of sample has been chosen. Since the purpose was to generate theory rather than
to establish the verification of it, the logical choice is purposeful or theoretical rather than
random sampling (Patton 1980: 105). The main purpose is to maximize information helpful to
illuminate the research problem. In this study cases were chosen because they were available
and yielded relevant information and because they represented serious and relevant change
attempts. As organizations they can hardly be seen as representing something particularely
exceptional. Some variation is also present in the ordinary when it comes to size, type of
industry, ete.
In sum, there seems to be something typical, or at least ordinary, about the sample when
considering the task of reframing. There are two exceptions. First, the focus has been on
private rather than public enterprises. In faet, all the case enterprises were private ones. In
principle this makes the findings relevant for private organizations only; if there are significant
differences between the two. Again, the meaning of significance is relational, as these
differences must be relevant for the nature of the findings. That can only be assessed in
retrospect. But there are reasons to believe that there are basic similarities between such basic
social processes as those related to reframing in private and public organizations.
Second, it is in principle a study of reframing endeavours involving external assistance,
although the project leaders as the major part of this assistance became almost full-time
members of their host organizations. Still, they had an additional point of reference.
Additionally, the credibility has chiefly been established in relation to the audience of the
project leaders and consultants. In principle this reduces the relevance of the findings to such
settings. That kind of situation is, however, a quite common situation. And, it would probably
hardly be all that different from one which had internal experts supporting the change project.
The main difference is that the project leaders participated in the learning process of the
consultancy firm, In the section on ecological validity it was doubted that this would matter for
the nature of the fmdings. It is also a question of whether the nature of the findings is such that
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it matters that credibility primarily has been established to a particular audience.
From a principle point of view the applicability is restricted to private enterprises using external
help in reframing attempts and is of use for these helpers and for the use of these helpers. In
practical terms it is not that restricted. First, the relevant differences between the case
organizations and those relying on their own resources are probably not all that great. Second,
there can even be expected to be basic similarities between public and private enterprises in this
respect Both these issues are in principle relational. They can only be settled in relation to a
particular setting. But they can, quite sensibly, be evaluated logically. That is, when
considering the nature of the actual findings, is it probable that the kind of differences discussed
above will mean anything?
Conclusion
The challenge has been to find and develop methods that take advantage of a unique possibility.
The setting allowed for exploring reframing endeavours in flux. This was a valuable and rich
situation considering the problem of developing a model of reframing organizations. It was also
quite difficult because taking advantage of the situation would, to some extent, mean integrating
the process of research into the operation of the consultancy firm. What still made it possible
was the fact that the research in a sense still was separated from the change projects in the sense
that the project leaders were almost full-time actors of the field This allowed for some kind of
distant interaction with the actual change endeavours. It allowed for both "hands on" data
combined with detached reflaction, individual derived data combined with joint exploration, and
it allowed for building on established understanding for further search, etc.
By using what could have been a problem from a research point of view, the interest in the
group for a continuous process of reflection and learning, it was possible to implement several
effective research procedures. It was possible to routinize a combined process of collecting and
analyzing data, and it was possible to integrate various kinds of member checks, etc. These
procedures are seen to produce relevant and fruitful data that are processed in a way that yields
credible fmdings.
Of course there are trade offs and weak points. The question is whether they have been handled
in an acceptable and fruitful way. The design of the study have been aimed at making the best
out of an interesting situation. The wholeness of the procedures are seen as yielding data of
quality, especially in consideration of the value of the setting. Credible findings produce by
exploring reframing organizations in this kind of setting can be of interest and are relevant to a
much wider audience. First, it is a problem of general relevance. Second, although this kind of
study is not based on a representative sampling, there are reasons to assume that the potential
applicability is fairly substantial.
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Chapter 4: Concepts for Organizational Reframing
The aims of this chapter are to develop and present a set of concepts for organizational
reframing in order to reveal critical and fruitful issues in the process of reframing organizations.
The issues that are presented have caught attention because decisions made or avoided in these
issues seem to matter for the chances of the reframing endevour to succeed.
The presentation is built upon "empirical glimpses" from the various change projects, which
were chosen to demonstrate the empirical grounding of the various issues. These are identified
by showing two or three glimpses that demonstrate specific similarties or differences in the
handling of the different projects. The presentation will consequently bracket and explain in
what sort of situations the issues appear.
Four issues are presented. The fust deals with the role of managers and leaders in forwarding
and supporting the new direction. The second deals with the relationship between the new and
intended ideas and the old and established ones. The third refers to the learning strategies
employed, and the fourth refers to the locus for forming new solutions.
The Role of Management and Leaders
ff you want to wash the stairs,
you have to start at the top.
The need for change was identified by the top manager - in some cases in cooperation with the
top management group - who initiated a change project. It was also the top manager who
"called in" consultants for help in all the cases. All the projects therefore basically follow a
more or less top down pattern. Different patterns could be observed, however, when it came to
how the steering of change efforts was organized and what parties were involved in what way.
By relating and comparing some empirical glimpses we shall demonstrate the issues that
emerged to us in this field:
Variations in top mana&ement roles
The reason for this division of the enterprises is that in Transport, Airline, and Banking the top
management group took responsibility for the change project or change operations. No steering
group was set up because the change operation was seen to be top management responsibility.
Decisions concerning change direction as well as change activities - as other important decision
- were seen to be within the discretion and responsibility of top management. Progress in the
change project was reported to the top management group. There were, however, considerable
variations in the way this position was tackled in the various individual firms.
Transport had already worked with change for 1-2 years when "the change project" started,
initiated and run by a new top manager. New goals and strategies were developed with a
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general focus on Organizational Development (OD) and restructuring Head Quarter (HQ). After
some time it was felt that the change process needed a clearer focus ("what kind of OD process
are we up to?"). Contacts were established between Transport and the consultancy firm. The
human resource manager, who was part of the top management group, played a central role in
establishing and spelling out the terms for the relationship.
In this process the premises for the "change process" were laid down. Seminars involving key
people in the organizations were to play an important role in starting up the process, and these
were later to be transformed in to a regular follow up/confrontation and learning forum. The
aims of these seminars were interrelated: Consciousness raising, creating acceptance and
commitment among managers and opinion leaders for the vision, goals and strategies, and also
creating a basis for systematic, disciplined long-term ways of working with reorientation and
business improvements. Consultants accordingly played a dominant part in these first meetings.
People also committed themselves to personnel development tasks.
Although important and meaningful issues came up and were discussed, the participants did not
seem to get really involved. This brings us to the question of the anchoring of the process. In
practical terms the seminars were initiated by one of the external consultants in collaboration
with the Human Resource manager. The impression was that the members felt it was not "their
process", but that of the external consultant and the HR man. This is supported by the fact that
the æo manager sensed the same thing and that he more or less took over in the first of the
second round of meetings. One of the consultants said about this:
"People perceived the seminar(s) and the change process as something these two (the HR man
and the external project leader) had initiated with the support from the æo.When the æo
intervened, took the chair of the seminar and played a central role in the planning and running
of the next, it seemed that he stressed his ownership to the change endeavour. It also resulted in
the other managers involving themselves much more strongly in the seminars".
The æo taking a more significant part in the planning of meetings and activities made the
consultants move from the foreground to the background, still playing an important part as
advisors and in management training/development (coaching). Apart from the practical aspect of
this change in the steering of the project, the signal (symbolic) effect was understood as being
the most important aspect for generating involvement among the participating managers. His
ownership was also underlined by the the Human Resource manager resigning. From one of
the consultants:
"From xix 198x the HR department was assigned to the department under the Vice President
for Finance. This was a result of the fact that the Vice President for HR "chose" to resign. The
resignation was the result of a period with "yellow card" due to his (lack of) relationship to the
operational side of the enterprise, and the failure to create his own power base in the
organization." "The signal-effect (way it was perceived) was probably two sided: On the
one hand it was a signal that not only the number of workers, but also the top management
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group was reduced in an economically difficult period, and also that the reorientation process
was more closely connected to the budget and planning systems. On the other hand this could
also cause the reaction that the only thing that now counted was money and not the talk about
"culture" and (strategic) visions".
All this probably strengthened the impression of a top management (manager) driven process.
Perhaps the two seemingly contrasting organizational interpretations of the change in status of
the Human Resourch (HR) department adds up to the same: In the end it is the operational
results that count - and therefore the CEO is backing (or rather fronting) the reorientation
process. Perhaps what happened in Transport can be seen as a process leading up to - or
clarifying the need for - top management driving the change ambitions.
In Airline. as in Transport. there was a "before process" in the sense that the firm had worked
with change before this particular project was established. A lot of consciousness-raising
seminars had for example been carried out, and there was some frustration that "nothing had
corne out of it". One of the first things to do therefore was to set up a "strategic management
group". This was partly in response to a heavy degree of segmentalistic/functionalistic
malfunctioning, but it was also done to give the change activities renewed foree. As illustrated
by the project leader, emphasis was put on establishing a unified and visible top management
effort:
''The first thing that had to happen was to establish a central and uniform strategic leadership
group. The aim was clearly to increase the powerbase - and thereby the energy invested in the
change efforts - in the organization through coordinated leadership signals. A lot of time and
energy was therefore invested in consolidating the group, coaching and increasing the
awareness of symbolic (signal) effects. To help me with efficient coaching, part of my role was
to seek information about the inner life of the organization, to catch how and what local
meaning attributed to management actions etc.".
In both these cases we can see that something is leading up to the realization that the top
management visibly and clearly has to represent the new ideas in order for them to be realized.
Perhaps there is something in the old proverb that "the past is a prologue". In the first case this
is seen through what happens in and around the seminars. In the second case it is the
interpretation of the past frustrations that leads up to the steps of building the new project
around the top management group. It is therefore interesting to observe the situation of the
relationship between top management and change projects in other cases.
A different to,p mana&emeDt role
In Electric Industry a steering group was set up for the project which consisted of two line
managers (but not ~ top manager), two union representatives, one personnel consultant, and a
project leader (external consultant). The responsibilities for the reorientation process and
activities were delegated to them. After some time, a change seminar with the middle and top
management was set up to provide a mile stone and move the "process" ahead. The first change
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seminar that was carried through with the middle management was, however, considered a
failure by the top manager. He was very disappointed that it did not go as it should and that it
was not as concrete as it should have been. The programme was designed to clarify success
factors and the new manager role. Success factors were lectured on with a focus on business
and not organizational factors, the new manager role was only touched upon. In addition, in the
discussion of "success factors", a focus on "openness" evolved (much to the frustration of the
top manager). One of the consultants reflected on this focus:
''Talks I had with people during and closely after the seminar revealed that the middle managers
had a conscious will to adapt "the process". They were, however, concerned with a criticism
of the top manager not being involved, demonstrating were he stood, etc."
He also said that this was the same kind of dissatisfaction that was expressed by the top
managers after the seminar, and goes on:
''The responsibility of the steering committee was vaguely defined as ''process responsibility"
for implementation in the whole organization. Commitment among the managers was seen as a
minor problem - if one at all. Nothing that the steering committee worked with was realized - a
management training seminar was cancelled at the last minute due to ''more urgent" business,
an evaluation programme was seen as uninteresting and rejected, so was a seminar programme
- more action orientation was called for, etc. While the mandate focusing on implementation
was formally valid, the project leader's attention was focused on generating (enough)
commitment."
The top management group (except the top manager) gathered afterwards to assess why the
seminar did not go well. They ended up discussing the role of the top manager related to the
project. They saw him as not having "ownership" in the process and focusing on other matters,
in a way signalling that it was not important. The reaction in this meeting resulted in the
restructuring of the management of the change process. The steering group was now to be
made up of "the board of division" (divisjonsutvalg), which is an organ set up as a
consequence of the agreement (hovedavtalen) between the central union and federation of
employers (W and NAF (NHO». It consisted of the top management - including the top
manager - of the division and two union representatives. This group was supplemented with
two middle managers. However, the top manager never got involved. The project leader
commented on this:
" ...considered commitment in the top management group to be an irrelevant issue and chose
not to get involved in the concrete process. On the one hand, he said that reorientation
(activities) was very important, but he chose to focus on other and different issues."
In the two first cases, the process enforces, in a sense, top management taking a more visible
and explicit role in the change efforts. In the last case we see the same tendencies, and perhaps
even stronger, but they are rejected by the CEO. As we shall see later, the change project broke
down after some time.
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The situation was again somewhat different in Furniture: The top manager here was in front of
the change efforts from the very beginning. However, some peculiarities deserve to be
commented upon: Together with the director of personnel he sat up a steering group that
consisted of the top manager for this particular division (he himself had been promoted to CEO
for the concern), himself, the director of personnel, the director of marketing and four union
spokespersons. One of the consultants commented upon this:
''They chose to leave several of the managers out of the steering group and also include the
"old" boss in the further work".
According to the project leader this was;
" ...because it is better to include the real than the formalleaders, because it is their commitment
and support that is needed in the change process ..."
The consultant that was involved in an organizational culture assessment of the firm added that
the evaluation of persons this view is based upon seemed right:
"They were, in a sense, pretending to be bosses and enjoyed little confidence in the
organization, especially in the production department(s). The union (representatives) also had
little confidence in them. Still, this had the dubious consequence in that the production
manager, responsible for the practical changes in the far largest group of employees, was not
represented on the steering committee."
The anchoring of the process and the creation of commitment among a larger group of key
personnel was supposed to be handled through a series of seminars carried through before
implementation. We can observe two things related to who owns or drives the project: First, the
new division manager did not seem to be "socialized" into the ideas of the reorientation effort.
The project leader said in retrospect that he had said he was "hanging in thin air", and that he
didn't get integrated in his management group; neither did he have much contact with his own
boss, the "old leader", apart from a monthly meeting where he reported on results. He related
this to the organization structure, in which he saw needs for change both in view of his own
situation, but also as a consequence of the needs for a more market orientation and a related
need for a more decentralized organization. He designed structural changes to accomplish this -
a solution that involved relocating (and degrading) a couple of managers.
This resulted in a great deal of resistance, a lot of it "behind the curtain activities" and in the
new divison manager being fired (we shall return to this episode in the section on
"integration".) The CEO said
"I have never seen anything like it" and that "the two days were completely chaotic". The
division manager, on the other hand, held the resistance he had met to be "not more than you
had to expect. "
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This must also be seen against the background that all actors in one way or the other could be
perceived as accepting the changes in advance because they had been informed. The union, as
well as the CEO, even thought they were necessary. What was wrong, they said in retrospect,
was that it was carried through in an "authoritarian and world champion like way" (from the
union) or advanced too quick with too little "anchoring" (from the æo).
The other aspect to observe here is the strength with which the change efforts were pursued.
The change seminars ended with agreements as to how the single managers should pursue
reorientation in the coming six months: Infonning or motivating the process among
subordinates, starting quality improvement work and also designing an individual action plan
for improving management practice and infonning the subordinates about it Progress should
be reported at training and follow up seminars. The comment made by the project leader as a
response to his own question about how much commited driving force there was in the
management group seems fairly illustrative:
"Not much had really happened before the first meeting (seminar). Peter had done 'nothing at
all'. He had, however worked his ass off with other tasks. For Fred and Adrian it was difficult
to see that "anything" was done. In Ian's case, however, there seemed to be some action,
whereas the trainers do as agreed upon ..... This could be typical for the situation that constantly
will emerge. Things that are more 'important' than the strategic programme pop up ....it will be
difficult to break old habits."
What was supposed to be the implementation phase occurred during the first months of the new
manager. The various managers did not pursue the change activities that were expected of them.
The general feeling seemed to be at the side line of the organizational reality and did not "count"
in the everyday situation. This was even more the case when the market dropped and the
company ran into economic difficulties. The focus was on cost reductions, even if it verbally
was stressed that the "process" was important. The reframing efforts got stuck and the
managers did not seem to follow up their commitment in this area.
Another thing that got stuck was an attempt at getting change started at the lower levels of the
organization. Seminars were carried through in order to teach the foremen and department
leaders how to develop goals and standards to improve quality in collaboration with their
subordinates. These seminars were also intended to reflect and motivate the basic message for
change. Whereas the courses (seminars for leaders, foremen, department managers) in
methods for developing new quality goals seemed to be well received and go well, the practical
efforts got started but then were stopped. In the beginning it went quite well, but met some
skepticism:
"Will this result in something, or will the efforts vanish once again? It seemed like quality
circles, and nothing came out of that. We have problems in meeting the deadlines because of
increased orders and a lot of over-time. How do we cope with that? Such things will always
happen. It takes more time than we expected."
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Mer some time the project leader says that "the goal development work has broken completely
down in the production department", which was the major part of the organization. The project
as such broke down later following a particular incident involving a conflict between the
division manager and the organization. We shall return to that later. Now we want ta discuss in
more general terms issues emerging out of the examples above.
The issue of anehorine the reframine efforts
Neither Transport nor Airline had any special steering group for reorientation projects. In
Airline this was the strategic management group, although the previous history might have led
ta this choice of solution. In Transport the project was, ta some extent, driven by consultants
at the side line of the line of command, so to speak. However, the tap manager sensed this ta
be wrong. His taking over the responsibility, fronting the project and also underlining its "line
nature" also seemed to revitalize the change efforts. In Electric Industry a special steering group
was set up, without the tap manager, but with some line connection. It was observed that a
reorganization of this steering group - including the tap manager - in a sense enforced itself
and the project.
This was most likely because both members of the tap management group as well as other
lower level managers found the fust arrangement confusing and difficult. The top manager did
not get involved in spite of the reorganization of the steering group, and the project also "died"
quite soon. It seemed that one reason was the lack of clear and convincing signals about its
value and direction. Although he might have had pressing reasons for concentrating on other
subjects, the effect seemed ta be that the other managers didn't see him as owning the process.
Why should they then choose to see it as important, especially when this also led to confusion?
In Furniture there was a steering committee which included the tap manager but none of the line
managers (if you don't consider the marketing director "line"). The line managers were,
however, supposed ta push and direct the necessary change activities. They didn't seem ta
push very strongly. The question is whether they could be expected ta grasp and commit
themselves ta new ideas at an early stage while not involved in their birth or concretization?
Line managers are important agenda setters in the everyday life of the organization. What is the
effect of keeping them out of the group defining and supposedly being the driving force for the
new agendas? At least in this case the new ideas, the new orientation, seemed ta have problems
in getting implanted in the organizational processes even at an early stage.
In these different examples the role of tap managers in relation ta the reframing efforts varies
significantly. Furthermore, there is a variation in the integration of the other (top) managers
and tap line managers with respect to their relationship to the change programme in question.
These variations also seem to matter for the prospect of the efforts ta be fruitful. We are
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struggeling to fmd a notion for this issue. In a sense it deals with the way the project is fastened
in the formal power structure of the organization. The tenn anchorine connotes just that; to
fasten or be fastened securely. It is also a tenn we occasionnaly run across among managers
and consultants ans used for similar purposes. More concrete anchoring can be seen as the
issue in who "owns" the endeavour of changing the organizational direction. Which groups or
persons are fronting - and backing - the decisions and activities that are carried out in order to
pursue this endeavour? Management anchoring refers to whether top management takes such a
role in relationship to the change project.
The tenn suggests that how this relationship is formed and performed is important for the
prospects of the project to succeed. This is a view that grew stronger after observing the change
efforts at Transport as seen in the next section. In principle, this project can be seen as both
having top manager and line anchoring. This particular incident, however, represents an attempt
to vitalize the change process by, in a sense, passing the line and creating a pressure for
increased change efforts at allleveis.
Chan" leaders
An attempt at "change management" in Transport evolved around the idea of internal change
agents. Internal "change leaders"- as they were called - should in a way "spread the gospel of
change", or be an essential part of what today is called internal marketing. We use this tenn
with this example, because it represents an approach which solely is represented in this
particular case. It is, however, contrasted with other approaches for forwarding change in
order to put the impact of this approach in perspective.
The project leader said that " the idea behind the change leaders was to strengthen the internal
marketing to achieve commitment for change. The aim was to create understanding and
engagement in the change work by mobilizing resources "out in the organization" that could
assist in the local efforts"
The change leaders were originally thought to travel two and two in various regions of the
geographically scattered organization. The selection process of people was very thorough, but
only internal people were being recruited. Progressive candidates that were expected to believe
in - and were able to advocate the new ideas - were sought. They were expected to motivate
and explain the new direction to the grass roots, but not from a line position. They were
educated through a series of seminars teaching and training them on the strategies of the process
ofchange.
These change agents - or intended opinion leaders - seemed, however, to create resistance, or at
least unrest in the organization. The union seemed rather neutral in the beginning, but as a
consultant said, they would not take part in the interviewing and selection "because this is not
where the fight (for the future) stands now". They said, however, that they very much would
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like to present their view on the future of the finn for the change leaders. The attitude seemed,
however, to change.
"The chairman for the most influential union called unexpectedly and said he would come to
the seminar. He had a meeting with the change leaders that belonged to his union and tried to
make them withdraw. They refused, however, on the ground that they was engaged in this as
individuals".
When the leaders started on their mission, the relationship to both the local union and local
leaders became difficult.
"The local climate got harder with confrontation between the local union representatives and the
change leaders. This also spread into harsh discussion in the whole system In their eagerness
to get started, change leaders also got into conflict with local managers. It seemed they were
considered competitors to the local union at the same time as they defended management views
in several conflict issues also considered competitors by the local managers. The change leaders
generally had more insight than they did into change plans and issues. And, in line with this,
the localleaders were not involved in discussions about how the change leaders could support
them".
The reason for the small amount of infonnation to localleaders was that top management did
not want to generate too optimistic expectations about what the change leaders could
accomplish. However, instead of helping generating resources in the new direction, these roles
seemed to lead to politicking and a waste of resources. At least, the whole arrangement was
perceived to create such a level of tension that it was stopped. The hope was that these people
would constitute a valuable resource for the company in the future, but as an arrangement it was
stopped.
ChanG leaders and the issue of anchorine
Perhaps this level of conflict and suspicion could have been avoided. Still, what happened
constitutes valuable experience for reflecting about the issue of management and line anchoring.
The change leaders represented people outside the responsible part of the organization, they
were not responsible for results like the line managers. They did not have power over the
everyday agenda of the employees like the line mangers had. Still, they had strong support
from top management. That accounts for some of the insecurity that was created; the local
leaders felt that they controlled and evaluated them and also could "tell on them".
The change leaders would, however, stilllack the opportunity to change something concretely
(work systems, information systems, evaluation criteria etc.) What they could and should do
was to "spread ideas and thereby create commitment." That, of course, could create
dissatisfaction, putting pressure on the local managers and perhaps the union, which again
accounts for their skepticism. Still, they could not directly create harmony between what they
preached and the rules after which people lived. The question would therefore probably be
whether the amount of increased information and consciousness that would or could result
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from their activities was worth the level of conflict created?
These experiences support the suggestion that the way the reframing ambitions and change
efforts are anchored in the management system constitutes an important and fruitful issue. The
overall issue seems to evolve around whether or not change and reframing should be driven
similarly or differently from other important business activities; from top management and
through the line.
Reframin& efforts and union rt(presentatiyes
What about the union? It is the other important organization of the enterprise. The role of the
union varies. It is for instance represented on the steering group in some cases but not in
others. Related to this issue, it seems relevant to note that union representatives are "leaders".
This idea was part of the thinking of many of the external consultants. Union leaders are, in a
sense, the normative leaders of the union members in issues that guided their enterprise
behaviour. Union members comply with norms and rules and to some extent share views for
the way they perceive and perform their tasks. Union leaders play an important role in how
these norms, rules and views are (re)formed.
The idea that union representatives are leaders was reflected - to different degrees - in some of
the cases. This is best illustrated by using examples from Furniture, Airline and Transport
which represent different ways of relating change projects to the union. InFurniture the union
representatives were considered by the top managers to be leaders in that two representatives
were included in the top management group alongside the line managers. They were also very
positive to the programme of changing the organizational direction, and were, in the initial
phase, seen by both the project leader as well as the CEO to be a driving force. They were
especially positive to the idea of achieving a more decentralized and flexible organization. A
project consultant said:
''The union chairman helped us inform some of the other union representatives about central
issues in 'process'. The way I have come to see it, resistance and holding back will be stronger
among the managers than among the union representatives.The chairman even suggested
himself that the top management group, together with the union representatives, should inform
the employees to make it clear that they all were behind it"
However, the consultant was skeptical to the idea that everybody stands together. He pointed
out, for instance, that the union rated the managers - except the top manager - very poorly. And
that they even considered the changes to come as an opportunity to put pressure on the union,
perhaps even get rid of some of them.
"I think it is important to realize that the union commitment and motivation are different from
that of the (motivated) managers. They agree to the ideas and plans that are presented, but I
sense that there are problems behind this where they disagree strongly with top management".
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He explained this with reference to power and interests saying more or less that the union did
not accept the management view that we are all in the "same boat", so that their commitment to
the plans and ideas should be seen as contingent In this there is, for example, a conflict of
interest between whether improvements should be to the advantage of the customer or the
employee. At one occasion it was in fact also stated explicitly that if the "process" did not mean
an improvement for the employees, then the union would withdraw its engagement
immediately.
In Airline the situation where union representatives were also considered leaders was handled
somewhat differently. This difference could reflect another idea of how to tackle the dilemma
above; they are both leaders as well as vehicles for special interests. In Airline they were not
included on the steering group, which was a strategic management group. The line managers
were therefore also left out of that group. In addition to the CEO, the steering committee was
the managing director for the largest sector, the manager responsible for development and the
one responsible for information. However, both the top line managers and the union
representatives were represented in meeting structures set up for the purpose of following up
and learning. Such meetings were also introduced locallevel, also with union representation.
The central meeting also had systematic talks with union representatives from all over the
country. This gave an opportunity to present the views and worries of the union on the present
and planned change efforts.
The project consultant, trying to reflect the management view upon the situation, said:
"The earlier polarization has been significantly reduced, feedback about goals, strategic
projects and the progress in activities has been of considerable importance for deciding on the
course of action in the project. The commitment of the union representatives is also seen as
crucial for the implementation of the new orientation. It is for them difficult both to be
'counterpart and partner'. It seems, however, justified to suggest that the participation of the
union increases the quality of the ongoing discussions also because of the representatives
having other perspectives on society than the average manager."
The union representatives, on the other hand, felt that the actual way their representation and
presence was tackled, meant being taken seriously in relation to the management function of the
company. The project leader saw disputes as having positive effects:
"Contradictions and counterforces (referring to the disputes with the union within the frame of
the change project) is a positive phenomenon. When handled right it has constituted a
constructive basis for creative thinking, new solutions and new energy to emerge."
Also, in Transport a ruling idea seemed to be that union representatives were leaders. They
were not included in the top management group, but they were included in the meeting structure
set up to accomplish change. In these meetings - the "Smiths" - the premises of the new
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direction were to be formed (although often prepared in advance). They were also for the
purpose of following up commitments as well as learning from experience. The actual
participation of the union representatives followed, however, the pattern reflected by the
quotations from the project consultant:
"The union representatives were skeptical to the whole approach to reorientation. One managed,
however, to create a more positive atmosphere, and at the end of the seminar the 'toughest'
union representative characterized the CEO in positive terms, and also said he looked forward
to working with us ..."
"In a later (separate) meeting with the union more skepticism was expressed, and they wanted
to discuss visions and goals in a larger societal perspective. The atmosphere was somewhat
more unstable and explorative, but far from warfare.
The project leader commented on a later "smith" saying that the union representatives said that
the change process did not have their support. They would not actively take part in the change
work (the seminar meetings). They said that they felt "raped" by the management and the
consultants, and they would only participate in order to be informed. This took place in parallel
with their resistance against the "change leaders" and this made the change process heavier and
more complicated.
The issue of union anchorin~
The different roles of union representatives in the projects call for reflection. Looking at Airline
we also need to look at the role of the top line managers to put that of the union representatives
in perspective, because neither the top line managers nor the union representatives were
included in the top management group. This does not necessarily mean that the project lacked
line anchoring, neither does it mean that the unions were not related to the steering of the
project. Airline was a much larger enterprise than, for example, Furniture which included the
union representatives as well as line managers. The number of line managers was so large that
it was not on the agenda to include them in the strategic management group. In this sense the
union was in the same situation as the line managers.
Furthermore, it is worth noting that the top management seemed attentive to the special situation
of the union representatives being both counterpart and partners. It would be impossible for the
union representatives not to see themselves as representatives of a special interest, even if they
took a responsible attitude to the task of shaping the future of the company. That would have
undermined their own power base and legitimacy.
The situation in Transport was different Here the union, although invited and formally
included, did not want to take part as "responsible" members. There are probably a lot of
reasons behind this, however the dominant union was basically very left-wing oriented, "anti
capitalistic" and conflict oriented with a strong leadership and, according to the consultants,
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rather passive members. In this context the CEO had on at least one occasion expressed himself
in such a way that the union could understand him as thinking there was no need for unions,
or that he wanted them replaced by some local independent union.
In additions to usual disputes over pay and pay systems, the union made concrete claims with
reference to the future strategy that was turned down - this dealt with, for example, not going
international, not actualizing a proposition of a system with employee shares, plus a number of
issues related to how the operations were structured, and so on. This can also be seen against
the background that management wanted union representatives to take on "full responsibility"
more or less in the same way as the managers. The unions did not see their input as being
given equal weight in the change process. They also probably anticipated difficulties in taking
care of the members' interests in a situation like that. In retrospect, we know that management
at a later stage did, and felt they had to, undertake a considerable reduction in manpower. This
is probably a more difficult kind situation for a union to handle if it is involved in management
loyalty.
The situations described deal with relationships between the union and the change project. The
union consists of people that are objects for the reframing intentions, and the union represents
them. We see that this issue is handled differently in different projects, and the way it is handled
seems to matter for the prospects of realizing a reframing process and for the premises of how
to handle it. An important point is that union representatives are leaders in relation to the
employees, even if their degree of power and influence vary. Consequently, they play a role in
the attitude and action the employees take in relation to change efforts. Should not the union
representatives be involved in the formation and performance of the reframing efforts thereby
giving the reframing efforts some kind of active support?
The notion of lUli.on. anchorin& seems appropriate to highlight this important issue. It refers to
the role of union in relation to managing the reframing of the organization .. Different models
are offered when management realizes this and there are also different patterns of reactions on
the part of the union. This probably reflects that balancing consensus and conflict as well as the
representative aspect is not easy.
A trivial issue?
It can seem somewhat trivial to suggest that the various aspects of management anchoring
represent an important reframing issue. We have explored organizations where the change
endeavours have been initiated by top management. They therefore have the initial ownership of
a problem or solution and need to push it forward. Furthermore, it seems somewhat self
evident that those at the top must show the direction.
The issue still emerges as a problem. In the cases here, one of the things observed is that even
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though it was the top management who initiated the project. some kind of organizational
problem evolved around the issue. Furthennore, top management related differently to change
endeavour in different organizations, and the differences seem to matter for the prospects of the
project to succeed. In other words, the matter of management anchoring does not seem to be
trivial considering the practical reality.
One reason for this could perhaps be due to the fact that managers often take a fairly
instrumental oriented view on the organizational territory. They see change as a task that can -
and even should be - delegated once having been decided on. Top management needs, they
feel, to concentrate on other matters than having a focus on change processes. Even parts of the
OD literature leaves us with the impression that change is the responsibility of the
personne1/human resource department since they are the experts in the field Most contributors
today would add that support from top management is needed in OD activities. This is argued
because political support is seen as necessary, or because symbols and signals are seen as
critical, like in the "Management by walking around" argument. Others would add - more in
line with the indications from this study - that change cannot be seen as separated from general
management responsibilities.
The point is, however, as we have seen, that this issue emerges when exploring change
projects. Therefore, it is important to suggest the various aspects of management anchoring as
a reframing issue. The different kinds of situations that brought the issue to the surface also
help explain and clarify it in a way that makes it useful. This will be explored further later in the
study.
Union anchoring can also appear as somewhat strange to bring forward as an issue. It is
perhaps taken for granted that the union has a role in change activities, like in any important
aspect of company life. What is observed, however, is that this is understood and handled in
different ways in different companies. These differences seem pretty much to evolve around
ideas about what kind of management interests, tasks and responsibilities union leaders can
and will take in reframing endeavours, and also, of course, what difficulties these ideas cause
when attempted to be practised in an actual context. The material here suggests that union
anchoring in this meaning is an important reframing issue. But there is little in the material to
suggest exactly how the issue of union anchoring should be handled.
The various aspects of anchorini reframini efforts
The notion of anchoring emerged from observations of the way top managers and union
representatives were - or were not - included in management of the change programme. This
refers both to the formal set up of the change project, which varied in the different projects, but
also the degree of active support in the performance of the management role, which so clearly
was missing in, for instance, Electric Industry.
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It seemed to matter whether or not there was an active coupling between the fonnal (basic)
management structure and the running of the project. This is also seen as applying to other top
managers at the same time as it is seen as suggesting that this is also a question of a relationship
between the "line" - the basic management organization - and the running of the project. In a
sense, the undertow here seems related to the fact that what is focused on by the line represents
a strong agenda for the daily activities of the organizational members:
Mana&ement ancborioK: Active and supportive coupling between management and the refnuning
efforts - in rational and symbolic ways
-Top manager anchoring: The top manager actively supporting the reframing efforts
-Top management anchoring: Other top managers actively supporting the reframing efforts
through;
- Line anchoring: Tight coupling between the line and the management of the reframing efforts
Union anchorio&: Active and supportive coupling between union represenlalives and the
reframing efforts
FIG. 4.1 ANCHORING OF REFRAMING EFFORTS
By suggesting this it is meant that the issue of anchoring is central in thinking, planning and
working with reframing organizations. Furthermore, there are critical choices to be made when
it comes to the anchoring of change efforts. These evolve around the questions of how to
design the management of the project and how that design relates to various leadership roles.
There is an underlying normative sUGGstion in this. The top manager seems the central (or at
least very central) person in setting the agenda for organizational activities both in the rational as
well as the symbolic sense. How can new ideas and priorities become important if he or she is
not seen as finding them important? A similar line of argument is applicable to the situation of
the line managers. They control - or are powerful agenda setters for - the everyday activities and
priorities performed to fulfil the task(s) of the enterprise. Lack of understanding and/or support
from them in a claim for pursuing a new course of action would probably serve the existing
order.
The role of the union representatives seem to be brought to the foreground for a similar reason
as in the case of management anchoring. They are also influential with respect to employee
ideas, priorities and actions, although the source of their authority is a different one. There is,
however, not the same degree of empirical support when suggesting that union anchoring is
needed or positive for the reframing efforts to succeed.
In other words, the material suggests support for the old slogan that "leaders should walk in the
front", especially in times of change. Reframing efforts should be anchored in the top
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management and also seek anchoring with the union. This implies that reframing endeavours,
at least the "main frame of the new direction" should be driven through "the line".
The old and the new
There is creation
in destruction-
and destruction in
creation!
Mana&ement and chan&, actions
The following situations deal with the relationship between the new and the old. By that is
meant an organizational direction characterized by certain tasks, standards and defmitions of the
situation, etc. Changing the organizational direction involves having new ideas ruling the
individual and collective (inter)action. These tasks, standards and defmitions must be altered.
The new ideas must be infused in organizational processes that are ruled by other - "the old" -
and established ideas. The following situations emerge around this relationship between the old
and the new. By focusing this relationship when new ideas in various ways are enacted or
enforced upon the organization, it is assumed that relevant reframing issues are revealed. This
should become clearer as three overlapping subjects around which this issue emerge:
Management signals, arenas for change efforts, and organizational elements:
SiwaJline the new direction?
The quotation below from the project leader in Car Retailer illustrates one important side of
how this project developed at that stage. It is focused on what happened in a meeting between
the top management group and the local managers. The aim of the meeting was to clarify the
strategy with an emphasis on the issue of moving towards a higher degree of customer loyalty.
A consultant report assessing the main hindrances was supposed to constitute the basis on
which the reframing efforts were to be built The project leaders said:
"Only the CEO familiarized himself with the written report. The rest had, at the most, briefly
read it. Still, he did not seem to understand the way of thinking change process.
In the fust strategy presentation to the retailers the document outlining the practical part of the
strategy was supposed to be explained step by step by the CEO. When the meeting started,
however, he handed it over to the information manager who was not very willing to explain the
content of - and premises for - the strategies. It all ended with the document being handed out
without any kind of discussion. In a meeting the local managers held between them shortly
after, they reacted quite sharply to this behaviour and attitude".
The top management group referred to here had been established as a result of an organization
assessment performed by the external consultants. The top management group had been
considered to be too numerous. In retrospect, the project leader thought that the new group
was constituted by selecting the most "central boxes" from the organizational chart. More time
and more effort should have been invested in assessing functions and people, because the
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existing group did not consist of people of sufficient understanding and competence for the
task of changing the organization. One of the indicators for this judgement seemed to be the
observation that after some time the group thought too much time was spent on long-term
issues. They didn't have time, for example, for meetings on these kind of issues. The project
leader commented:
"The managers continued to work exactly the way they did before. We have, for example, been
asked to extend the "coaching" to the evenings, because they have too much work to do at day
time. This is of course understandable, because neither did they seem to have increased the
degree of delegation in order to be able to change their priorities."
He goes on commenting on the degree of focus on the new direction:
"It is a problem that management in a sense runs a process in addition to the planned one,
without seeing how what they do relates to these efforts. This seems connected to the fact that
the culture is very 'activity' oriented - the more (new) activities the better. So, at the same time
as they think too much time is spent on development work, we must hold back on their
tendency to implement a lot of short-term oriented activities aimed at improving the functioning
of the organization".
The project leader based these kinds of problems on the general attitude among the (top)
managers, and said that this was reflected in the focus of meetings on change issues and
problems. It is revealed through what was focused on as well as what was not focused on:
Information meetings (chaired by the top manger) were much more sales than service oriented
and the customer relation issue did not seem to get more space on the agenda or more force in
the organization. This was also reflected in the fact that at the same time as the internal
message was supposed to put forward the focus on long-term customer loyalty, intense and
high profile national, hard selling advertising campaigns were being carried out
The problem of giving space on the agenda for the issue that was supposed to be developed as
the future focus - customer relations and customer loyalty - is reflected in the following
example. A bit more than half a year after the project had started, a new model car was
introduced in a major European city. Sending people there was expensive, but there was a
tradition for sending a lot of sales people to travel as reward or bonus for good performance.
The project leader said:
"There was no moderation; lobster, the best meat, cabaret shows, champagne were central
ingredients in these gatherings. In addition you found pep talks, people embracing each other
and expressing that they were longing for the past. The service people carry the burden of these
difficult times. The sales people stare at the wall, whereas people work hard in the service and
parts department ....support the long tenn relationship with the customers, and ask themselves
whether the firms should not rather have bought decent tools rather than spent money on
sending the sales people to such events".
Old habits and old tracks were followed by the management of the organization. This was so in
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spite of the espoused will to reframe the organization based on analytical considerations of the
firm's situation, and in spite of this having been communicated to the organization. The
organizational members, however, were also confronted with the fact that their managers, to a
strong degree, followed the old tracks.
This is an issue that can be seen in Furniture, although the situation was somewhat different. A
considerable number of key personnel took part in a series of consciousness raising and
commitment seeking seminars. They were chaired by the top manager who was seen by the
consultants as
" ...a driving force who not only demonstrated commitment for the new ideas and change
models, but who also processed and transformed them in a way that made them clearly appear
as his own." He was seen as demonstrating "a high degree of commitment to ideas as well as
efforts towards implementation".
They saw him as a person perceived as having a high degree of integrity and were therefore
very optimistic to the development of the project The commitment among the rest of the
management group was seen as more unclear. However, the new ideas met no resistance.
"Commitment seminars" for leaders and key personnel were carried out for those that had not
been present at the first series of seminars. According to the project leader, they were seen as:
" ...gaining good response and the ideas presented were winning support among the
participants. The managers giving presentations and leading sessions were also seen as giving
a good performance".
The next change activity was a "kick off" day planned by the marketing people, signalling to
the organization that something big was about to take place. An amusing, but still to the point,
brochure had been distributed, picturing the typical company man in the new firm. The punch
clock for the workers had been removed when the workers arrived in the morning and their
reactions were filmed for use in the internal marketing. A few weeks later, the first "training"
seminar (learning and following up) was done for the top management group. Among other
things, they reported on local progress (e.g. training and job rotation). According to the
project leader:
''The reporting showed that the different managers had not done much of what they should in
this area, which gave the group the impression that they were not getting any further."
One of the actions taken was to arrange a series of seminars for department leaders,
developing local quality goals. This was also done in response to an anticipated need to do
something "concrete", and it was done to raise the consciousness about reframing needs and
issues also at the grass-mot's level. The feedback was that the seminar offered "practical,
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simple, fruitful and necessary tools." With this as a background the various departments started
the task of developing local goals (LOD). The project leader tried to keep track of the
development
"It seems to work, the reception of this is positive, although it is met with same skepticism.
There are comments like: Will this make any difference? It looks like "quality circles" and there
never came anything out of that."
Another example was people saying they would have problems complying with the deadline
because of a lot of overtime. A few weeks later the project leader stated in an interview that "the
LOD work has broken down."
In parallel with the LOD sub project, a serious drop in the market was experienced. At the
same time it was discovered that the management information system on economic status was
very bad, revealing the the situation was even worse than believed. The top manager (who at
that time had become top manager at HQ concern) demanded cost reductions and intensified
marketing efforts. The project leader said:
"He jumped behind the wheel and screamed: Cost reductions! Get out in the market and get
orders! Ensure the result! Every month he called the various managers to his office and
examined them forcefully on activities and results in this area. I am afraid a division has been
created between development efforts at the business side and the culture side; between cost
reductions and ensuring results on the one hand and quality development, training, rotation and
tearn organization at the other".
He therefore took steps to
"increase the frequency of the training seminars to once a month. This was to create a stronger
focus on the organizational development efforts and to balance them in relation to the following
upward economic results. We also think the name of the seminars should change from
"training" to reporting on results."
However, although the experiences with the LOD effort varied, somehow it "died", especially
in the production departments. The project leader saw this as being related to bad timing, but
also because:
"the top manager now was perceived only to be concerned with short-term economic results,
although he earlier on had said that it should not happen that short-term economic
considerations should come before a long term-priority. He exerted pressure on the area
managers who stressed the various unit leaders, and so on. How is it possible to endure
homogeneous management signals when the enterprise is under considerable strain?"
The project leader became critical about the approach that had been followed and raised the
question whether reorientation rather should be pursued through concrete operational projects
that related to short-time solvable problems.
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The issue of mana&ement intemtion
In the examples from the change efforts of Car Retailer and Furniture presented above, we
observed that top management gave the members of the organization conflicting signals.
Sometimes they communicated the new but then sometimes the old direction. What are the
signals from the top management? The members of the organization experienced a lack of
coherence. It must have been hard for the members of the organization to know what was
really expected of them, what it was that counted at the end of the day. Was it the espoused
(and often unclear) new values and goals or was it performing their everyday tasks - perhaps
harder and better? This illustrates that there is rich potential for mixed management messages as
one kind of lack of coherent direction given in change processes. Therefore, the term (lack of)
maoa&ement intemtion can be used to coin this phenomenon appearing in change efforts
We find conflicting or mixed management signals in different forms. The most obvious is
perhaps when managers say one thing and do another. Like, for instance, in Car Retailer when
saying that long term customer relations is what is be emphasized, while at the same time in
other ways and by other means emphasizing and honouring the short-term sale aspect. Like,
for instance, in Furniture when the top managers in many ways pursue long-term
improvements, but at the end of they day it is short term economic results that is followed up
most forcefully. Or, the more general observation that top managers espouse delegation but
exert control both by examining the subordinates decisions and/or by making decisions that
interfere in their possibilities for creating the results for which they are responsible.
Some of the examples given in last section on "anchoring" also have some relevance here.
Recall once again the example with the top manager of Electric Industty who abdicated from
the change work. He expected the external consultant, the project leader for the change process
- with the help of an internal project manager - and the steering committee to be responsible for
that This attitude also manifested itself in the original set up of the project, the steering group
consisted of two line managers (but not .tm: top manager), two union representatives, one
personnel consultant, and a project leader (external consultant). The steering committee did not
accomplish anything except some formal planning that never got beyond that stage. Criticism
of the top managers role in relation to the change project also came to the surface in and around
a change seminar. The other top managers as well as middle managers were confused about
"what to do". They felt it necessary to include the top manager in the steering committee to
establish conditions for creating clarity
This observatoion helped moved the focus to the assumtion that lack of mangement integration
can be created by different managers in the management group demanding different things from
the members of the organization. Sometimes they do see this is the case, sometimes they don't,
but the effect can be the same. The top manager in Furniture seemed for example to forward the
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new ideas with a lot of enthusiasm, whereas there were indications that some of the managers
at the level below did not follow this up at all in their departments.
In other words, the degree of management integration is related to the consistency of 1hc. .si.n.&k
manaeer as well as the consistency between different manaGfS. Such situations are probably
created by power garnes, lack of common understanding, lack of competence due to personal
or cultural factors, ete. In any case, lack of integration means that there is not a consistent
management message pointing out a new direction.
Arenas for chaoit' efforts
The idea that others than the top manager can be responsible for change endeavours is found in
other examples. The Human Relation manager in Transport play, for instance, a central part in
setting up the project in collaboration with the consultancy firm involved. At one instance - one
large meeting - he showed the meaning of this in a "living" metaphor by carrying the transport
manager on his shoulders. The other managers had no significant part in the planning, nor
carrying through of, the different activities of the change efforts. It was within this frame of
understanding that the concept of change leaders for spreading "the gospel of change"
emerged.
In the section on anchoring, the top manger of Transport in the middle of a seminar session
"understood" that something was wrong. He decided to take the responsibility for the change
efforts himself to demonstrate that it was "his project", which he at that time thought necessary
both to create commitment and to lay down rational premises.
In addition to taking the chair in that particular seminar, he also got heavily involved in the
planning and carrying through of change efforts thereafter. In fact his involvement resulted in a
changed understanding of these change seminars. Instead of separating the focus on
respectively change issues and issues related to the running of the business, the issues were
tighter knit together in the sarne arena It became the arena for laying down premises and
following up change as well ''business''. They were no longer seen or treated as separate types
of issues. It developed, as the project leader phrased it, towards what was seen as "a new form
of budgeting process".
"All important decisions were to be taken at these kinds of meetings, and thereby the decision
processes also became easier to grasp and were more consistent. Making money and carrying
through change were not seen as separate activities."
The problem of separation of change issues from business related ones was also observed at
Furniture. "The development efforts are at the side line" was an expression used by the project
leader to illustrate what happened. He also found that "change work is heavy and that there is a
lack of driving force in the implementation efforts". This can be understood concretely, the
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change efforts took place in an arena apart from the everyday life of the organization, as well as
abstractly meaning that they did not influence the agenda for how the members of the
organization performed. He meant both.
As we remember, the change efforts were focused on a series of change seminars, followed by
"training seminars" that were supposed to follow up the change ambition agreed upon by the
top managers. Notice two things. First, unexpected problems made the top manager press very
hard for economic and market results. This was not done in the training sessions where change
was still emphasized. The top manager had individual meetings with the different managers for
the purpose of following up profit and market share development. Second, very little seemed
to happen in the area of efforts to support the change. At least the managers could not report
much progress. And the attempts to develop local and concrete goals reflecting the reorientation
ambition got stuck in a large part of the organization.
The project leader reflected on the new division manager being frustrated over all the projects,
plans, dead lines, etc. in which he could see no clear connection and coherence:
''This reaction is probably not only being caused by him being new in the job". Commenting
on this issue he looks back. "Stressing quality for the customer was a natural consequence of
Furniture's business idea, with the consequent need for quality in and between the members of
the organization and in the leadership. Culture and leadership were therefore defined as the
most important strategic issues in the nineties. Then comes "Black Monday" and a drop in the
market - also for Furniture. Related to last year the turnover (in x month) was reduced by SO
%....There is now a pressure for cost reductions and ensuring results ... I am afraid a division
has been created between development efforts at the business side and the culture side;
between cost reductions and ensuring results on the one hand and quality development,
training, rotation and team organization at the other".
What is observed is the organizational difficulties in dealing with the new in a way that it is not
pushed aside by a more concrete focus on the established business activities. An episode from
Money Market illustrates the point from a somewhat different angle. Here the managers were
at one time paid extra for taking part in change preparation activities. The project consultant
said about this that
"There was no tradition for personnel management in the company. What counted was to be
best at the dealing table. Many experienced therefore the change process to be without
importance. I think the management reinforced this attitude by paying NOK 1()()()()as bonus
for participating in the management seminar focusing change".
(There was no tradition for paying overtime in this organization).
The issues of inteWUin& chan&e efforts
There is an important point here related to the issue of how the "new" tasks are perceived by
organization members, and how that issue is related to how change efforts are organized and
carried through. What are the arenas for explaining new tasks and priorities and making their
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importance clear, and how is this related to the ongoing organizationallife? New ideas, tasks,
priorities ete. have to be integrated into the life of the organization in order to become real in
their consequences, if new ideas are to become realized. In Furniture, for example, there was a
tendency for the change effort(s) in a sense was to lead a life ofits own at "the side line of' the
organizational life related to operating the business. Wheras Transport switched from such a
situation to a situation where the arenas were integrated.
The problem indicated by these examples is that activities concerned with change very often are
perceived to be perhaps important but irrelevant, that they are not "what really counts". The
"here and now" activities constitute more concrete pressures. It is according to the established
agenda and through the established fonnal - and informal - structures that people are
continuously evaluated and visibly and invisibly rewarded and punished. It is not according to
how well and when they perform at the change arena. In a way it is Gresham's law at work.
The battle between the old and the new raises the issue of the integrations of the two arenas, or
rather intemtion Qf refrarnine efforts in organizational processes. That would mean that doing
new things and things in new and intended ways would count. The greater the lack of such
integration, the less convincing it is for the organizational members that the new and intended
direction is the one that counts.
Chan" and the complexity ofor&auizations
Apart from anchoring and this kind of integration there are other aspects of the organization that
seem to bear heavily upon how change effort are and can be received. Looking at the situation
in Car Retailer we become aware of another issue. Car Retailer wanted to develop closer
relations with the customers. The aim was customer loyalty, to now focus on the second sale
rather than the first and the customer should experience attentiveness and quality also after the
purchase, feeling that he or she was taken care of in a for them uncomplicated and efficient
way. This meant changed work roles for sales as well as technical/service people. The
reflections of a project consultant illustrate this:
"The reason for the weak service orientation among the sales persons (as indicated by a
survey) is probably related to the pattern of recruitment to these positions. However, there are
organizational conditions that probably reinforce this. The largest proportion of their salary is
for example related to number of sales. This is forwarding a short-term and individual network
oriented service attitude. The development of goals is prognostic. It is not seen as an
opportunity to involve the sales force in planning of service and marketing activities as a
precondition for a good long term sale". He goes on commenting on the following up
mechanisms of the organization: ''The salesforce experience strong goal orientation (indicated
by a survey). However, the area manager is following the sales manager from week to week
focusing almost entirely on number of sales ...using a high proportion of their time and energy
on such pushing of cars."
In addition to this, the sales force did not seem to have sufficient system support for following
up or getting information about customers and customer groups. Additionally there was a sharp
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organizational division (from the top to the bottom) between the sales part of the organization
and the service part of the organization. The service people at the shop floor level never met or
were in any way confronted with their customers.
''There seems to be a general agreement that this part of the organization is crucial for customer
loyalty, but nobody (referring to management) is willing really to follow it up. The pay
systems vary, but do not seem to influence the speed of work, but rather the distribution of the
jobs that give a bonus. At the same time a feed back of quality complaints to the "responsible
person" is seldom practiced. The overall signal seems to be that management priority is speed.
Inmy opinion this reinforces the effect of having customer contact as a separate function".
This is another quotation that reflects the problem that an organization is a complex historical
product In this case we see that systems as sediments of past priorities reinforce the "old"
orientation, or at least must be seen as barriers to realizing the new and intended.
Another aspect of the situation can be found in Airline where the pay system appears as a
crucial factor for the chances of reorienting the organization. For the purpose of improving
customer service and for the purpose of utilizing resources in a more efficient way, the idea
was to implement multifunctional work units (teams). People within these groups were to have
joint responsibility for a set of tasks. They were therefore to rotate between the tasks dependent
on where resources were needed. The needs could, of course, fluctuate as different tasks had
different cycles and also because of unforeseen rushes. This was to be developed for example
within the various sales units: Historically different functions were grouped around different
jobs like, for example, answering general phone calls, facing customers at the counter,
handling special requests, making out the tickets, and so forth. Such functions were to become
ajoint responsibility, eventually grouped around customer groups. Similar changes were to be
made in other parts of the organization between such functions as checking in passengers,
giving information, guiding passengers at the gate and perhaps (but not likely) handling the
luggage ete. There were some obvious restrictions to these plans: Some of them had to do with
a need for competence - sometimes combined with safety problems - that made it unlikely that a
lot of employees could be expected to include the necessary exams, certificates, ete. in their
repertoire of possible tasks to take on.
Another problem was pointed out by the project leader:
"There are several unions in the company which have their own wage agreements ....The
implementation of an efficient team structure is necessary to 'move across' the borderlines
created by these agreements. To do so, negotiations and new agreements are needed, and the
establishment of such a new organizational structure is not within the straight forward
management rights of the company and becomes increasingly difficult when the negotiations
are being handled outside the division, and/or are related to national union interests ...all groups
and types ofpositions must be renegotiated".
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One of the union representatives explained this by pointing out two particular groups of
employees that could be integrated in the same "team". ''They have different salaries, and the
group with the highest salary will not accept less pay by (partly) doing different tasks than
today. The company will not like to pay those earning the least salary more for rotating the
other way".
Although such problems are caused by changing the formally accepted principles for the
organizational structure, this does not necessarily mean that people have difficulties in seeing
the logic behind the new thinking. One of the project consultants said:
''There are considerable local variations where the informal divisions go. Locally there might
be considerable rotation between jobs within the same sector of wage agreement, sometimes (in
periods of stress) also across such border lines".
When it came to formally laying down new principles we see several levels of the problem
reflected in the examples mentioned. First, the pay and career systems need to be rethought
The single most important issue to change in this context is that these systems have to honour
breadth (joint responsibility orientation) rather than depth (function orientation). Second, this
indicates that the agreements between the different unions (in this case two major ones were
involved) and the company about the premises on which they build must be renegotiated. This
places the possibility for solution outside the organization. Third, and to complicate the matter
further, the present situation is cemented also by the fact that some of the groups involved have
members in different unions. All this could call for coordination and negotiations also between
unions, which again could face problems of prestige and legitimacy.
InTransport there were also problems with patterns of problem solving created in the past An
essential element in the reorientation process was to offer guaranteed transport services. In
essence that meant that if the customer delivers the goods before a certain time one day, it is
guaranteed to arrive for example at noon on day two. If it does not, the customer pays nothing.
A lot of established work patterns and systems at the terminals would make such an
arrangement difficult.
One of the project consultants commented on this:
"As an example we can take the routines related to the unloading of goods. Traditionally goods
were received and unloaded all day. They were now forced to work more variable hours since
all goods arrived at one particular time of the day (depending upon the geographicallocation).
That causes peak periods. Furthermore, the procedure around the checking of goods against
the papers (bills) had to be changed. 3-4 people used to work with that, a time consuming task
that often became a bottleneck in production process. This procedure has now been completely
eliminated. It has to be right the first time. "
He also drew attention to the pressure that emerged for work pattern and tools (technology) that
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supported the new product (service):
"This (Guaranteed delivery) demands a different and frequent communication between the
drivers, terminal workers and the office to keep track over where the various shippings are.
By car phone it is continuously checked whether they are on schedule or not, and what
measures, if any, have to be taken to be able to meet the guarantee. The communication also
had to be improved between the terminals, and they get for example immediate feedback by fax
if goods have been sent to the wrong place. In some places a system has been implemented that
gives the workers responsibility for certain particular destinations. Both the drivers and the
workers express a feeling of "ownership" following from this system, which again helps
fulfill the guarantee."
The issue of intemtion of orianizational elements
These examples are indications of the complexity of organizational reframing; in a way changes
call for changes. Organizations are complex, historic products and can be described as being
constituted by various types of elements, like organizational culture, organizational structure
and systems, ete. These different elements and their relationships have developed over time,
and as a result of the problems the organization has had to cope with. So have the pays systems
at Airline and so have the unloading routines at Transport.
Different kinds of organizational elements naturally have bearings on organizational action. It
was, for example, indicated by the examples that the established communication patterns at
Transport and the reward systems at Airline had to be changed if new organizational ideas
should become realized. The existing structure might not be consonant with the ideas for
authority and responsibility reflected in the new direction. It is a question of different elements
of the organization speaking the same or different "languages" related to the issue of following
up the new and intended or not
We suggest conceptualizing this issue as the intemtion .of Ol'&i'"izationalelements in reframing
efforts. The greater the lack of such integration, the less bearings seem to be brought upon the
organizational members to reorient their thinking and actions. New ideas and new actions can
be rejected because old elements of the organization underpins the old ideas.
Summini up: Consistency and intemtion ofreframioi efforts
Reframing deals with infusing the new in the old Although the old in various ways opposes
and contrasts the new, the new still has to be implanted in established and ongoing social
processes. To say it bluntly this cannot be achieved without taking action. Actions are the
means for making people grasp and enact ideas that are new and different for them. By actions,
however, we mean talk as well as other kinds of action. New ideas are implanted in
organizational processes by taking actions. Looking at it this way several problems seem to
evolve. They evolve around the issue of the way the relationship between these new actions
and the established patterns of handled. Problems have been identified related to how the
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managers tackle this, to the characteristics of the arenas where the new is pursued, and to what
is done with how old organizational features relates to the new ideas:
Issues on refratpin& intemtion
Manuement inremQon: Deals with the relationship between the managers' actions and
the intended ideas. Is there consistency between
-what managers say and do?
- what they say and do in different context?
- what different managers say and do?
Intemtion of chaoG efforts: Deals with the relationship between the change actions and
the existing organizational context Is there consistency between
- the reframing message in the various reframing arenas and
- the message received in the everydayorganizational situations ?
InreWUioo of "rqanilJlrimal elements": Deals with the relationship between the various
elements and the new ideas. Is there consistency between
-the new ideas and
- the ideas embedded inorganizational elements bearing on organizational
{inter)action?
FIG. 4.2 ISSUES ON REFRAMING INTEGRATION
One thing is being able to define and implement actions that forward the new direction at all.
The problem we spotted was even when doing so it seemed that managers had a problem.
Mangagers of Car Retailer and Furniture said, for instance something, but communicated other
messages through actions. Or they communicated the new ideas only in some settings. In
others they kept on sending the messages which reflected established patterns. There were also
indications that different managers in the top management group were seen as sending different
messages about the importance of following up new ideas. Management integration, or lack of
management integration, was seen as a good label on this problem in reframing endeavours.
Another aspect of the problem is what we observed in Transport, Furniture and to some extent
Money Market There seemed to be a division in the conception of responsibility for pursuing
going concern and pursuing change respectively. At least these kind of tasks were tackled as
different and had in a sense separate arenas. In the beginning the Human Resource Manager
was responsible for pursuing change in the change seminars at Transport This became visible
as a problem because the top manager sensed it did not make people feel the responsibility. In
Furniture this kind of division was even reflected in the label "training seminars". What was
pursued in the other arenas did not communicate the change message. Integration or lack of
integration of reframing efforts was seen as an appropriate label for this problem in reframing
endeavours.
Finally, we face the problem that we confront a complex and established system. The various
elements have emerged or been constructed to meet problems, fulfill values, etc. of the past and
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will therefore not necessarily support what is pursued in the reframing endeavour. The reward
systems at Airline were not fit for multifunctional teams. The communication systems and
unloading routines at Transport were not fit for guaranteed delivery. Integration or lack of
integration of organizational elements was seen as an appropriate label for this problem in
reframing endeavours.
Formation and learning of new solutions
Executives can control the rules of relevance; but the rules
of ilrelevance - the paradigm as it is tacitly used- are not so
amenable to managerial control.(Kuhn 1962:376);
Just as jealous husbands are the last to know of their wives'
romances. so authoritarian leaders often learn of plots and
punches only when it is too late.
All the change projects observed are, in principle, run after a top-down concept. In spite of this
basic similarity, critical differences can be observed between the change projects with respect to
how these top down efforts were performed. How much for instance, was decided centrally
and in what ways were solutions found? Different patterns concerning how the new ideas
were exposed, concretized and imposed on the members of the organization are also revealed
by examining some glimpses from four of the organizations. They are presented before
discussing the conceptual implications.
Participant problem assessmem and solution fOnnulation in Money Maricet
The project in Money Market had been going on for about a year with "Kick off" seminars
being held, management coaching carried through, and goals developed for the organization.
The efforts did not seem, however, to gain a foothold An important factor could be unclear
expectations. Management seemed to have "bought an improvement process" aimed at making
them more achievement oriented
The external consultants played a very heavy part in the change work being carried out by
planning and chairing the meetings and seminars. What was said about one of the seminars can
serve as an example to illustrate their participation:
"The change seminar was based on more material being presented by consultants than was
usual at these sorts of meetings. The top management group was involved very little in the
planning, and it was the consultants who controlled the content and actual design of the
seminar". .
One important aim of the seminar in question was to give some input on the subject of
management and organization as there was seen to be a need for doing that. Also, when it came
to the top management group, one of the consultants said about this particular seminar :
92
"We were deadly scared that management should open their mouth and spoil the whole thing."
This attitude constituted an important part of the reasons for it beeing the consultants rather than
the management that defined the agenda.
At one stage it became clear that new life had to be brought into the change project. The
manifest reason for this was general mistrust between the project leader and one of the
important managers. A new project leader took over, and he managed to bring the project to a
"turning point" in a seminar that, in away, started the renewed process.
"We managed to bring the situation to a"tuming point" at the meeting where everybody took
part by taking a high risk and investing all our forces in one chance. We succeeded in my
opinion because of the simple fact that we introduced and integrated all the budgeting work into
the seminar and the process. We therefore became unpleasantly concrete and placed ourselves
in the midst of the nerve system of the organization."
The project leader thinks this contributed strongly to establishing the project, and it also
established confidence with the new manager. After this, several activities were carried out -
theory oriented and consciousness raising seminars for employees with leadership
responsibilities, improving the information policy, revealing extremely poor MIS
(management information systems) by trying to go through a process of breaking down the
goals of the organization, ete. However, it was seen as urgent to rethink the form of
organization. This brings us to another critical observation about the way the rethinking of the
organization was carried through. The project leader said:
"The work put into organizing the bank as a team was carried through in a more forceful way
than we thought at first. We have "driven" the organization through a destabilizing process
called ''p 40", where the management forcefully have communicated that costs must be reduced
by 40 %, whereas the income must remain at the same level or be increased. To make this
possible it was necessary to rethink the way the enterprise was organized. Fortunately, many
members of the organization picked up this challenge, and a process was developed where the
unions were invited to assess the problem and suggest alternative forms of organizations. This
process was run by the management and the trade union in cooperation, and it resulted in two
alternative ways of "team organizing" the enterprise. These models are extremely exciting."
These solutions were also considered very interesting by the management. Those involved had
gained considerable insight into the situation of the company as well as an understanding of
problematic issues and challenges, and the employees had "ownership" of the new solutions. It
was not a new ready-made work structure enforced upon them, or, to use the words of the
project leader:
''The work carried through in connection with the suggested models for "team organizing" has
resulted in a considerable amount of learning. First, we have established quite another (self)
understanding in the organization. We have, among other things, used questionnaires. The
organization is now relating to its real problems. The work involved designing the two team
concepts has also resulted in a larger proportion of the employees being committed".
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The way this process was handled in terms of involvement is somewhat in contrast to the
situation at Airline.
Centrally fOnned solutions in Airline
The fust thing that was done to revitalize the reframing efforts in Airline was to establish a
strategic management group. This was partly an answer to a fairly complicated and rather
ambiguous situation that the top management of the company discerned. The strategic
mangement group was, however, also supposed to constitute the steering group for the change
project Their arena for change efforts was primarily the learning and following up forum
(FUAL) that included the strategic management group, important staff people and all the local
(area) managers. This was the arena for following up results as well as for initiating new
activities and new ambitions. A major tool for accomplishing change was considered to be a
process of breaking down goals; a long-term ambition was to do this all the way down to their
team and individualleveis. A project consultant's report shows that it would
"I. Make the organization draw in the same direction because of a common understanding,
and it also would constitute an effective means of communications across the levels. 2.
Represent a structural pressure necessary to identify the organization as a whole. 3. Represent
a democratic element allowing for the management of one's own situation and 4. Constitute a
driving force for the allocation ofresources."
The process was planned to gradually cover deeper levels of the organization in some kind of
cascade effect The strategic management group took the responsibility for defining economic
and market goals with what the single unit (area) should contribute. According to the project
consultant:
''This has been going on for a long time in fact, all autum. At the FUAL meeting in November
the local managers presented their results, plans and experiences with the process. I refer from
the meeting: A general impression was that the process by and large had worked in a positive
way and created: openness/commitment in the the development of ideas, broad participation in
problemsolving are, increased understanding for the enterprise as a whole, "cost
consciousness", motivation for action, a tool for management and control. However, the
efforts in this process have also revealed that it is sometimes difficult to formulate
understandable values and goals, it is not always easy to gain acceptance and understanding,
and there is not always enough power base at their middle manager level."
The consultant pointed out that it was quite clear that the process had not reached deep enough
and efforts had to be put into this issue before the next meeting.
The following up was based on these goals, and the process of doing that was quite tough, and
was felt as rather authoritarian. "Terror management" is a phrase that was used by one of the
local managers in a later follow up interview. His view that the process became more learning
and exploring oriented and less of an inquisition as the local managers, in the eyes of the top,
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fulfilled the expectations of working more systematically and goal oriented, seemed fairly
common.
The goal-oriented way of approaching problems of change seemed to set a standard, For
example costs were to be reduced because of a drop in the market and the contribution of the
single unit was set and followed up on this basis, leaving some discretion as to how this was
achieved, for instance, costs eg.ua.lin~a certain number of jobs, etc. The problems identified in
the November FUAL meeting mentioned above, could, however, have been fairly widespread
as a number of interviews one and a half years later indicated.
"It is quite uncertain how widespread the development of lower level goals is, or if it is only
common in the sales organization. This is especially the case when it comes to other types of
goals (organizational, process). It is a reasonable assumption that considerable local variation
exists, this again being connected to such issues as a difference in managers, the degree of
local development in the area ofteams, local FUAL, etc."
Organizational changes were introduced more or less after this model. The strategic
management group found that a team-oriented (multifunctional work units) organization should
be implemented. The schedules were presented for commitment at the central FUAL (follow
up and learning) seminar. The project leader said that:
"At the same meeting there was a presentation about 'why a team', what it is, and also there
was a discussion of the experiences gained by the management of ER (a special department),
in addition to the experiences made by a local unit in preparing for implementation of teams.
Based on these inputs, a plan was formed that should serve as a guideline for the preparations
to be undertaken by the strategic management group as well as the local managers before the
team seminars were carried through in all regions. An important point was the information that
should be given to all employees. The local managers were responsible for that."
Team seminars were carried out mostlyas extended management meetings (20-25 participants)
sometimes for all the employees. Most of the input was given by external consultants that,
however, knew the organization very well. The progress was frequently discussed by the
strategic management group.
The seminars seemed "to work more or less quite well," There was some general (union)
resistance to the team idea due to, for example, the relationship to the pay system, and a
process was started to handle that. The seminars were also met with some skepticism probably
because of several reasons. The project leader pointed out several :
"The team idea was introduced right after an extensive cost reduction and the employees .
therefore perceived the project as primarily to be intended to save costs. Second, quite a few
employees had the understanding of always having worked in 'teams' and considered that they
had nothing to learn. Third, there was a general impression that new projects were constantly
started without old ones having been terminated and evaluated."
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Gradually he also came to see transfer of competence as an essential problem:
"What we discovered and did not pay enough attention to in the beginning, is that there was a
need for close follow up and transfer of competence at this stage."
All in all, this led to the project leader having to travel around and teach, involving himself in
finding general and local solutions to problems that arose, a process that proved to take more
time than anticipated. The project leader said about the progress in implementing teams:
"Especially because of the complexity in establishing new structures and the accompanying
lack of competence, the establishment of teams in the organization has taken more time than the
time limit given in advance."
He then pointed out that this was not surprising; such processes are so complex that they have
to take time. But he also pointed out that "tempo" seems to matter when it comes to the breed of
counterforces:
"In some places where they had not gotten very far it was quite clear that the interest was
decreasing. It was far too easy to make propositions that in reality were identical with the old
departmentmodel."
It must be noted here that the process took even much more time than he estimated at this stage.
More work had to be done in the area of informing and transferring competence, and more
local variation emerged than was planned.
In the Money Market and Airline cases different approaches can be seen regarding who is given
the initiative at what stage in the change process, and also in what way the premises of the
central and locallevel are allowed to influence the change process. There are also differences
as to the way the members of the organization are meant to learn and use the ideas for the new
direction. Before trying to conceptualize these different approaches, we should also picture
how this is done at Furniture.
"Ieachin&" the new direction in Furniture
There was a tendency in Furniture to focuse the change efforts on a, in a way, separate change
arena. There was, for example, a series of two (2·2) seminars for those considered to be the
power base, including union representatives. These seminars focused general and local change
issues and were supposed to constitute a "preparation phase". The top managers chaired but
several consultants contributed actively. The top manager and the project leader were so
satisfied with the consciousness raising effect and so convinced that it was crucial to prepare
well and secure commitment for implementation, that they planned and carried through a third
one:
"Paul (the top manager) considered the consciousness raising that was created in the seminars
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so important that he wanted to extend them with a step three, rather than to slur over important
issues. The aim of this step was to create understanding for the consequences of new goals and
ideas for management and organization of the enterprise, to create insight into the coming
course of the project, and to map strategic issues for developing and designing a program of
concrete actions to be taken in the months to come".
These activities turned out to be more of the same: Commitment seminars for the rest of the
managers, union representatives, etc.; "kick offs" symbolizing and informing about "the new";
seminars to train foremen and local leaders in how to develop quality goals and standards
(creative techniques) etc. Also intended was to start the development of such goals, local
training, job rotation, and team organizing. The seminars were seen to:
"be a tool that also could be used in adjusting the use of resources, but where the pedagogy
also could be used to create acceptance and involvement, which traditionally is a problem in
this kind of work".
They were also, in a sense, intended to "reproduce" the process the others already had been
through: Communicate the need for change and its direction, what ideas should rule, etc. These
seminars, as with the seminars for managers and key personnel, were well received and "went
well". They were, however, met with some skepticism: "We have done such things before,
does it matter? Will something happen, or will the ideas just vanish"? Furthermore, the
concrete work with developing goals was only carried through for half the company, and very
little of it had any impact in practical terms. Neither were the other concrete activities given
much attention, as we have seen in previous sections. The following seems to be rather
illustrative of what the project leader observed:
"Not much had really happened before the first meeting (seminar). Peter had done "nothing at
all". He had, however worked very hard with other tasks. For Fred and Adrian it was difficult
to see if anything was done. In lans case, however, there seemed to be some action, whereas
the trainers did as agreed upon. This could be typical for the situation that constantly will
emerge. Things that are more 'important' than the strategic program pop up ...it will be difficult
to break old habits".
The change activities were not pursued as presupposed. This could be seen as related to
established thinking:
"Perhaps a tougher attitude is necessary to make people do their homework. In this enterprise it
seems to be a widespread syndrome that things do not have consequences, so it is not that
dangerous not to do your homework".
The lack of emphasis on the new can also be seen in connection with the fact that a market drop
took place in this period. The activity that followed from trying to cope with that in practical
terms squeezed other kind of activities aside. However, the approach has emphasized
"teaching", in a classroom fashion, the organizational members which way to go. The idea
seemed in a way to be that they should "go out and do it" themselves, which of course also left
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discretion as to how one should do it. At least there was no significant pressure on doing
things in distinct and new ways. This was very different at Transport. especially for the shop
floor workers, but also for the managers.
Enforced emaiences at TranSWU
The change program had several essential components in this enterprise. Change seminars
involving key personnel - consciousness raising and concept teaching sessions aiming at
preparation and commitment - played, as indicated earlier, a central role early on in the
change work. These seminars were in the beginning driven by staff and external consultants,
but the top manager changed the character of the seminars by "taking over" and also making
them more "business oriented". Mter some time, they were also integrated in the plan and
budgeting work cycle. Or the other way around, change work was integrated in the running
of the business, and it ran from making strategic choices and priorities through different
phases of planning to resource allocations of the budgeting process and then implementing
through following up what was agreed upon. The project leader said:
''The plan/budgeting process is a systematic integration of business and culture. The aims of
this process are multiple: To obtain a systematic approach to change, to commit managers to
critical policy decisions, to make managers more market and decision oriented, to motivate,
and to strengthen them as leaders."
This take us to the changes in the management structure and practice undertaken to support the
reframing process. Several structural measures were taken. The infrastrucutre of the enterprise
was rationalized considerably. The number of terminals was reduced considerably making the
management structure simpler. This was reflected and supported at HQ where the hierarchy
was made less steep, and an extensive exchange of managers also took place. The top
management group was reduced from five to two, with five regional managers reporting to
them. Coaching of managers was done at HQ as well as at the locallevel.
The form of management seemed to change. A project consultant characterized the "old
culture":
" ...or lacking or unclear goals, there is no point in following them up. When taking part in
making a decision, he is quite secure that it will not be put into practice, and in a few months it
will be forgotten."
Another project consultant found things to be changing one and a half years later:
''Top management now seems to practice a confronting management style with reference to
direct following up and giving feed back. Have you done what we agreed upon? now seems
to represent the style".
Guaranteed deliveries was a service or product that reflected the new strategic direction of the
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finn. It seemed to bear heavily upon the reframing efforts: Delivery is to be effectuated before
10 o 'clock day 2, if it is sent before a certain time day one, otherwise the customer will not
have to pay. The concept for this was presented to the organization by top management, but it
was further developed and implemented by an interplay between project work in the local units
and the meetings in the change forum. In the local units project groups assessed the problems
in introducing the new product and how it should be introduced. A manager at HQ was
responsible for coordinating this interplay, and he was also conscious that as many as possible
should have a share in the final solution.
''This created room for influence from various groups. The product became better, and people
had a sense of having created it themselves", is what one of the consultants observed after
having talked to people.
It was, however, introduced successfully in spite of bad test results. The project leader
commented:
"The result of the test period would have made us run into the ditch within a few weeks. The
results improved, however, week by week, and when the product was launched the results
were satisfactory, representing a degree of quality few had thought would be possible to reach
within such a short period of time".
How the new product came to bear upon the organizational process was illustrated in the
section on "the old and the new". It was pointed out how various system changes evolved as
necessary tools to make the guarantee possible. The project consultant also pointed out other
ways of seeing this:
"It worked as a structural pressure, enforcing upon the employees another way of working and
therefore also new experiences. This was supported by the guarantee working as a collective
goal, motivating most people. For once you got simple and understandable feed-back on
whether or not you did a good job. In this way there was also more focus on finding out who
and what caused delays. What made it a driving force was that it also was an operationalization
of the vision. It made it concrete ....the arrangement helped release unrealised values. It
appeared as good morale and a way of "doing the job properly", which also undermined the
old ideas of what was a fair day's work".
The starting point was described by one of the consultant as
" ... a volume orientation where people do not care about economy and accountancy. Judging
the achievements of the company is made in terms of tons and not in terms of profit."
Another consultant related to this observation about one and a half years later:
"It now seems very well accepted and understood that we have to operate according to business
principles. This means making money. We now know "tons" is not something we can put in
the wallet, as somebody said the other day. At the end of the day it is from the customer we
live".
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Another aspect of the starting point was described as:
"the traditionalist has always done things his way, and he fears suggestions from others, and
any suggestion about changes is seen as an attack on the way he does his job ...he doesn't
really like to leave his office to check how things really are".
According to one of the consultants one and a half years later:
''Today the shop floor workers start to react if the containers are half empty, or if goods remain
at the end of the working day, or to a way of sending parcels that seems complicated etc.The
employees say today we try to find a solution before asking the boss."
The project leader reflected on the same aspect:
''The foremen report increased enthusiasm and feelings of responsibility among the employees.
When the train broke down, the workers themselves suggested to rent trucks, and the whole
operation was completed within two hours. This kind of initiative did not occur in the past. If
now, for example, goods are left at the floor/platform. the destination station would
immediately try to find out what had happened and the customer could not be invoiced for that
shipment. Consequently, the workers in the warehouse had to communicate more closely with
the drivers, people at the office, other stations and change their work routines during the day.
"
In sum, people seemed to shift gradually towards becoming more conscious about the
organization being a business having to satisfy customer needs rather than "moving tons" at a
profit, and also consequently were more concerned with the results rather than procedures of
what you do; Did the shipment get there on time?
Two interrelated dimensions are revealed by comparing these cases. These dimensions are
implicit in the actual approaches and do not necessarily reflect conscious choices. The first
deals with the way the organizational members learn, or are supposed to learn, the new
orientation. It deals with the pedae;ogicalllitJ,G Qf chane;e actions. The second deals with the
extent to which the practical formation of the orientation is made from or by the top, or whether
lower levels are involved. It deals with what are them fm: tbst fonnation Q.{ chane;e solutions.
Pedawe;ic ap_proach: Ideational vs. experience enforcine;
A_heavy emphasis on change seminars was observed in Furniture. The aim was to prepare for
the new by teaching and informing, and was intended to create commitment to the new
direction. The manager and project leaders were very concerned with the power of conviction.
By being conceptually well prepared with a high degree of intellectual consciousness about the
new organizational direction and its rationale, the key personnel of the organization should be
prepared to implement it - "to go out and do it".
The organization in a way first learned and then did it. This as an example of an approach
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relying on what can be seen as ideational-oriented or deductive reframing efforts. By that is
meant that the underlying assumption seems to be to change practice by changing the ideas
about practice. The idea at work seems to be that when organizational members have
comprehended the "new ideas"/ideas for a new organizational orientation, they are ready to
implement these ideas. They are then expected, and are supposed, to change their everyday
action programs (the way they perform tasks and relate to each other.
This kind of approach is also illustrated in, for example, the early phase of the Transport
change program. Concept-oriented and consciousness raising-oriented seminars planned and
arranged by the external consultant and HR managers had a central place in the project. There
was, however, as you recall, a turning point in the project as the CEO noticed that "something
was wrong, the participants did not really seem to take the seminars seriously as a
reorientation process, and they did not get involved". He "took over" the seminar and it was
also more strongly integrated into business issues.
There are also elements in the Airline project of such a deductive-oriented appearance. In faet,
the history of the project was of a very ideational nature dominated by concept-oriented
seminars. The revival of the reorientation efforts was started by the establishment of a strategic
top management group that assessed and examined the situtation of the firm. On this basis the
managers of the different units were given motivated (sub) goals. There was, of course, an
element of discussion, perhaps negotiation in accordance with the top management evaluation
of this assessment.
When it later proved that exceptional cost cuts had to be made, the approach and procedure
were the same; they were also told to get rid of costs equaling a certain number of jobs while
being left the discretion to find other solutions. Furthermore, it was centrally decided that the
fonn of organization for the new organizational direction was a "team organization". Ideas and
models were then taught to the key organizational members, who were then expected to
transform these into practice. This can be seen as a deductive-orlented approach, although the
reframing efforts in this case are more integrated in the organizational life than in the other
examples.
This observation is perhaps symptomatic for the next point. The change efforts in Airline also
demonstrate another aspect of organizationallearning approaches. After new actions supporting
the new organizational direction had been explained, motivated and conceptually supported,
they were also "enforced" on the members of the organization. After communicating the
message, structural pressure was exerted making the participants having to perform according
to the new demands. From the point of view of learning the new orientation there was, in this
context, an emphasis on learning the new ideas by having to comply with and practice them.
This emphasis stresses the implicit or rather "inductive" way of learning new ways.
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This point is also illustrated by focusing on the guaranteed delivery in Transport. Essentially,
if the goods were forwarded before a certain time one day, they would anive at the door of the
receiver before lOam on day 2. This visualizing of the new strategy to the members of the
organization enforced upon them other ways of perfonning and relating, and it constituted a
clear and simple goal with a measurement system underpinning this enforcement process.
Additionally, this again constituted a pressure for additional changes by creating a focus on the
functionality of existing structures, systems and tools. Such an approach could be seen as
action oriented, or rather experience-enforcing reframing efforts. The essential point is,
however, to grasp that these actions could enforce upon the participants the kind of
eXPCriences illustrating and supporting the new orientation. The ideas for the new direction are
implicit in and can be induced from these experiences.
In the same enterprise another aspect of such inductive oriented learning can be seen. The
service product was designed in a process involving a considerable part of the organization.
By making the new concept - the idea for the new product - concrete in relation to the decentral
and local (their own) situation, the ideas behind the new organizational direction were also
apprehended by the participants by the assessments and the exploration they had to make. The
same approach was observed in the case of Money Market. The members of this organization
were to define the situation and find solutions by examining infonnation describing the
economic and market related situation. By doing so, they apprehended the new direction by
being exposed to a situation, rather than having a new concept or a new solution imposed upon
them. The learning effect resulting from having to examine a situation either based on the frame
of a new concept (guaranteed services) in the one case, or "facts and figures" about the'
organizational situation in the other, is different from being told what new ideas to enact.
Inherent in the various reframing endeavours are two qualitative approaches to learning. ~
ap,proach deals with trying to infuse the new orientation by way of, for example,
communicating ideas or models in different kinds of meetings and seminars by various types
of presentations and discussions. Written communication could also be involved, although this
has not been very visible from the examples here. This approach is deductive oriented,
emphasizing the ideas underlying the intended new orientation as a deductiye-oriemed allproach
characterized by change actions of an ideational nature.
The second awroach deals with the new orientation being enforced upon participants who are
put in new situations that make them perform differently. This situation can be one of having to
see your own and the organizational task from another perspective by having to assess it and
find new solutions within a new frame. Or, the situation can be one of new or other tasks,
relationships, systems, emphasis, (enforced) agendas, etc. constituting a structural pressure
reflecting the new frame. People experience new ideas by way of enacting their understanding
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of the new context. When this is "successful", from the point of view of management, this
means that they enact the new orientation. This is seen as an inductive oriented ap.proach
characterized by reframing actions of an experience enforcing nature.
Learnin~ the new frame
• Inductive-oriented approach; experience enforcing reframing efforts
• Deductive-oriented approach; ideadonal or "teaching" <Xientedreframing efforts
FIG. 4.3 LEARNING THE NEW FRAME
The Transport project switched from an emphasis on the one approach to an emphasis on the
other. The Furniture project had a main emphasis on one approach but still elements from the
other, and the Airline project shifted between the two. In other words, they are approaches
mostly in the analytical sense. In concrete projects, we expect to fmd elements from both and
also that the emphasis might change over time, although the overall tendency might be more in
the direction of one of the approaches.
Loci for solution formation: Top mana~ment vs. locally driven
The change endeavour in Furniture was started from the top. A new understanding and
definition of the situation of the organization had been developed at this level. The ambition
was to "repeat" this kind of process at the lower level. In concrete terms the intention was that
the work groups themselves should develop their ambitions and goals within the framework of
the new direction. This should be signalled and explained by the project management through
the various change seminars mentioned. The lower levels of the organization were, in other
words, left with the discretion of developing decentralized or locally driven solutions.
Such discretion was also observed in Money Market. Based on their own assessment of the
situation from economic and market information, the organizational members were expected
to define and suggest new solutions. Their input would contribute to concretizing the new
organizational direction and reflect their local situation and practical problems. By giving such
input they influenced the form of the emerging new organization. Local influence on practical
solutions in the development of guaranteed deliveries who also planned in Transport. The
design of the process was intended to involve the local levels in producing solutions that
reflected their defmition of the situation. The final solution and the practices used to produce it
should reflect the situation for those involved in producing it. In this particular case we could
also identify a dialectical element, as the process was designed as an interplay between the
various local and the central levels, giving various groups a share in the final solution.
InTransport as well as in Airline we find reframing efforts that contrast with the locally driven
solutions. Significant cost cuts were effectuated in Transport, and at one stage the local units
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were told the exact number of employees by which to reduce their workforce to save a certain
amount of money. This was seen as necessary to survive in the short term and also as part of
long-term survival and the new strategic direction. Suggestions to save money by other means
coming from the local level were rejected. We are faced with a situation which is a
"manae;ement driven chane;e solution".
In this case it would have been a little less management driven if the local managers, for
example, had been told to reduce their costs with an amount equaling a number of employees,
which in fact was the case at Airline. It was, however, fairly top management driven when -
in "Airline" - it was decided that all organizational units were to be reorganized like teams after
a certain definition. Centrally decided, locally implemented. It must be said, however, that in
this particular case, the tactics were changed towards allowing for more decentralized initiative
and local variation in the solutions being formed.
Solutions forwardine; the new frame
• Top managent driven; being fonnu1ated at the top - at centtallevel
• Locally driven; being fonnu1ated locally - at decenttallevel
FIG. 4.4 LOCI FOR SOLUTIONS FORMATION
Goals, models and solutions representing the new organizational direction can either can be
identified, formulated and imposed from the top, or they can be identified and formulated
locally. This issue deals with the degree of (de)centralization in giving the basis for, as well as
the solidifying of, the new organizational direction. The stronger the degree of solidity in a
decision or solution formed at the top, the higher the degree of centralization; the more holistic
solutions that have to be found locally, the stronger the degree of decentralization. The issue is
to what degree the approach to formation of solutions supporting the new orientation is
centralized and decentralized. This is a question of 1012manae;ement za, locally driven chane;e
solutions.
Conceptual clarifications
What are the relationships between the issues that have been introduced? Are they analytically
separate categories? All the cases had for instance a tendency towards "top management driven
solutions". Quite naturally since the projects were initiated from the top. It is the degree to
which this was modified and accompanied by locally driven solutions which seemed to make a
difference. There are some indications that a local emphasis can create "ownership" and more
relevant solutions judging from the development in, for example, Money Market and
Transport. In these cases the change ambitions seemed to be advanced by people taking part in
the formation of solutions. This is also indicated from the local initiative and local variation that
enforced itself on the reorientation process in Airline in spite of the initial design, although that
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could also reflect nothing more than an expression of other motivated resistance.
There is, however, a relationship between the approach for learning and the degree of locally
driven solutions to be noted. There is an empirical overlap between inductive learning from
assessment and locally driven solutions. Furthermore, inductive learning resulting from
enforced new task performance could constitute a driving force for new solutions underpinning
the reframing process. The two dimensions are related but not overlapping:
Top management
driven solutions
Deductive -+- Inductive
reframing efforts reframing efforts
Locally driven
solutions
FIG. 4.5 RELATIONSHIP BE1WEEN LEARNING AND SOLUTION FORMATION APPROACH
The relationship between the two dimensions is not an isomorphic relationship. There is
reason to believe the two sets of issues can be seen as fruitfully analytically different There is
a tendency for some kind of overlap. Like when there is an emphasis on generating local
solutions, like in the case of guaranteed deliveries, there is an inductive learning approach. The
same relationship is indicated between top management-driven solutions and the deductræ-:
learning approach. However, we can also see a combination of top management-driven
solutions and a main emphasis on inductive learning. This seemed to be the case in the overall
approach of Transport after the top manager "took over". And, in Airline, the process was top
management-driven in the distributing of the goals and their rationale, but the learning was
forwarded by managers being forced to comply to these new standards through the learning
and follow up structure.
The "bridges" - the closest interrelation - between the two dimensions can, however, be
suggested. The (sub) issue of inductive reframing efforts that deals with assessing and finding
new solutions within a new frame, like in the Money Market case, comes close to an empirical
overlap with "locally driven solutions". Furthermore, it seems reasonable to suggest that the
"follow up" aspect of the learning arenas constitutes an example of a bridge between "top
management driven" and "inductive oriented reframing efforts". This is so because it forces
upon people the top management-driven solutions (given consistency).
Furthermore, we can see a "teaching" aspect of "top management driven solutions", that is, the
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verbal communications of management-defined solutions that take place in change arenas or
when change is put on the agenda. This aspect is empirically close to aspects of "deductive
reframing efforts". Finally, we can see that change seminars, planned as well as unplanned,
also deal with discussing the new ideas being presented. The dialogue between new ideas and
peoples' reactions based on their local understanding bridges the "locally-driven solution" and
"ideational change actions" .
Top management
driven solutions
Seminar discussion
Follow upTeaching
~ti~ -+ _
reframing efforts
Inductive
reframing efforts
Local assessment and suggestion
Locally driven
solutions
FIG. 4.6 BRIDGING TIlE APPROACHES FOR LEARNING AND SOLUTION FORMATION
Furthermore, there is an empirical overlap in examples grounding "intemtion m reframin&
efforts" and "inductiye reframjn& effons". The first deals with taking care of "what counts", or
counts as new in everyday situations. The second deals with how people are supposed to learn
the new ideas. One aspect deals with learning by assessing one's situation. The other deals
with learning by complying to new standards. This seems close to what integration of
reframing efforts means. The difference is represented by the focus. Integration stresses the
possibilities for conflicting demands between the new and the old. This point is further stressed
in management integration and the integration of parts; the handling of the relationship between
the old and the new. Wheras, for example, the issues in formation of solutions focus on the
construction or formation of the new. In other words, there are reasons to see the issues as
analytically different.
This kind of relationship is also seen between manl&ement intemtion imå ~ mana~nt
~ m anchorin&. The first deals with consistency in management signals and the second
deals with ownership of the reframing ambitions. However, there is no clear, at least in the
eyes of the receiver, ownership of the new orientation if there are mixed management
messages. The other aspects of this issue does not seem to tend to overlap or have such clear
relationship to the other issues.
Concepts for reframing organizations
Conce.ptually different foci
The presented reframing issues are to be seen as concepts for reframing organizations. It is
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important to realize that these issues are meshed together in the same empirical field of action.
In that sense they are separate concepts only analytically. Still, they highlight subject matters
on which decisions that make a difference in the strive for change can be made, and they are
therefore important for the possibilities to succeed.
The aspects focused by the issues can be tackled in many ways. The way they are tackled
matters for the progress of the reframing process and creates different contexts for the next
"move". The issues should therefore be seen as highlighting aspects that are central to thinking,
planning and working with reframing organizations. They are concepts for reframing
organizations and, in a way, they can be seen as building blocks in a language forreframing.
The concepts naturally deal with abstractions of the same territory. Although they are
interrelated, at some points more than others, they are conceptually different They do have
analytically different mg The different foci can best be understood as follows:
Conceptually different foci:
• Anchoring: Focuses power in the sense of the rational and symbolic support
• Integration: Focuses competition between the different refraIning efforts and between the old and the new
• Top management driven vs. local driven solutions: Focuses the loci of forming and making
concrete the new orientation
• Inductive vs. deductive refraIning efforts: Focuses the way the ideas representing the new
frame are communicated and supposed to be learned
FIG. 4.7 CONCEPTUALLY DIFFERENTFOCI
Nonnatiye SU&i«stiyeness
In other words, the issues have emerged because the support of the new ideas, the way they
are treated in relation to the old, the way they are made concrete and the way they are taught -
supposedly learned - seem to make a difference. This observation implies a normative
su&&estiyeness. What do the data tell about the way the issues make a difference?
"Anchoring" emerged, for instance as an issue because a project would seem to get into
troubble if it lacked anchoring. A normative suggestion was made at the time of discussing the
issue that the lack of anchoring would create problems for the reframing efforts.
Integration very much emerged for the same reasons. It appeared as an issue because lack of
integration seemed to create problems for observed reframing efforts. The examples
demonstrating integration seemed to create a more fertile soil for that progress than did the lack
of integration. Also in this case there is an underlying normative suggestion that lack of
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integration would create problems for the reframing efforts.
The remaining two issues are more difficult to account for in this vein since they appear as a
pair of concepts. First, it is clear that we are not faced with dichotomies. A reframing project
is, for example, not based either on top management or locally driven solutions. There can be
a mixture and there can be some kind of dialectic. The same is quite obviously the case for the
relationship between ideational oriented (deductive) and experience-enforcing (inductive)
change actions. We are faced with a situation where the cases differ when it comes to what is
the emphasis in the dimensions represented by these issues. This also seems to make a
difference, but we are told less in what sense it makes a difference.
Deductive means exist in all the projects. There is, however, some justification for the view
that inductive oriented learning approaches are creating conditions that are favourable for the
change project This is indicated by the lack of progress in Furniture which was dominated by
a deductive kind of approach. And also by comparing that observation with the impression that
the introduction of inductive means brought about a revival in the reframing efforts in Money
Market and Airline as well as the shift of focus in Transport.
The same can be said about the locus of solution formation: Top management-driven solutions
seem insufficient as a basis for the formation of new solutions, although they are necessary to
point direction. And an acknowledged need for locally driven solutions can be identified in all
these cases. This might not be obvious in Airline, but local influence emerged in the course of
the process. In Furniture this need was admitted and activities were started (but died out).
All in all, there seems to be a need for deductive as well as inductive reframing efforts; top
management-driven as well as locally driven solutions. They probably attend to different needs
or aspects of the change process, and that issue shall be reiterated in the next chapter. The main
point so far is that there is a normative suggestion that the lack of what these issues represent
would create problems for the reframing efforts.
Concluding so far
A set of concepts for reframing organizations had been generated. This means basically that
the "anchoring", "integration" and "ideational" vs. "experience enforcing" change actions as
well as "top management" vs. "locally driven" that have been explained and defined in the
respective sections, reflect and highlight important aspects of such an endeavour. A
summarization follows on the next page:
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Anchoring reMing efforts
• Management anchoring: Management driving and supporting the refraining effæts
in rational and symbolic ways
- Top manager anchoring
- Top management anchoring
- Line anchoring
• Union anchoring: Union leaders driving and supporting the refraining efforts
Intemti<>n in reframing efforts
• Management integration: Deals with the relationship and degree of consistency between the
manager's actions and the intended ideas.
• Integration of change efforts: Deals with the relationship and degree of consistency between the
change actions and the existing organizational context
• Integration of "organizational elements": Deals with the relationship and the degree of
consistency between the various elements and the new ideas.
Learning the new frame
• Inductive-oriented approach; experience enforcing reframing efforts
• Deductive-oriented approach; ideational or "teaching" oriented refraining efforts
Solutions forwarding the new frame
• Top managent driven; being formulated at the top - at centrallevel
• Locally driven; being formulated locally - at decentrallevel
4.8 SUMMARIZATION OF REFRAMING CONCEPTS
The reframing concepts reflect issues on which critical choices can be made or omitted. There
is an underlying nonnative suggestiveness in them. The lack of the conditions they
conceptualize are suggested to create problems for the reframing efforts to succeed. What kind
of aspect of the reframing process the different concepts focus on has been specified. To move
further in the search for a model for reframing organizations, a conceptual understanding of
characteristics of the reframing task that these aspects reflect needs to be generated.
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Chapter 5: Counterforcing Reframing Organizations
The aim of this chapter is to explore the issue of organizations counterforcing change in
order to help understand the nature of reframing organizations. These reflections have
developed largely in parallel with the work presented in the previous sections. They are for
practical reasons presented at this stage. The reflections lay the foundation for a more
precise understanding of the task of reframing organizations. It is inherent in the theoretical
perspective that reframing will tend to be rejected. This stems from the excluding and
persistent nature of organizational frames. The issues identified in the last chapter also
reflected problems in realizing new ideas.
The chapter suggests that organizations are characterized by momentum sustaining the past
and rejecting the new. The suggestion is based on empirical observations, participants
speculations and theoretical contributions. It is largely the interrelationships between
rational, political and cultural reasons for counterforcing change that account for the
development and existence of an organizational momentum.
The concept of liminality is used to help understand the reframing situation. Liminality is
the betwixt and between situation when previous patterns have been terminated, but new
ones have not yet been established. Change actions cause such a threshold period to emerge
in which forces of both conservation and renewal are released. It is therefore argued that
the task of reframing organizations should be conceived of as one of gaining a foothold for
the new frames in a period of liminality.
Rejecting the new
It is a fairly common situation when people and groups of people often want to - and strive
hard to - change, but don't achieve the wished for results. Managers have, for instance,
meetings and seminars on the need for change. They verbally commit themselves to a new
direction, whether new leadership styles, basic values, or new orientation for the
performance of tasks, for instance an increased degree of customer orientation. The
employees enthusiastically - or sometimes reluctantly but nevertheless agreably - leave
information and motivation meetings having received information about the new direction,
the new finn. They agree to be the "best", they agree to become a better, more decentralized
and customer oriented firm for the 90s. Still, the customers experience little difference; the
efficiency does not change substantially, the improvements do not occur, the employees
become frustrated waiting for another kind of leadership, or at least something "new", and
the managers become disappointed with their employees whom they don see as
understanding seriousness of the situation because they do not grasp the new signals or
change their behaviour. Simultaneously, there are individuals who feel that their new
plans, suggestions, etc. that supported the new direction do not gain a foothold They do
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not get support but are rejected or silently overseen or forgotten. The new intentions
remain, but the old practices survive. Even if people in the ideational sense learn the
message it is not transformed into a new collective practice.
It is not hard to imagine that organizational features developed under one set of conditions
could tend to reject rather than support the practice of new ideas. Structures and systems
are, for instance, not always revised to suit a new situation. In the attempt to develop local
branch managers into responsible managers in Banking, a lot of the established
organizational features seemed to work against this. Traditionally the design of products,
customer terms, marketing issues as well as branch location, etc., had been decided by
central staffs. The local managers therefore did not have an opportunity to control the
variables that, to a large extent determined their results. Furthermore, the employees felt
that the computer system also represented report and control systems, but was a bad fit for
integrated information processing, which they thought of as a prerequisite for responsible
and professionallocal action.
Taking the perspective developed here seriously would, however, imply that it is not only
the tangible, fairly accessible and easily available aspects of the organization that
counterforces "the new". An incident from Furniture helps explore in greater depth what
goes on when new ideas do not get a foothold. This is followed by a comparison of an
aspect of the change efforts at Electric Industry which will help suggest a conceptual
understanding of the nature of reframing an organization.
The rejection of a new organizational arrangement
One morning, the project leader at Furniture received a phone call from the top manager:
"The CEO has intervened in the restructuring process, stopped it and fired me with
immediate effect This probably also means that you are out". At the time of this incident
the top manager (the division manager) had been in the job for a bit more than half a year.
His predecessor, who initiated the change programme, was now CEO of the concern of
which Furniture was part
The new manager had been exposed to heavy expectations from his boss, the project leader
and to some extent from the union to make "something happen". He was especially
expected to improve the commitment of the management group to the change project After
the last top manager left to take over his new position, the internal pressure for change had
diminished. The expectations were that some structural as well as personnel changes
should be made in the top management group at Furniture. The project leader claims that
"these changes had been discussed for a long time, and also the union representatives had
demonstrated a positive attitude towards them, the aim of the changes was seen as a step
in the overall reframing process and as necessary adjustments. to the difficult situation of a
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falling market, for example: 1) The organization had to be adjusted to a more market-
oriented business concept as well as in the forms of distribution. 2) A few leaders were
seen as not good enough and should be moved. 3) Achieve rationalization and synergy
effects by, among other things, implementing a 'main user' principle in the design and
organization of staffs. 3) A flatter pyramid and also that the division manager felt a need to
get himself better integrated in the management group."
The changes involved some specialization of production between the different production sites
and a restructuring of management responsibilities, meaning that two managers would in actual
fact be degraded.
The month before the incident in question the division manager had meetings with several key
people. He said in retrospect about this,
" I understood that the CEO accepted what I was about to do. I perceived that he gave him a
"good - go!" message. The two most involved managers - one of them after one day of
reflection - said they supported the solution. Furthermore, I think that the protests the CEO
received were not more than the normal "screaming and shouting" you have to expect in
situations like this".
The situation was characterized by the two managers being informed for the first time about the
consequences for them on a Thursday. The day after, the top management group discussed this
as well as the structural changes. The two managers were frustrated but agreed to the changes,
one of them saying that he "had no choice", but that he gave his support. The other wanted to
think about it, coming back the next day however and expressing his support. From Monday
to Wednesday, the management groups of the various departments were informed. The union
chairperson was informed, and gave the impression of finding this to be a very positive
solution.
During these information meetings it was emphasized by the division manager that it was the
overall structure that had been decided, and that the consequences of the changes still had to
undergo further discussions with the various units as well as with the unions. Having done
this, the division manager went abroad, but was called up and instructed to meet the CEO on
Friday morning. He was fired there and then. Most of the changes were also nullified; this
was important to regain stability and peace, so it was said.
It turns out that the superior had been exposed to very heavy pressure on Thursday, having
received angry calls from allover the organization. Contrary to the division manager, the CEO
says that
"I couldn't risk such a level of unrest in the still most profitable part of the concern. It was
like a "witch nest". I supported the changes in principle, but I thought that they were
introduced too fast; that the new manager acted too quickly, authoritarianly, immaturely and so
on, and that he lacked support from one of the key people who was informally very strong,
and who I had underlined for the division manger that he needed active support from. I do.
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however, realize that the division manager had been under pressure to make something
happen."
According to the division manager, however, he had received support from the union chairman
in a meeting with him. The union turned against him after he had officially informed them
about the decisions. Something that was said in one of the information meetings was
interpreted to mean (probably wrongly) that the union was now left out of the management
group, a position they had felt a tremendous victory in obtaining. They also expressed that the
changes were carried through fairly quickly and authoritarianly "He behaved roughly ...he
declared war". A lot of action now took place behind the scenes, and a lot of pressure was put
on the CEO. In addition, it was argued that the new solution was too poor and that the
division manager was unfit as a manager because of the leadership style he had. The CEO fired
him even though he found his new structure to be very good.
"The division manager no longer had an organization to lead", he said.
An organizational diagnoses carried through one year before the incident had suggested that the
Furniture culture had similarities with what has been called a clan. Everybody knew each
other, and a lot of the employees also had relatives that worked within the company. The
members of the organization were characterized by the thinking that
- nobody should dominate or
- take themselves too seriously or
- stick their neck out and they should
- avoid conflicts,
- find the scape goats and
- stay where they were
Furthermore, the organization was seen to be constituted by a lot of small "kingdoms" and
"play behind the curtains" or "guerrilla activities". They were also used to change attempts
evaporating. "Good at planning but not at carrying through decisions", as some of them said
"Here you will get old before your decision is implemented" it was ironically phrased by one
of them. People - especially on the shop floor - were very skeptical towards managers;
especially those with a "capital M", as they said. The CEO was exempt from this negative
characteristic, and seemed to be seen as both "one of the boys" and some kind of a father
figure simultaneously.
Understanding the organizational (re)action
Shortly after this incident, a meeting was held between the CEO, the division manager, the
project leader and two other external consultants. The aim of the meeting was to learn from
what happened. There were, of course, different opinions as to whether it was a good solution
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to fire the division manager. There was a common view that the following issues were
important factors in explaining what happened: First, what could be called "cultural rejection"
was at work here. This was especially because the division manager behaved in a way that was
contrary to the prevailing cultural code(s).
"You were seen to behave like you considered yourself world champion".
Second, he lacked support, a ''power base", both because he had misjudged the support from
his superior and also because he lacked acceptance and understanding from his subordinates.
The espoused "yes" was given under some kind of perceived pressure, or the actors
understanding of the situation changed because of the way he was perceived when giving the
official information:
''To the others it seemed like you proceeded directly from a decision generated by yourself to
implementing it."
Third, this was seen to be a case of what was characterized as ''political games". The division
manager had been in contact with, for example, the official spokesman but not the (informally)
most influential union spokesmen.
"You know I told you that you would not get anywhere without support from the Union. And
you provoked them with your style, and by also going abroad after giving the information."
It carne up that the CEO had been asked by the Union "whether he was behind all this". It
seemed that he would not like to have that stick to his reputation after having worked among
them for many years. Additionally, he got a call from one of the degraded managers saying he
felt ''raped''. A lot of other people called defending this man. The CEO said he hadn't slept at
night, and also "I told you you had to have active support from him" directed to the division
manager concerning the degraded manager mentioned above. All taking part in the meeting,
however, agreed on the general impression that there had been a lot of activity behind the
scenes both within and across various groups. There was also a discussion whether the way
the CEO tackled this represented a "leakage of power" by not referring people that contacted
him in this matter to the division manager. By accepting their calls, he verified a manifest view
that it was he that was their actual leader C'father") and in that way accelerated the process, it
was said In principle, the CEO also accepted this view, but rejected that he could have acted
otherwise in this particular situation because of the risks involved
The meeting concluded these factors had been different aspects of the process leading to the
firing of the manager and were interrelated. The CEO's historical roots in the organization
were experienced as an important factor in all this, together with the division manager's lack
of cultural anchoring and perhaps understanding. Before discussing what this incident could
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suggest in more general terms, let us tum to another case which was also aborted. Together,
these can help us understand and (re)conceptualize the nature of the problem of reframing
organizations.
Reasons for rejecting a new direction
As we recall from previous sections, the attempts to carry through a reframing process at
Electric Industry were quite problematic. These problems, to a large extent, evolved around the
top manager. He saw it as an implementation project that did not need his particular attention
while other managers experienced his absence in the "change fora" as problematic. Some saw
him as abdicating whereas others seemed to be bewildered about the seriousness of the project
However, it was observed in what got started that marketing quickly developed action plans
for their area of responsibility. The production departments, however, had hardly started. The
production leaders also argued against such changes as increasing coordination of production
planning and analyses of sales by using such arguments:
"The existing possibilities for material administration, shift work and so on do not allow for a
top adjustment ofproduction and shifts (cycles) in market demand/market situation".
The project consultant was very concerned with the resistance that appeared. Drawing upon
his observations he reflected upon this from different a angle, and grouped them around
"rational", ''political''and "cultural" reasons for counterforcing change.
Rational reasons:
"The most obvious explanation could be that the production managers are right, in the sense
that what is expected of them is wrong. The ideas for change are perhaps not sufficiently
thought through or tested at their operationallevel. It could be that what is suggested simply
represents bad solutions, or cannot be introduced at the existing level of competence. If this is
the case, their resistance, whether espoused or not, is rationally motivated also from the
perspective of management Such resistance could be interpreted by those who meet it as bad
will, incompetence or worse. By doing so, a creative (dialectical) source for reinterpreting and
improving the new direction could be lost Top managers cannot fully be expected to be able
to anticipate the consequences at an operationallevel when deciding a new direction".
He further suggested that this account of resistance on the part of the production leaders could
be challenged by suggesting that it was grounded on:
Political Reasons;
"One could for example assume that the production managers are beginning to fear for their
jobs. They cannot fully see or understand what is expected of them as a consequence of the
new frame. What does it really mean to their situations? What is expected of them in the
coming situations? What kind of qualifications are needed and favoured, and consequently
who is going to have good or bad prospects for their qualifications and interests? And - in the
worst case - after a reorientation would there be room for people like them or with
qualifications such as theirs? Even if not experiencing the situation as so dramatic, I think they
could fear that their power base will be reduced as a consequence of the reorientation. In
addition to lost status that could mean less money and also less career possibilities, it could
also be that the new direction will imply working in ways that are contrary to their professional
115
values.
From their perspective this kind of resistance is also 'rational', but it is not so from the
perspective of managing the finn. Somebody will lose and somebody will gain. The new
direction will favour other kinds of qualifications and thereby other persons and groups than
the established and existing ones. They will be given access to the better positions and will
improve their opportunity for money, power, status, careers and exerting their professional
ideas and values than the "old" or existing groups. This kind of resistance can be seen to be
politically motivated in the sense that individuals and group interests form the platform for the
reactions."
He added that: "Opportunistic motivated behaviourcan, however, also be fairly complicated to
understand and detect . In this case it seemed for example that the unions tried to create a
negotiation advantage for another issue by being negative to this particular attempt at
change.Union resistance, it seemed to me, was based on the general suspicion towards the
management. It did not want to go along with anything that would make management succeed
in a way that could give them more power. Furthermore, the unions opposed a project that
should be set up to explore how sales and production could be more integrated. The most
obvious explanation for this, it seemed to me, was that it could involve more shift work, which
was perceived to be contrary to the welfare of the employees. It would, however, be
interesting to know what kind of information the unions got and from whom. These particular
ideas had only been discussed in a small group of managers. Somebody could have leaked the
information in a way that made the union perceive the ideas as concrete plans and the leakage
could have been made through an informal network in the company. It could be that one or
several managers felt that their autonomy - or small kingdom - would be threatened by what
could come out of exploring the new ideas. Knowingly, or unknowingly, the union actions
therefore also represented the political interests of various managers."
Cultural reasons;
The consultant suggested that there was a third perspective on this counterforcing that also
seemed fruitful. He felt that informal conversations revealed, for example, that the employees
in question - as well as others - felt at unease because the language of the marketing people
seemed more relevant in the eyes of top management than the ''production language". They felt
alienated by the "sociological" language used by external consultants. All in all they didn't like
the new "style" in the management meetings.
"Imagine", he said, "that the cue could be that the production managers think that the new
direction is good, but when they were supposed to perform tasks differently, or take on new
tasks, they simply didn't They even talked negatively when one of them tried. It did not feel
natural, or something within them said "no", or they simply did not manage. Neither did they
feel any particular need to explain why they did not act in new ways. However, if somebody
accused them of being irrational or political, they defended themselves. And, from their
perspective, I think they were right in the sense that what they did, and what they did not, felt
natural. It was hard for them to conceptualize why they did not comply with the expectations of
others. They could even sometimes see that nothing new happened at the same time as they
defended status quo. To a certain extent they felt, however, that they had a communication
problem. Their usuallanguage wasn't understood the way it used to be understood. And they
didn't quite understand the top management as they used to; in some way or other their
language - and priorities - had changed. When they tried to attend more to matters they thought
now were expected of them by their superiors like planning, developing new systems, etc.,
their subordinates were less satisfied. Even if they had expressed a wish that these matters
should be taken care of they seemed more satisfied when the production managers helped them
116
solve their immediate problems".
In other words, the resistance of the production leaders could be culturally motivated.
The relationship between counterforces.
The production managers defined their interest in light of the established frame. When they
tried to analyze what solutions seemed good for the company, they also did so within the
models of reality imposed on them by this frame. Their interests and future position could have
been served by using their competence in production and production planning to take a
proactive part in the design of a new production planning system. This planning system was
supposed to integrate and reflect the fact that the demand in the market was characterized by
shifts and cycles. However, the established frame constituted a barrier for them to define the
issue in those terms.
The incident at Furniture can also be seen as reflecting these reasons. It was noted that the
resistance that developed was being caused by, among other things, cultural and political
processes. It would probably also be understandable and defendable to assume that the new
arrangement could be perceived simply as a bad solution. A considerable number of people
also felt it to be against their present orland future interests. The reasons that it was not
understood to be a good solution for the firm and or that the rationality of the new arrangement
was not achnowledged could, however, be due to the frame of reference of the members of the
organization.
The point seems to be that there are reasons to believe that there are several understandable
grounds for counterforcing change inherent in the same situations and in the same actions and
also that these factors work interrelatedly. We can also trace this in other examples:
There is one rather humorous example from Car Retailer. In a strategy seminar in one of the
largest retailer units there was a focus and agreement on the need for long term efforts in
securing customer loyalty. This again was based on the realization that this was not the way the
"culture" worked now, that there was a discrepancy between the existing and the needed
frame. This was discussed from different angles for one day. The seminar ended in the
afternoon. The top manager suggested a trip to a huge second-hand car sales exhibition that
the firm arranged just outside the city which was interesting. Arriving there, it was found that
practically all the other participants in the seminar had had the same idea. The issue was now:
"How many did you sell? Of the x- kind? Of the y- kind?"
It seemed that they "finally" could focus on issues that felt natural to them, which in a way
verified the "organizational culture" problems they themselves had agreed existed. This
illustrates a more general observation that there were problems in leaving the hard selling
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"counting" focus. "We have to sell more to afford to go along with the new", was another
saying frequently overheard. Of course this is not to suggest that car retailers should not focus
on selling cars. The point - also made by themselves - was that the "hard selling" focus was on
the sale as such, but that it was insufficient if long-term customer relations were to be
strengthened and it also seemed to counteract the development of a long term focus.
Cultural as well as rational aspects can be assumed to be reflected in people's inability to
perform in new ways and in line with others way of defining their tasks, as well as in the
question "what is in it for me"? When reflecting on that issue, it perhaps strikes people that,
although perhaps favourable to the company, the new direction does not favour the kind of
knowledge and competence they have established. In other words, it would be reasonable for
them to expect that the future would favour other people with a different background from their
own. The political motivation can be assumed to be melted in with their rational and cultural
based reluctance to help forward the new organizational direction.
Similar ways of thinking could be employed for other organizations in assessing why they
seemed to be counterforcing change. In spite of the employees talking about Airline becoming
a Team organization, and in spite of them being able to give a reasonable account for why this
was sensible for the company, there were often rational arguments for why things were as
they were. Employees individual and collective experience, it could be argued, strongly
influenced their assessment of the potential arrangement as good or not good. Furthermore,
their access to a good future situation is dependent upon how their competence is asked for in
the future organization. It would be understandable if their judgment was that they would be
better off with a status quo. Again, similar to the production leaders at Electric Industry facing
other demands and qualifications (as already indicated), the local managers in Banking faced
the prospect of being judged by management results rather than professional skills, the
employees of Money Market faced a future with increased clarity about who generated the
profit, replacing the old situation in which a lot of myths existed in this field, and the worker at
Transport was certainly faced with being judged by other, customer- oriented standards .
A question that now remains is whether rational, political and cultural factors interrelate in a
particular way. There is not much help from the data in this issue, so we turn to other
researchers for help. Pettigrew (1985: 41/5) proposes and emphasizes a cultural-political
perspective. He finds it fruitful and rewarding to use this combined perspective to understand
stability and change. To some extent this idea bears similarities with Weicks suggestion that the
notion ofrational vs. irrational is replaced by the notion ofmultiple rationalities (Weick 1969).
Pettigrew, however, sees organizational culture as framing the attention, whereas people and
groups are naturally also motivated by their interests. In other words, how they see their
interests served depends on their organizational and group cultures. That also includes what
they see as status, rewards, ete. Different groups have different rationalities as he sees it. He
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therefore holds the product of legitimation processes shaped by political-cultural considerations
to be the content of strategy expressed in rational/analytical terms.
The question is then of the "What comes first, the chicken or the egg"? kind. It is possible to
suggest an answer to the question of which factors come first. There is, for instance, reason to
believe that when the organizational members of Car Retailer actively do not support initiatives
taken to forward a customer orientation, it is first of all because it is felt to be alien. They are
used to being judged according to sales quantity; the new criteria will be different, more
complex and something with which they are not familiar. It is in this light that they understand
and formulate the idea that it is perhaps against their personal or group interest It is in this light
that the rationality of concrete steps, solutions and actions taken to forward the new
organizational direction are argued against
Furthermore, when the employees discover that the practical solutions launched or suggested
to forward the new organizational direction will mean that their work structure will not be
formed according to old occupational barriers, that they shall rotate, perform other tasks, be
evaluated for pay raises and promoted according to other criteria, or that their coffee rooms
shall be used by people coming from other groups, ete. They find reasons to argue that these
solutions are not sensible. It is consequently from the perspective of their accustomed
collective ways of thinking and acting that they evaluate what best would serve themselves and
their interests.
Counterforcin& reframin&: Or&anizational culture and organizational rationality
The cultural type of counterforce therefore seems to be the most basic. Recall the idea of
making local bank managers "mini" executive managers with overall responsibility for the
results of their units. An examination of their structures and decision systems, however,
revealed that a lot of decisions were taken by central staff. In fact, the local managers couldn't
control the variables that influenced the results for which they were responsible. One could say
that the cultural artifacts of the organization represented an earlier rationality than that
forwarded now - a sort of ossiftcation of past rationality.
Past rationality becomes ~ way of doing things. It is seen as rational and was defended as
such. How people in organizations deftne the situation is culturally channelled. In the next
vein, however, their deftnition of the situation also "works back" on the culture (e.g. Ball
1972). One could say that participant rationality is a result of, and existent within, their culture.
This view is strongly supported by Gagliardi's (1986) culture fan of option. According to this
view the organizational culture is constituted by severallevels, a view he largely has adopted
from Schein's (1984) interpretation of Kluckhohn (1953). Rationality is seen as a
consequence of the prevailing basic assumptions and values. More precisely, he says that the
basic assumptions and values are the basic level of the cultural fan of options. The next level is
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constituted by what he calls the "primary strategy" which should be understood as the drive for
survival. The expressive as well as instrumental strategies are formed on this basis again
framing the modes of implementation. The modes of implementation represent what seems to
be rational within the cultural fan of options; the organization is not able to produce practical
solutions that are outside what follows - the frame of - these basic values and assumptions.
Modes of Implementation
Instrumental and
expressive strategies
Primary strategy
(survival)
FIG. 5.1 GAGLIARDI 1986: "FAN OF OPTIONS"
Basically this line of argument is in line with for instance Brown's (1978) conception of
organizational paradigms and Spybeys (1984) frames of meaning. According to such views,
organizational rationality is seen as a cultural phenomenon.
Counterforcin& refranUo&: Or&anizational culture and orpnizatiooal politics
It has been demonstrated that the rational arguments are formulated within a cultural frame. The
political dimension is not included in Gagliardi's model. It does, however, seem to have an
obvious relationship to the cultural. How do, for example, the Sales people in Car Retailer
assess the new direction from the perspective of their own career and interests? It seems rather
clear that their "old" qualifications won't count that much any more. Their qualifications were
to go out in the show room and simply talk a person into buying one of their products.
It was quite similar in Airline. People were experiencing having to broaden their area of
competence. In the planned team organization people were to be honoured for a broad scope of
competence, whereas in the past the demand was for specialists. The product manager in
Electric Industry must become aware of that what he was rewarded for doing in the past
would not have the same value in the future, ete. To many people, a new organizational
direction will appear as a manifest or latent loss. As touched upon above, the view that there is
a distinct relationship between cultural and political systems is strongly supported by Pettigrew
{1985, p.42) who states that
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"Indeed, a key part of the political processes of the firm may have to do with which issues
become a focus of individual or group interest and attention and move onto the stage of
decision-making, and which issues are suppressed and otherwise immobilized and left in the
wings ... "
Furthermore, Pettigrew (p. 44) finds that the acts and processes associated with politics as the
management of meaning represent conceptually the overlap between a concern with the political
and cultural analysis of the organization. He therefore finds the central concept linking the two
to be legitimacy. The management of meaning refers then to the attempt to create legitimacy in
one's actions and ideas.
Counter{orcin& reframin&: Culture. politics and rationality
It seems, in other words, quite defendable to claim that both political and rational ideas, views
and judgments seem to result from, or be heavily influenced by, the organizational culture.
Gagliardis fan of options, it seems, could also be expanding and adjusting to include the
political dimension. We have to be aware that this model is not an explicit model of forms of
resistance. It is, however, a model developed to help assess what kind of solutions can be
implemented in a particular organizational culture. It therefore seems defendable to use it to
discuss the relationship between the different forms of bases for counteractions to reframing
organizations. In view of the discussion above, a rationally-oriented resistance to change
would reflect a political undertone. However, the organizational culture would bear heavily
upon these political motivations
FIG. 5.2 EXPANDED FAN OF OPTIONS
(Hennestad et al. 1990; Adapted from Gagliardi 1986)
It is illustrated that organizational culture bears heavily on what is defined as the interests of
individuals and groups. Organizational culture also bears heavily on what is seen as rational
and what is not. Consequently, organizational culture can be seen as having a primarely role in
constituting counterforces to change.
Self reinforcement
Gagliardi suggests, in line with Schein (1984), that collectives or groups learn from their
positive rather than negative experiences. The model he forms on this view is helpful in
grasping the implications for reframing organizations following from the ideas presented
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above. It suggests that cultures are formed on the basis of the ideas that "work" for the group
in coping with their environments. Constructively learning from negative experiences seems to
be a less likely pattern fororganizations (e.g. Starbucket al. 1977, Starbuck & Milliken 1988).
/
Stabilization of values
and symbolic field Collective experience
ofsuccess
Ex~iseofdistinctive
Cohesion and ,./
organizational efficiency
FIG. 5.3 ORGANIZATIONAL SELF REINFORæMENT
(Gagliardi 1986)
The exertion of a distinctive competence, like a new line of products, new ways of
cooperation, etc., is the basis for a process of organizational development. If the result is
success which is experienced by the members of the groups, "this is a good way of doing
things" and, after some time, "this is ~ way of doing things" or "~ thing to be done" is the
kind of collective interpretation that will emerge.
The idealizations will cause a stabilization of organizational values and the development of
symbols supporting them, which again will rationalize collective thinking and behaviour,
implying increased cohesion and organizational efficiency leading to an even more effective
exertion of the distinctive competence. This is a virtuous circle as long as there is a need for the
distinctive competence, but the same circle becomes a vicious one when there is no longer a
need for that distinctive competence: the organization will go on doing what it did before in
spite of the changes in the environment.
A computer finn established by one or several entrepreneur(s) to develop and produce very
advanced computer products can serve as an example. Imagine that it is successful by having a
loose, informal "let a thousand flowers bloom" sort of style. Imagine also that the finn grows
considerably and that its organizational and management style is a critical success factor. The
market changes, however, after some years. Customers now want information processing
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problems solved rather than state-of-the-art products, resulting in demands for punctuality,
service, following-up delivered products, etc. The company's "let a thousand flowers bloom"
style of management and organization does not make the changes a natural and easy thing to
implement In fact, if and when the company runs into problems due to the market change
mentioned, the (Gagliardi's) prospect is that it will try even harder to do what it did before the
way it did it before. This idea is also very much in line with some of the ideas in the field of
organization learning (e.g. Starbuck et al. 1977). Gagliardi's model pictures a development
that is circular and self reinforcing. In essence, Nystrom and Starbuck draw the same
conclusion, but phrase it somewhat differently:
"Organizations learn. Then theyencase their learning in programmes and standard operating
procedures that members execute routinely. These programmes and procedures generate
inertia, and the inertia increases when organizations socialize new members and reward
conformity to prescribed roles. As their successes accumulate, organizations emphasize
efficiency, grow complacent, and learn too little." (Nystrom and Starbuck 1984: 1)
The Creation of Organizational Momentum
The exertion of a particular distinctive competence can be seen as a chosen form of rationality.
It is chosen by the person or group of people who get the activities started or it simply
represents their way of defining things which they have comprehended during various forms
of experience.
The point is that after some time this will appear as ~ way of doing things. It follows,
however, from previous discussions that a certain distribution of compensation, power, future
opportunities, etc., will be one of the effects of the development It is to be expected that
people will tend to defend their interests according to the situation that has emerged. This can
serve as an additional explanation for why the circle of organizational culture is a fruitful way
of describing the formation of organizational culture and why it is hard to change. Within the
framework of Gagliardi's original model, we could integrate this aspect as follows:
Idealization
Stabilization of (wues ~
and symbolic field
(and politics/interests)
Collectiveexperience
ofsuccess..
Cohesion and /
Exercise of distinctive
competence
(Chosen rationtJlities)
FIG. 5.4 ORGANIZATIONAL SELF REINFORCEMENT REVISED
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The starting point of the model is the exercise of a distinctive competence. We could
therefore, in contrast to what has been suggested before, say that in a sense "rationality comes
before culture". However, ~ established or formed, the cultural aspect has become the
most basic aspect of the three forces forms and motivations resisting change. The model also
illustrates that one particular form of rationality becomes ~ rationality. In other words, that
rationality is culturally defmed.
The idea is that the counteracting tendencies of organizations imply that organizations result
from some kind of development logic. What is presented is probably close to the phenomenon
labelled by Croziers (1964:187) as a "self-reinforcing equilibrium", a stationary and persistent
set of patterns and structures that prevents change from taking place. This kind of social
mechanism can be related to the "circular character of culture" that has been demonstrated in
earlier chapters. It means that organizations tend to continue along the same line of
development rather than reversing it, even when environmental changes imply that it should.
Such processes are described by Donald Schon (1973) as "dynamic conservatism", processes
that reproduce infmite variations of the old but very little that is new.
Miller and Friesen (1980) even claim to document that a centralized, mechanistic kind of
organization will tend to grow more centralized, whilst a decentralized form of organization
will tend to grow more decentralized ete. What they actually are saying is that organizations
tend to be morphostatic rather than morphogenetic (Smith 1984); the existing types of
activities, operations, and decisions tend to be reinforced and reproduced in spite of changes in
the environment and attempted management change.
The organizational culture plays an important part in this because it implies that the participants
of the organization are "victims" of self confirming interpretations of the organizational reality.
They are part of "vicious circles" (Crozier 1964, Masuch 1985) or "games without end",
which lead to a reproduction and reinforcement of past behaviour in the future. This is
especially the case since organizational culture also mediates what is defined as politically
interested and rationally sound
The notion of the creation of an organizational momentum conceptualizes (Miller and Friesen
1980) the phenomenon explored here. It is here seen as connoting that once established it
sustains the establised past and rejects the new. Sustaining the past and rejecting the new is, in
a way, two sides of the same coin. In both cases, organizations are characterized by
momentum in favour of the existing organizational direction. The basic aspects of the
organizational momentum are chosen rationalities, organizational culture and organizational
politics. It is their relationship that creates and constitutes the circular and self reinforcing
tendency giving organizational processes a momentum.
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Organizational momentum - counterforcing reframing
The aim of this chapter is to achieve a better understanding of the nature of the task of
refraIning organizations. It is already implicit in the perspective that there is a certain self
conserving tendency in organizational frames. "Seeing is also not seeing" to put it bluntly. It is
also quite evident that power and politics will play a role in resisting new frames becoming
realized. Organizations imply a certain distribution of resource and status. In addition to
various individual reasons for rejecting change (e.g. Greiner and Schein 1988, Staw 1981) and
the consequent use of existing power bases (Pfeffer 1981, Bråten 1973) in pursuing these
interests, political processes will breed forming coalitions for opportunistic purposes
(Pettigrew 1985).
In addition to understand the rejection of new frames as being explained by cultural and
political reasons, it has also been suggested that new frames might be rejected for the simple
reason that they do not represent good or rational solutions. The interrelationships between
these reasons were discussed, and a conception of organizational momentum was developed
around the relationship between these three reasons for counterforcing refraIning organizations.
By that is meant that organizations develop forces and mechanisms which sustain the
established organizational direction.
In the introductory chapter organizational frames were seen as channelling organizational
thinking and action. They were seen as reflecting organizational culture and manifesting
themselves in the organizational orientations. The task of refraIning organizations is therefore,
in a sense, a task of confronting the power of organizational frames. These reflect the
organizational culture, which plays an important part in constituting and sustaining
organizational momentum. It leans heavily on how people define the situation in both rational
as well as political terms. The counterforcing of refraIning organizations is represented by a
complicated texture of cultural, rational and political reasons. It still seems to make sense to say
that they develop a organizational momentum that is culturally based, rationally argued and
politically motivated. In this sense "man is an animal suspended in a web of significance he
himself has spun", as Geertz puts it.
Obtaining reframing momentum in the period of liminality
We know it is possible to break out of establisehed organizational frames. Quite a few
organizations that have lived for a long time have had to relate to qualitatively different
conditions. To manage this they necessarily have had to go through extensive shifts in their
way of functioning. Still, we also know it is not an easy task to manage. Attempting to break
the organizational logic can easily become victim to the logic they are trying to break.
Furthermore, organizations (organizational cultures) do not change overnight by decree. This
follows from their complex and interwoven nature. The establishment of a new organizational
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direction of development therefore implies a transition period in which the attempt to gain
foothold, "win or loose". There is a need to characterize what kind of a situation we are facing
when attempting to reframe organizations by change actions; trying as described in an earlier
chapter, to obtain "internal" effects by "external" means.
Turner's work on cultural and structural change (e.g. 1980) can offer some help in this respect.
It is built around a concept characterizing this period, or situation. He introduces the tenn
"liminality" to describe the betwixt and between position which develops when previous
structural arrangements have terminated, but new ones have not been established or gained a
foothold. Turner himself says about the concept:
"I have written at length about the threshold or liminal phase of ritual and found it fruitful to
extend the notion of liminality as metaphor beyond ritual to other domains of expressive
cultural action (161)".
The concept was originally used to describe rituals when people in "primitive" societies entered
a new stage in life and status in society. Originally it referred to what transfonned the
individual, but conserved the established form of society. The rituals however took the
participants out of the structure and rules of everyday life. Liminal conditions were, by van
Gennep, referred to and characterized as "being betwixt and between more stable and
predictable social arrangements. Liminal conditions create an "as if' reality were wish, desire
and hypothesis reign". It is here that the creative potential resides.
Turner points out that in the modem society religious rituals have lost their significance. Other
media - for example stories - have conserved the possibility for liminal experience, they create
meaning and are important means for grappling with ambiguity and change. He finds that
liminal reflexivity creates some form of "consciousness of consciousness" by which important
aspects of life, for instance roles and relationships, can be reconsidered. Liminal reflexivity is
found in sense-making processes dealing with new social arrangements or new cultural
constructs. They form creative processes in which new meaning is being constructed to
integrate the new social arrangements or cultural meanings.
Feldman has studied organizations based on Turner' s idea that stories relate to change and
conflict as a mediating force that works to resolve political conflict and cultural contradiction. It
is here that stories exercise their transformational power. By representing events in terms of
past experience (culture) and political interests, stories evaluate and distort what they represent.
The synthetic nature of stories goes beyond saying what dM happen, to implying what should
happen or what kim happen. In this way, they not only influence thought, feeling and will, but
the construction of social reality itself. Turner concludes that stories are a form of cultural
creativity that can be used to mediate conflicts and contradictions that arise from changing
circumstances, and that stories, despite the fact that they are a form of cultural change, can
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have an anti-transitional influence on the process of organizational change. He concludes that
(pp. 29 and 29/30)
"For the transition to be structurally transformative, the liminal phase must carry through its
alchemy of social roles and relations in such a way as to create new and legitimate structural
conditions. For the creativity of the liminal phase to be transformative, the powerful and
important must support it".
Feldman analyses what happens in a period of leadership change through the idea of liminality
by studying stories produced in this period. He uses the term to connote a period of unclear
authority and conflict where new cultural constructs are created to make sense out of, and to act
on, the new situation, but before new structural arrangements have become clear and stable
(Feldman 1989:2). He also shows that things can happen during this period, in his case the
creation of organizational stories, that can have an anti-transitional influence on the process of
organizational change. By doing so, he introduces the concept of liminality to a different field
than its origins. He stays, however, close to the original meaning of the concept by sticking to
the media of stories, underlining their potential of taking the participants out of the everyday
situation and thereby creating liminality and its creative potential. Furthermore, he shows how
they function to support transformation and how they also can function anti-transformationally.
It seems fruitful to use the concept (metaphorically) in the more general situation of attempting
organizational change. This is justified because, in a situation of attempted organizational
change, the members of the organization, in addition to the possible production of
organizational stories, are exposed to a multitude of new stimuli like information on an
organizational crises, new ideas about the tasks of the company, visions, new concepts and
scenarios as well as various means of internal marketing. Additionally, organizational members
may be exposed to new demands and new ideas because of structural changes, ete. Taken
together this means a sort of between and betwixt position in which the new is not established
and the old is not completely valid, and in a way the period can also be characterized as an "as
if' organizational reality where wish, desire and hypotheses reign (Feldman 1988:7).
The tenn liminality can be used to connote a situation that is created when change actions have
started to have effects that put the established organizational direction in a new perspective, but
when the intended organizational direction has not become concrete and valid to the
organizational members. In this ambiguous "betwixt and between situation" counterforces will
be released and the effects of the change actions are not clear. They can have an intended effect,
or to be "overruled" so that a transformation of the organizational direction does not take place.
The battle for reframing organizations must be won in the period of liminality, meaning that the
new direction must gain foothold during this period. The conditions for new organizaitonal
frames must be cultivated during this vacuum period in such a way that it obtains momentum.
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Only in that way can the process of reframing get started and result in a real shift This process
can, as pointed out, hardly take place as a sudden or overnight shift from one frame to
another. It is therefore necessary to examine the conditions for how new ideas gain
momentum during the period of liminality so that the period of liminality becomes a period of
reframing.
Commitment for the new; an incremental process
The idea of a period of liminality implies that reframing organizations is a process, it can not be
a sudden shift from "one day to the next". To clarify, structural change can, of course, to some
extent, take place overnight The formal structure of decision authority can be altered from one
day to another. Departments can be removed, tasks can be moved from one department to
another, the information flow - especially the kind facilitated by computer means can be
changed, ete. Such changes do not, however, necessarily accomplish changes in collective
thinking to support their intended purpose, and certainly not overnight. On the other hand,
structural changes can always be expected to influence the way organizational members
interpret and enact their situation, but certainly not always as intended by the structural
changes. The structural changes are usually launched to accomplish or to help a new direction
develop. If this direction is to become realized through a process of organizational reframing,
organizational commitment is needed.
In a way it seems a bit risky to introduce the term "commitment". It has probably been subject
to as many definitions as there are researchers using the term. Still, there seem to be two major
ways of using the term. Roughly half the users use it as an attitudinal construct analogous to
motivation, involvement, or identification. For the second group of users it represents
something different from attitude and personal conviction. For this group commitment refers to
structural conditions in which a behaviour is irrevocable or difficult to change, the act of
staking additional consequences or side bets to an original course of action, or a state of mind
that makes it difficult to change attitudes or behaviour. (Staw 1981: 101). Commitment in this
sense is, in a way, the glue that holds individuals in a line of behaviour. This paper more or
less follows this second conception of commitment. Organizational commitment refers to
organizational members - in some cases a subgroup of members - being collectively committed
to the new.
It follows from this view that, from one perspective commitment represents the forces that
make the organizational members stick to a course of action. From another perspective,
commitment therefore represents the counterforces. In away, commitment is both what the
organization or management needs and what it should fear. What is an advantage at one
moment in time turns against you at another moment in time when change for one reason or the
other is needed.
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Of course, this way of using the term organizational commitment causes definitional as well
as operational problems. Here organizational commitment is used when the organization as a
collective is characterized by a certain way of thinking .ami acting in relation to a specific set of
issues or problems. This means that organizational commitment to organizational frames can be
developed to a certain width. dmUh .um~
By degree of width is meant that the set of ideas representing the new direction are shared fully
or only partly. By degree of depth is meant that the commitment can prove to be be reflected in
organizational behaviour to different degrees. It can prove to only be only lip service, or only
ideational, or it can prove to have greater depth by being reflected in behaviour, and it can go
still deeper be being reflected in altered organizational systems and structures. ff this is the
case, we are close to the kind of organizational commitment representing cultural change. The
extent of organizational commitment does, however, also vary since the new direction can be
found to have commitment only in the top management group, or in the top and middle
management, or in these groups and the union representatives, or it is possible that the new
direction only finds commitment in the headquarters.
The point of this short examination of the complex nature of organizational commitment - as a
prerequisite for organizational reframing - is to demonstrate that obtaining organizational
commitment for a new direction cannot be done overnight.
Incremental and transformational change
In the literature on organizational change and the incremental and the transformational theories,
or theses, of change are often considered contrasting (e.gDunphy and Stace 1988). According
to incremental change theory, often associated with the OD tradition, effective organizational
change is seen as a result of management moving the organization forward in small logical
steps (e.g. Quinn 1980, 1981). However, the contrasting transformational view, that perhaps
can be considered to have emerged as a result of growing discontinuity in markets and societies
(e.g. Drucker 1969), considers effective organizational change to take place as extensive,
large-scale organizational transition involving total structures and management processes rather
than only components of the organization (e.g. Kimberly and Quinn 1984).
How does this fit with the view that organizational reframing has to be an incremental process?
This view does not rule out the possibility that structural changes can be of a sudden character.
In fact, it can not be ruled out that such changes can be a necessary step in the reframing of
organizations. Of course, an extensive structural change can lead to a major shift in
organizational frames without other actions from management However, if this shift is
supposed to be in line with intended ideas for a new direction, it is likely to assume that other
actions must be taken. By actions is meant other structural or system adjustments, motivation,
information and explanations, creations of ruling myth,s ete.
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Organizational frames represent such a complex and pervasive social phenomenon that they
consequently cannot be programmed by structural manipulations. The cultural influences and
implications of an extensive structural change are dependent upon the meaning the participants
of the focal social system attach to it, which again is a highly complex social process dependent
on the interrelationship between historical, environmental, subcultural and also personal
factors. Consequently, the process of gaining organizational commitment to a new direction is
by its nature, a step-wise - or incremental - process, in spite of the possibility that
transformational structural change could constitute a crucial step in this process.
Gaining foothold for a new direction
In attempting to manage organizational reframing, there is a period of liminality in which
conflicting social processes unfold In simple terms, there exists in this period tensions,
conflicts, and contradictions between the old and the new. The result of this struggle could be
that the new direction or frame gains foothold, it could be "more of the same", but it could be
something new and unforeseen, perhaps, but not necessarily, unwanted. What happens
when direction will "win" is the result of conscious as well as unconscious social actions of
the actors involved. From the point of view of wanting to introduce a new organizational
direction, one way to see it is that the challenge is to start a movement in an environment of
hostile, historically anchored forces of cultural content and manifestations.
During the period of liminality, momentum must be gained to develop organizational
commitment to the new frame. Such reframing momentum - the establishment of social forces
working towards the new direction not depending on (structural) forces exerted by the top
management or people in power - must be socially constructed by intentional incremental steps
in the period of liminality. It is not only a question of frame-breaking, but also a question of
making the new frame stick (pettigrew 1985, Kimberley and Quinn 1984). It is not only a
question of forcing people into new behaviours representing a new direction, but also a
question of getting them to be committed to do so.These are not questions of yes or no, but of
degrees.
Still, the assumption is that at one point in time the new direction gets or can get a foothold in
the sense that the interplay between people and their structures and systems starts to
(re)produce actions, artifacts and meanings consonant with the intended new direction, and, it
starts to do so "from within".This is not just because they are forced by some superior agency;
the new direction no longer relies solelyon enforcement, persuasion and seduction. When
such a social force is constituted, reframing momentum has been established, according to this
view.
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Obtaining reframing momentum
The discussion implies a need to be more precise about the nature of the task. Reframing
organizations implies that a momentum for change has to be created. There are especially
two ideas that have led to this understanding. Organizations tend to develop a momentum
implicitly counterforcing attempted organizational reframing, Furthermore, the period of
change is one of liminality. These conceptions imply that a foothold for change has to be
gained standing on the threshold between the old and the new with different forces pulling
in each direction. Although some change actions have been taken, and a period of change
therefore developed, it is still yet unsettled whether the organizational processes will move
towards a new frame producing a new direction or whether they will "fall back" into the
old.
Period of liminality
Reframing momentum
<,
New - intended - orientation
FIG 5.5 REFRAMING MOMENTUM
Organizational change as reframing should therefore be seen as related to establishing a
momentum. The reframing concepts that were identified in the last chapter should be
understood in this perspective. Theyemerge as organizational issues reflecting the problem
of gaining a foothold for the reframing process. The task of developing concepts and a
model for reframing organizations is one of identifying concepts and a model for
establishing a change momentum. The next chapter shall identify, explain and discuss
some basic conditions for establishing a change momentum.
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Chapter 6: Conditions for Establishing a Reframing Momentum
The aim of this chapter is to identify basic conditions for establishing a reframing momentum.
Conditions are properties that, when established, will underpin the development of a reframing
momentum. These condidtions should suggest in which direction we should focus the energy
in order to accomplish a reframing of organizations. But they will not tell us what activities
exactly to undertake.
Rationale and structuration have been identified as two such conditions. Rationale refers to
basic motivation for changing the organization. Structuration refers to mechanisms for
controlling change efforts so that they generate a continuous focus on the contingencies for a
reframing momentum to be established
These two notions are seen as necessary, but not sufficient, conditions for areframing
momentum. The relationship between them, and how they relate to the various organizational
situations is discussed. The section begins by demonstrating how the notion of structuration
was developed. It emerged when comparing certain aspects in Transport and Airline, where
grains for a reframing momentum were implanted, and the same aspect in Furniture where the
reframing process was aborted.
Structuration as a condition for establishing a reframing momentum
The controlline effects of a new product at Transport
The situation in Transport was that there had been two (2·2) preparation and commitment
seminars for key personnel including union representatives. After the CEO sensed the need
for him to demonstrate the importance of these efforts by "taking over the seminar", it seemed
as if the participants committed themselves also to individual development tasks. These
seminars were then transformed into a regular meeting structure - "Smiths" as they were called
- for following up and learning. Furthermore, the management structure at HQ had been
simplified, the hierarchy made less steep with coaching of managers at central and local levels
and managers resigning. A restructuring of the nation-wide structure of terminals had started
and the total number had been reduced In addition, the firm also had considerable layoffs
due to the need for future investments and cost reductions caused by a serious drop in the
market.
What is to be noted is particularily related to the introduction of a new service product. It
represented an operationalization of the strategy of offering guaranteed transport services and
was supposed to improve the image of the company and also speed up the pace of change. To
understand what is special about the new it is necessary to repeat that the firm was
"traditional" in its work orientations. It was, in a sense, bureaucratic and inward oriented
thinking "tons" rather than market, efficiency and profit (economy).
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"A real company man within the old frame", said one of the external consultants somewhat
ironically, characterizing the company orientation in the very beginning of the project. "does
not care about economy or accountancy. If he is to judge the achievements of the company, it
will be in terms of tons rather than surplus and profit. ..The company man perceives any
suggestion about changes coming from another as an attack on himself and the way he is
doing his job ...he does not really like to leave his place to check how things really are. His
security is based on his operational competence."
In retrospect, one of the other consultants described the dominating work orientation to be
"ritual" rather than "problem-solving". In practical terms that would also mean a "what we
don't manage to do today, will have to be done tomorrow" sort of an attitude ..
The new product reflected the new strategic direction of the firm and was based on a concept
of door-to-door delivery and guaranteed services. In this particular case the delivery was
guaranteed to be before ten o'clock day two, if it was sent before a certain time day one. If the
goods were not delivered before deadline, the customer would not have to pay! This kind of
promise contrasted with the prevailing company orientation quite dramatically.
The concept for the new product was presented to the organization by top management The
processes of concretizing the product at the operational level and preparingfor its
implementation, related to the change meetings mentioned above and was performed in an
interplay between project work in the local units and this forum. In the local units project
groups assessed practical problems in introducing the new product Their assessments were
given to a manger at HQ responsible for coordinating the formation and introduction of the
product and who also prepared the discussion in the forum.
''We tried to make as many as possible of the local work groups recognize some of their
thinking/assessments in what gradually emerged as the fmal product", he said
The project leader added to this
" ... goal development processes were carried through in all departments, and goals and
action plans were related to the demands raised by the new product The result of a test period
was, however, 7% failures, a result that would have brought the firm to the level of
bankruptcy within a few weeks if the guarantee (new product) had been active at that time.
This led to an assessment of all internal routines, a mapping of possible problem and actions
taken to improve them; in short a genuine internal "clearing action". The result improved week
by week and at the time of implementation we were under 1% failures."
This result seemed to be sustained. Although there were, of course, periodical problems and
variations across terminals.
One of the consultants drew attention to the visibility and immediate feed back of not
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succeeding in the job that had now emerged. Cargo that should have been sent a particular day
would visibly remain on the floor or platform if they failed. Furthermore, the destination
station would immediately try to find out what had happened and the customer would not be
invoiced for that shipment. He also drew attention to the pressure that now was created for
work pattern and tools to support the new product service:
''This (Guaranteed delivery) demands a different and frequent communication between the
drivers, (terminal) workers and the "office" to keep track over where the various shippings
are. By car phone it is continuously checked whether they are on schedule or not, and what
measures, if any, have to be taken meet the guarantee. The communication also had to be
improved between the terminals, and they get, for example, immediate feed back by fax if
goods have been sent to the wrong place. Some places a system has been implemented that
gives the workers responsibility for certain particular destination. Both the drivers and the
workers express a feeling of "ownership" following from this system, which again helps
fulftll the guarantee."
He also observed how bottlenecks in the production were now focused on by pointing out:
"The procedure around the checking of goods against the papers (bills) that used to occupy 3-
4 men, a time-consuming task that often became a bottleneck in production process, has now
been completely eliminated. It has to be right the first time."
"The orientations of the employees seemed gradually to change", he summed up after
investigating the organizational effects with two others. One way of phrasing that is that a
volume orientation (moving tons) seemed to have been replaced by a business orientation
(making money/survive), and a ritual work orientation (this is how it is done) seemed to be
replaced by a more problem-solving orientation (getting the goods there according to the
customer needs)." One of the employees simply put it this way, "We now know that we
cannot put tons into the wallet". Another said "In the end it is the customer that gives us our
bread and butter". Others said things like, "Today we try to fmd solutions before asking the
boss". (They did!) "Previously it did not make much difference whether you performed the
tasks that were given to you. It did not have any consequences". "People are much more
effective today - today you cannot expect to be left in peace."
The above example also presents a case in which ~ for the establishment of a reframing
momentum have been sown. This is also the case in the next example, which demonstrates
another approach for exerting pressure on the work patterns of the members of the
organization.
The ap.plication of a &oalstructure at Airline
There was a strong empahsis on developing and following up goals in the Airline approach.
The idea was that emphasizing goals would: 1. make the organization draw in the same
direction because of a common understanding, and that it also would constitute an effective
means of communications across the levels, 2. represent a structural pressure necessary to
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identify to the organization as a whole, 3. represent a democratic element allowing for the
management of ones own situation, and 4. constitute a driving force for the allocation of
resources. The process was planned to gradually cover deeper levels of the organization in
some kind of cascade effect.
The aim was to develop a more market-orlented enterprise characterized by decentralized total
responsibility. The idea was that the new direction should be demonstrated by form as well as
content. The structure for working with change was formed with the intention of forcing
managers to take on responsibility for results demanded by the emerging situation of the
company.
"The plan was clear", stated the project consultant, "The establishment of goals, strategy for
action, and breaking down goals at lower levels were first and foremost at area levels. The
expectation was that this process should influence the attitudes towards change among the
members, increase the insight and understanding for the process, ete. The process was
supposed to gradually cover lower levels of the organization through some kind of cascade
effect. This would also manifest itself in the change of ideas, structures, systems and
activities".
The strategic management group, also the acting steering committee for the project, had the
initiative and was driving this process with the follow up and learning meeting (FUAL) as the
primary arena. Gradually local goals concerning economic contributions and level of sales
were formed in an interaction process where the sum of unit goals were given. The unit goals
were consequently followed up in the change structure (FUAL) by the top management.
It was a general impression that the working style had contributed to creating openness and
commitment in the development of ideas, broad participation in problem solving, increased
understanding for the enterprise as a whole, "cost consciousness", motivation for action and
became a tool for management and control of the change endeavour. The efforts also revealed
and clarified difficulties like problems in formulating understandable values and goals, lack of
economic knowledge in the organization and problems in establishing a power base at middle
manager level. The project leader said, for example:
"This process demands result (responsible) units. This again demands efficient economic
management information systems, which again seems difficult to establish. Technically
competent and capable accountants are not good at asking key questions from this
perspective".
"However, through the breaking down of goals a new understanding of reality emerges", the
project consultant remarkd. "New operational goals concerning economic contribution and
level of sales offer meaning and direction to work efforts ...Little by little a crisis
consciousness developed through this process."
"In an early phase", said one of the external consultants after having talked to several of the
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involved managers, "top FUAL was experienced as tough. Terror regime is a phrase that was
repeatedly used, but gradually developed towards a more open style ...the net effect seems to
be that this phase is seen in relation with the need for getting things started. The forum has
gradually moved towards focusing and following up goals and economic issues emphasizing a
more trusting atmosphere".
This now became the way of introducing and enforcing new activities, be they major cost
reductions or team organization. The overall goal was proposed (set) by the top
manager/strategic management group and then broken down through a process in the learning
and follow up meetings, where progress and results were also very forcefully followed up,
performance also constituting a basis for evaluation of the single managers.
"In addition to contributing to a more responsible management style of culture", said the
project leader, various effects were generated though this process. When it came to the nature
of goals in the organization the need for people to influence the goal-setting was increasingly
acknowledged, and also for them to have some freedom in deciding how to reach the goals.
Like, for example, instead of ordering lower units to reduce costs by laying off a certain
number of people, they should decide how to do it themselves. The need for what was
considered to be indirect goals became gradually apparent. It was for instance seen as
necessary to establish goals for absence because of sickness (signalling leadership or quality
of work defects) and wrecked material (signalling ineffective work patterns or routines). The
idea also became more conscious that goals should concern results that people can influence,
and they should have a say in the realism of these goals (ownership). Steps were taken for
goals to be developed at team (multi functional basic organizational unit) level concerning
economy, efficiency (cost pr. unit/deliverance), damages, organizational climate, development
of level of competence, etc., in addition to the centralized standards for performance."
There is an indication here that goals represent structure when being followed up. They clarify
where to go and represent a means of checking and confronting individuals and groups as to
whether or not the right course is being followed. A structure of goals can therefore impose
upon people experiences that represent new kinds of ideas and a new direction. At the same
time, the persistence of this structure ensures the reinforcement of these ideas, thereby
generating a focus on the conditions for the practice of these ideas. A question is, however, if
pure economic goals are "black-box" types of goals that offer no direction to new ways of
approaching tasks, and, consequently, whether goals that concern variables affected, more or
less, directly by people's actions expose people more clearly to new experiences.
Before going more into these examples, let us look once more at Furniture.
Lack of structural pressure at Furniture
Two seminars were aimed at securing the understanding of the need for change and the
directon in which to go. A third one was also planned and carried through partly because the
top manager and the project leader saw their functions as crucial and partly because the first
seminars were so successful. The change project was run by a steering group which was
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chaired by the top manager, however the other members of that group were not from the top
management group. There were two union leaders, the personnel managers and the sales
manager. These were people believed by the top manager to be progressive and dynamic
enough to give the project a "driving force". The line managers were left out of the steering
group.
The seminars focused on various aspects of the change needs: to transform the company from
a traditional production oriented frame towards a frame forwarding a higher degree of
flexibility in the deliverance/marketing system. The production had alreadyshifted from
traditional mass (series) production towards more order-oriented production. The challenge
was primarily seen as a "culturallag".
"The seminar must be characterized as very successful when it comes to establishing a
dialogue about goals and plans for action", said the project leader. Several proposals resulted
in changes in the company goal. Furthermore, the discussion resulted in a revised marked
concept - the quality wheel. At the end of the seminar, concrete 6-month plans were
formed ....At the end of the seminar the participants clearly expressed that the process was
theirs. The seminars worked as a consciousness raising process for several persons in the
management group. The commitment and courage to bring forward disagreement has
increased, but there was no basic resistance against the suggested efforts, and several
participants expressed a need for structural changes."
An observation made by another external consultant is also of interest:
''The union had participated in formulating the strategy and contributed to it in the seminars by
encouraging others to take a stand. The union chairman proposed, for example, that the
management group and union representatives jointly should arrange an information meeting
about the new direction to symbolize that they were all behind it."
"Commitment seminars" for leaders and key personnel were also carried through for leaders
and key personnel who had not been present at the first series of seminars.
These seminars gained solid response and support in the eyes of the project leader, who also
held the opinion that, "the message seemed to be in resonance with participants ideas. It was
seen as the right way to go."
This phase of the project, in a sense, culminated with the "kick off' day mentioned earlier. It
was supposed to signal to the organization that something big was about to take place. An
amusing, but still to the point, brochure had been distributed and the punch clock was gone
when the workers arrived in the morning, their reactions being filræd for use in the internal
marketing, etc.
At this time the project proceeded to what can be seen as an implementation stage. The steering
group was terminated and "a change structure" set up consisting of the top management
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group, including union representatives who were considered "managers". The "training
sessions" were, as might be recalled. held every second month for the purpose of establishing
action plans for change activities, reporting on and following up of such plans, and
exchanging experiences as well as reflecting about change issues for the purpose of learning.
The comment made by the project leader as a response to his own question about how much
commitment or driving force there was in the change efforts supposed to take place seems
fairly illustrative:
"Not much had really happened before the first meeting (seminar). Peter had done "nothing at
all". He had, however worked his ass off with other tasks. For Fred and Adrian it was
difficult to see if anything was done. In lans case, however, there seems to be some action,
whereas the trainers do as agreed upon. ....This could be typical for the situation that
constantly will emerge. Things that are more "important" than the strategic programme pop
up ....it will be difficult to break old habits."
The various managers did not pursue the change activities that were expected of them nor
seemed to follow up their commitment in this area. Around this time frustration started to
generate in the organization because "nothing happened". Pardy in response to this, but also
in response to an emerging idea that the change project had to attend to practical "here and
now" problems, a method for getting the reorientation started at the lower levels of the
organization was introduced. Seminars were carried out in order to teach the foremen and
department leaders how to develop goals and standards to improve quality, as a basis for
doing exactly that in collaboration with their subordinates. These seminars were also intended
to reflect and motivate the basic message for reorientation. Wheras the courses (seminars) for
leaders (foremen, department managers) in methods for developing new (quality) goals
seemed to be well received and go well, the practical efforts in developing new them got
started but then stopped.
In the beginning it went quite well, but met some skepticism like:
"Will this result in something, or will the efforts vanish once again?.. It seems like quality
circles, and nothing came out of that. .... We have problems in meeting the dead lines because
of increased orders and a lot of over-time .... How do we cope with that? Such things will
always happen .. .It takes more time than we expected."
"The development of local goals, standards and action plans was meant to have different
functions", says the project leader, "It was supposed to train people in developing local goals
on a the specific issue of quality, it was to implement the "think, plan and follow up" style of
working in the whole organization, and it was of course to improve quality. The experiences
varied. Activities got started in "marketing". In the "production" timing seemed bad. This kind
of work was demanding, people had to gather in the evening, the department managers had a
lot of groups to deal with, etc. The implementation stopped seemingly due to strong pressure
for production that developed in this period."
138
After some time the project leader said that "the goals development work has broken
completely down in the production department". ( The major part of the organization.)
Looking at the premises for the change structure and the change efforts, we do observe the
following: The top manager of the unit who initiated the change process, but who now has
been promoted to HQ, was seen as doing the following:
"Previously he had in written words informed the organization that "we do not let short term
economic thinking come in the way of our long term efforts", observed the project
leader ... "He is, however, squeezed by the owners and has limited time to demonstrate
profitability. He squeezes the area managers, who squeeze their department managers."
This is also related to a serious drop in the market that was experienced in this period. A lot of
activities were initiated to help save costs and increase sales. Mangers were followed up
intensivelyon their business improvement: Every month, the various top managers in the unit
have to meet and be examined about their business result and progress. At the same time they
were told that the change efforts were more important than ever when taking part in the
(change) training seminars.
They did, however, manage to succeed in increasing sales and reducing costs. They did not
manage to implement the change ideas. The managers did not seem to follow up their
commitment in this area. The action focus was on other things, that is the sort of things they
were used to, in addition to working harder and also - it could seem - more efficienly. In any
case, the change activities and commitments were not followed up. The change project as such
ended with the incident that was described in the (last) section on counterforcing change: The
new division manager tried to follow up what he perceived as being ideas behind the change
project by implementing some structural changes and also moving managers around. This
caused a "revolt", he was fired and the change project stopped.
Discussion There is creation in regulation.
There is confmnation in novelty"
What do these examples say? Comparing the last example with the two others, it seems that
one difference between them is the amount of structural pressure that is put on doing new
things or doing things differently. From Transport is an example ofhow the implementation of
a new product exerted a pressure on the employees to change their work: pattern by imposing
new work patterns on them. They experienced the new ideas that constituted the new direction
by having to put them into practice.
From Airline is demonstrated how the establishment and following up of a goal structure put
pressure on the managers to change their work pattern and to focus differently. Both of these
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organizations seemed to cope with the issue of having as a heavy pressure on the change
activities as on other activities. In Transport we could even observe the generative aspect of
this pressure as people started to focus on the conditions and contingencies for them to comply
to and follow up on the new standards. Contrasting these situations with the one in Furniture,
we observe that the latter in a sense had established a structure for change activities that proved
inefficient, in fact did not work as a structure. There was a structural pressure on going
concern business activities downgrading the pressure put on change activities.
The preparation and introduction of the new product at Transport was clearly also considered
relevant for business and the work situation. This was underlined by the fact that it was
proved that this kind of approach worked: they were able to deliver time guaranteed transport
services. They experienced so themselves by coping with the new demand. They could also
read in the press that the public was favourable. The successful implementation of guaranteed
products seemed to be an important factor in the creation of a new company image. It was not
only a nice, and perhaps intellectually necessary idea, but it meant that the new idea became
concrete at the level of the individual organizational member. New work orientations, patterns
of interpretation and (inter)action developed and could be seen to develop. The self-
reinforcing tendencies of old work orientations seemed to be broken up.
There are some conditions that most probably ensured that the introduction of the product had
the described effects. First, a similar product service had successfully been introduced half a
year before, but on a much smaller scale. It affected only a small proportion of the operation
and of the manpower. This "early victory" demonstrated to the rest of the organization that it
"was possible". So there was a concrete model as an example both of what should be done
and what was possible. Second, the more extensive product described above had been
developed interactively with representatives of the different local units. This process seemed to
develop a feeling of ownership with the product. Third, we would also guess that the product
capitalized on imprisoned professionalism (craftsmanship) - imprisoned due to poor systems
and management. Previous attempts to increase efficiency have perhaps been perceived as
demands to "sweat more", for instance because goals for improvements (as well as recessions)
were expressed in distant and perhaps alien figures. The measurement of professional success
had not been very concrete or understandable to people on the shop floor.
Nonetheless, there are certain similarities between the nature of a goal system, as described
from Airline, and the enforcing nature of the new product presented above. In fact, the new
product can be seen as representing a goal structure, as the goal structure can be seen to reflect
aspects of the product. Both emphasize clear directions and possibilities for feedback. The
new product seems to capitalize on frustrated professionalism in the sense that people get the
chance to do a good job - and see that they do so - and that they previously have been deprived
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of that opportunity by the system. Or, to view it from another angle, people just do not like to
do stupid things, and the new product made a lot of common sense they immediately could see
whether they succeeded or not.
A goal structure can have the same type of elements in it, even if the measuring of results
cannot be as concrete and visible. It seemed that the management by goal structure functioned
that way in the case of Airline. It must, however, be pointed out that the settings are different:
Figures and percentages about sales and finances might be distant and alien when it comes to
the perceived relevance for the work situation of a shop floor worker, as opposed to middle
line managers. And the other way around, "no excuse arrangements" might be felt as very
relevant to the performance of the shop floor worker, but it is the effects in figures and
percentages that are of interest and felt as relevant to the managers.
The issues identified in the similarities between Transport and Airline on the one hand and
Furniture on the other dealt with the amount and kind of structural pressure involved in
making people comply to new ideas and new standards. The next sections discuss and
suggest what are the conceptual implications of these observations.
Structure conctrols
The point to note in the section above was the role of structural bearings in situations of
change. At this stage there could be a point in recapsulating the challenge we are up to. Even
having intellectually comprehended the new direction, people and collectives of people still do
not tend to change their behaviour. Old habits are, as common sense also would tell us, hard
to change. Organizational frames, it has been pointed out, tend to be preconscious and self-
reinforcing. This is due to the fact that seeing is also not seeing. There is additionally the fact
that "people know what they have got, but not what they are going to get". The new ideas and
the new direction have not proved their legitimacy. People even react against the new because
they suspect that maybe they will lose status, power and/or rewards as a result of the new
direction. And, of course, some will. It has been concluded that we are up against an
organizational momentum. In order to break that, it was claimed, a reframing momentum had
to be created.
It is in this context the that importance of structural bearings should be understood. Due to the
strength of an organizational momentum, it becomes necessary that behaviour and energy are
channelled - or controlled (Nadler 1981) - in the desired direction. It is suggested from the
observations presented above that structural bearings reflecting and communicating the new
ideas can be designed and imposed upon the experiences of the organizational members. In
addition to the examples mentioned, we recall one consultant outlining a few experiences from
trying to reorient a bank. This bank was dominated by the central staff to a degree that was
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considered. to be unproductive and ineffective. He said it was decided that all the major staff
should be assigned to their most dominant principal user as part of a plan to redesign HQ.
This was to red.uce their role in influencing and dominating other organizational units. It was
claimed that it seemed to force both the staff department and the rest of the organization into a
new role where they were exposed to new experiences that underlined and clarified their new
roles.
A somewhat similar example can be taken from the activities in Transport. It indicates that the
structural measures taken control organizational efforts in new and intended ways.
"The reduced number of hierarchical layers - as well as management positions - forced
managers to relate differently to problems, subordinates and each other", said the project
leader. "They seemed be more directly confronted with the market and the problems of
operation. A smaller number of managers also enforced a more direct dialogue, and also made
agreement and disagreement more visible. "
These examples represent single structural changes enforcing upon organizational participants
new experiences and thereby new models. They visualize new demands and solutions that are
in accordance with new ideas. The changes seem to enforce and seduce the organizational
members to practice patterns of leadership and cooperation consistent with intended ideas,
thereby imposing on them experiences that make the new direction more concrete and realistic,
preferably proving its viability.
Controllin~ by structurarlon
Although the above discussion has been focused on structure and structural pressure,
"structure" as a term does not seem to cover the phenomenon identified. The task we are up to
deals with how a constant pressure can be brought upon the establised momentum. In the last
chapter we identified that as an inherently incremental problem. In the examples from
Transport and Airline we have seen seeds for succeeding in establishing such a generative
counterpressure. People did not only start complying to new standards demanded of them,
they also started focusing on the contexual contingencies for managing to do so.
In order to grasp this kind of social mechanism the term structuration seems to come in
handy. We take the chance of borrowing it from Giddens (1976), who used it to refer to the
existing frame bearing on the ongoing production of that of tomorrow. Structuration for
reframing is here taken to mean any mechanisms enforcing the new direction by controlling
that new things are performed and that things are performed differently. The point is also to
create a counterbalance to the inherent organizational tendency towards the old way of thinking
and doing things. As demonstrated earlier, "new behaviours" in an "old culture" are not what
counts nor what pays. Mechanisms for structuration visualize and put pressure on what new
is needed and whether or not new goals and standards are being followed.
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Squeezing the example a bit further for meaning, we can try to ask a few questions about how
mechanisms for the structuration of change could work. In the examples presented earlier, we
see mechanisms more or less extensively embodying and channelling energy in the new
direction. In Transport it was demonstrated how the "no excuse" product reflected the new
strategy and forced upon the organization patterns of behaviour that underpinned this new and
intended organizational direction.
By succeeding, the organizational members also learned about the quality of that direction. By
restructuring its management structure the new form imposed new experiences upon its
participants that were in line with the new organizational direction. InAirline one managed to
embody both the form and content of the new organizational direction by goal orienting
through a management and control structure also aimed at learning from results. Furthermore,
the major staff functions at Banking had to relate to the business issues differently and more
constructively by being assigned to the principal user of their services.
We can induce several characteristics for structurizing change from these examples. The
mechanisms might represent, be in line with, or in any way signal the intended new direction.
Or, they could demand new (inter) action and priorities by intervening in or putting pressure
on the existing organizational frame. The examples also illustrate how it is possible to measure
if tasks have been carried out in accordance with the new direction in terms that are
understandable from the perspective of the individual job. This also makes it possible to see if
the new direction works. When this kind of pressure develops and also generates a focus on
the contingencies for people to cope with new demands and new ideas it is seen as
structurizing.
Rationale as a condition for creating a reframing momentum
The reasons for running a change project varied in the different enterprises. All projects started
with the purpose of improving the organization and developing a better match with the overall
task of the organinization. In three of the organizations, however, the situation changed after
some time and change now also seemed necessary for survival reasons. Or, at least the
organization was seriously threatened if one did not manage to change the situation that had
emerged. In the following sections it will be demonstrated that there are different basic reasons
- rationales - for change in different projects, and that this also make a difference for the
reframing efforts' prospects to succeed.
Reframin~ rationale and reframin~ efforts at Transport
Transport had already worked with change for 1-2 years when "the change project" started,
initiated and run by a new top manager. New goals and strategies were developed with a
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general focus on OD and restructuring HQ. After some time it was felt that the change process
needed a clearer focus (what kind of OD process are we up to). Contacts were established
between Transport and the consultancy firm,
It is probably symptomatic that it was the human resource manager, who was part of the top
manager group, who played a central role in establishing and spelling out the terms for the
relationship. In this process the premises for the change process were laid down. Seminars
involving key people in the organizations were to play an important role in starting up the
process. The aims of these seminars were interrelated: Consciousness raising, creating
acceptance and commitment among managers and opinion leaders for the vision, goals and
strategies, and also creating a basis for systematic, disciplined, long termed ways of working
with reorientation and business improvements.
What has been outlined in the earlier section on anchoring is that the æo understood that there
was a lack of involvement among the participants because they thought that it was the HR
manager and the external consultants was owned the process. So he took over and also very
consciously chose to chair most of the sessions. At a somewhat later stage the HR manager
was also fired, due to his lack of involvement in business (operational) issues and a lack of
power base in the operational departments of the firm.
In sum, this meant an underlining of the management and the line responsibility for the
reframing efforts. As pointed out earlier, the reorientation efforts were also integrated in the
cycles of planning and budgeting of the company. The change seminars were transformed into
learning and follow-up meetings and included a focus on planning and budgeting. It also
seemed as if the new direction gradually gained commitment, at least in the sense that seeds for
a change momentum seemed to grow in the sense that collective reorientation began to develop.
What is worth noticing is that a change situation emerged in parallel with the strengthening of
the integration of the reframing efforts which were being linked stronger to business operations:
Whereas the project was started in a situation that seemed reasonably safe and sound in terms
of economy the firm was exposed to a falling market and heavy cost problems. The firm did
not seem to be able to survive without substantiallay-offs. At least this was the case when the
problems caused by a falling market were seen related to the needs for investments to be
competitive in the future. It became clearer that the planned strategic changes were needed in
order to ensure survival in the long run.
"The stick", observed the project leader, "was the fall in the market, the lack of activity. The
changes in Transport seemed to develop at a slower pace when there was no crisis. The
organizational vision, however, can be seen as the carrot as can the crisis be seen as the stick."
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There was, of course, a considerable amount of information which explained the situation to the
organizational members. The question is whether the crisis contributed to the realizing the new
direction. Furthermore, an admittedly depressing question is whether the personnel reduction
contributed to the effective communication and understanding of the crisis.
"The last point on the agenda", reflected the project leader, for example, "was the discussion of
how to deal with the coming layoff of 120 employees, and how this number should be divided
between regions and terminals. It seemed to me that it is when concrete problems as these are
discussed that the seriousness of the situation becomes clear to the present members of the
organization. "
The organization succeeded in effectively sustaining its reframing efforts at the same time as it
managed to cope with its immediate problems. In fact, it was asked whether the immediate
problems helped in pursuing the long-term ideas. What we possibly observe is that the change
activities at Transport were based on what seemed to be a clear vision and strategy for the
future, and that these efforts were integrated into the general management function of the
company. Simultaneously the firm was exposed to a fall in the market, perceived by
management as a crisis, meaning that the company had to reduce their costs by laying off
employees. Let us compare these features of the change activities and change process at
Transport with the equivalent aspects of the change efforts at Furniture.
Reframin& rationale and reframin& efforts at Furniture
We recall from the section on structuration that the initial emphasis was on change seminars
from key personnel. The information and motivation to the rest of the people with leadership
responsibilities were performed through a commitment seminar and to the organization at large
at a "kick off day". Later on, the steering group was terminated, but the top management group
was to have training sessions to follow up the change efforts every two months. In addition,
two union representatives were included in the top management group. The implementation of
the reframing ideas did not, however, develop as intended. People did not follow up on what
they were supposed to do and commit themselves to in this area.
Partly in response to this the local goals development effort was initiated with seminars for
teaching a method, followed by group meetings for developing such goals. The aims were, as
can be recalled, both to meet the need for doing something concrete, handle some here and
now problems that also made sense in a longer perspective, and to implicitly reflect and
motivate the basic message for reframing the organization. These efforts had problems and
were more or less stopped. This was seen as related to the CEO squeezing his managers very
hard for results. There is also another factor this can be seen as being related to.
"At this time", said the project leader, " things started to go worse for Furniture, increased costs
and decreased margins of results. But there was little awareness of this among the managers.
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We had no hints that the situation was like this, and due to inferior management information
systems we didn't get to know until months later, when the market really dropped "
"The top manager (who at that time had become top manager at HQ), demanded cost reductions
and intensified marketing efforts", the project leader said, "He jumped behind the wheel and
screamed: Cost reductions! Get out in the market and get orders! Ensure the result!... Every
month he called the various managers to his office and examined them forcefully on activities
and results in this area ..(Stressing) Quality for the customer was a natural consequence of the
Furnitures business idea, with the consequent need for quality in and between the members of
the organization and in the leadership", he also remarkd. "Culture and leadership were therefore
defined as the most important strategic issues in the nineties. Then comes black Monday and a
drop in the market - also for Furniture. Related to last year the turn over (in x month) was
reduced by 50 %....There is now a pressure for cost reductions and ensuring results."
This resulted in a strong focus on reducing costs and getting new contracts, even if the top
manager stressed the need for long-term development, especially at the training sessions. He
said it was more important than ever. The employees, however, expressed the view that there
was no time for change activities. The firm eventually succeeded in improving the immediate
situation, cost reductions were achieved and neworders obtained. In fact, they turned out to
have problems in meeting the demand. The result of this was that there seemed to be
increasingly better arguments for not pursuing the long-term change efforts.
Whereas the change efforts at Transport seemed to have a serious impact on its operations and
the collective orientations of the company, this did not, in the same way, seem to be the case at
Furniture. The change efforts in this company did not seem to any have serious impact on the
collective orientations. Change efforts seemed to remain as espoused theories explored during
the change (training) seminars. The change process that so many talked about and referred to
was hard to detect outside the seminar rooms. It seemed as if it was defmed and experienced
as something different from operations or the daily work. In away, we could say that it did not
manage to reach the agenda of the organizational life of the organization. The planned and
desired change activities - and changed modes of operation - did not seem to be "what counted"
in the organizational defmition of the situation of the organizational members.
Whereas it could seem as if one managed to utilize the confronting crisis in Transport as a
driving force in the reframing efforts, it seemed to get in the way of such efforts at Furniture.
The crisis emerged and was coped with, but rather by "striving harder" within the old pattern of
operations.
Finally, let us also look into the main feature of the change efforts at Airline and also take into
consideration the "basic living conditions" of the firm.
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Reframin~ rationale reasons and reframin~ effons at Airline
The overall change agenda was, as you might recall, to change the company from a segmented
and a functional-oriented, centralized frame towards a frame focusing on a higher degree of
quality at the same time emphasizing responsibility for results and customer needs at all levels.
This was, however, initially motivated by improving a favourable situation for the company,
even though improvements were necessary in view of future investment needs.
However, this changed as the market dropped, competition increased as result of change in
government regulations and costs increased more than was estimated and also more than was
bearable. This meant that in addition to the need for long-term improvements, there was also a
need for short-term improvements in sales as well as costs. The efforts to cope with these more
immediate problems were handled through the same structure as the long-term oriented
changes. The level of cost reductions that had to be achieved by a certain unit was defined in the
learning and follow-up forum (FUAL) ,and also followed up in that setting:
"Through the breaking down of goals a new understanding of reality emerges", the project
consultant remarked. " New operational goals concerning economic contribution and level of
sales seemed to offer meaning and direction to work efforts ....Little by little a crisis
consciousness developed through this process."
We could say that the new and intended ideas to some extent are practiced in the way the firm
coped with immediate problems. They are translated into an alteration of the management mode
of operation which is enforced upon the management function, for the strategic issues and also
for the relationships with the mangers at operational level, for example, coping with the cost
problem. These immediate problems were seen as having such grave importance that they had
crisis-like characteristics. Rather than stop the reframing efforts, it is the observation of the
project leader that the following way of handling the problem seemed to underpin and support
them:
"By pressing for higher goals, by showing that if not we had to go to the banks for money next
year due to increased costs, competition and a stagnating market, new insight developed. The
new understanding of reality also included a consciousness of this crisis ...I don't think we
could have achieved this by just focusing on the existing situation, but rather on developing the
situation to come."
The point seems to be that it is the understanding of the firm's external situation that helps
unfreeze or destabilize old definitions of the situation, thereby preparing for the new. One of the
local managers who took part in the learning and follow-up meetings put it this way:
"The existing understanding seemed to be destabilized, or could be destabilized, when there
was variation in the external world. The economic situation - and implications - were easier to
explain and understand when we had competition from more actors. ".
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The project leader explained this in more detail by pointing at two factors. One is how the
understanding of the situation was transformed into demanding economic goals and what effect
this had on the managers. The other factor is how the consequent cost reductions effected the
reorganizing efforts.
"The pressure for 13% contribution leads to insecurity....However, whereas it was previously
considered in negative terms, it is now perceived more as a positive incitement, even if the
atmosphere and attitude of the single individual members of the management group may vary.
....The team organizing process has come close to the cost reduction process, and it has
consequently been identified with it Team has become a threat just as cost reductions and lay-
offs. This does not seem to be paralyzing, and I think the preparation for and the
implementation of teams have come at a favourable time.....it is experienced as a constructive
way of turning a destabilized situation around.....increased market and customer understanding
seem to permeate the organization. You can see this, among other things, from the kind of
questions that are asked at the team seminars..."
Discussion
Espoused ideas for a new direction existed in all firms. In the three firms presented here, the
project got started in a situation where there seemed to be future, but not immediate, pressures
for change. In both Transport and Furniture, however, this changed radically as significant falls
in the market occurred. The gravity of the pressures seemed to be strongest at Transport
because it seemed impossible for them to cope with the situation without cost reductions on
such a scale that could only be achieved by a significant reduction in the work force. Perhaps
the market fall also signalled more basic and underlying structural changes in the market, and,
in any case, the immediate crisis, together with the anticipated needs for future investments,
made these reductions even more urgent
In the case of Furniture, however, it was possible to cope with the immediate crisis by
working harder, saving costs within the established mode of operations, and selling more by
selling harder. In Airline, the crisis did not appear as so manifest. Still, the situation put a
pressure on the organization that was perceived as quite serious and the consequences of
serious cost cuts had a wide impact on the organization. It was carried out, however, without
laying off permanent employees. The process of cost reduction was performed through the
same mechanisms as the general change efforts. What we observe is that the reframing efforts
in Transport seemed to be helped by the seriousness of the immediate situation.
This is contrary to the situation in Furniture. Here the perceived crisis did not seem to help
working with change. In fact, the case seemed rather to be the contrary. The danger of the
situation was coped with successfully but without any new or changed measures being put into
force. It was not handled in a way that clarified the reframing needs and underpinned the
reframing efforts. In Airline, the crisis, although probably not acute, still seemed to be
perceived and tackled in such a manner as to underline the need for change and helped develop
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mechanisms for coping with that need. It can be seen as a reminder that the environment
constituted a threat to survival and had to be adjusted to, and that by coping with it through the
same management functions/mechanisms that were set up to both reflect the new organizational
direction, as well as to forward it, these mechanisms were proven to work.
A question is therefore whether the existence and awareness of crisis has stronger power of
conviction than ideas for a new and improved direction alone - even in cases where reframing
is accepted to be a future necessity. It is difficult to capitalize on a future crisis or a feeling of
the situation being unsatisfactory. A future need appears as distant and vague, even if this
dissatisfaction is increased by the consciousness of having better means of coping with that
future situation than are apparent today. A rationale for change can be seen to consist of two
dimensions; crisis motivation and idea(tional) motivation .
.criill. motivation refers to the sort of situation where the "figures are red" and moderate cost
reductions won't save the situation. The gap between what is done and what is needed is
considerable. The very existence of the enterprise is threatened if substantial measures or
changes are not carried out. Ideational motivation means that a relatively clear picture of another
direction, purpose, or way of functioning has been developed. The implicit alternative frame
could be constituted by other ways of serving needs in the market and/or other ways of
organizational functioning for fulfilling the new or changed tasks caused by new products and
services. The ideational motivation implies a tension is created between what is and what could
be.
Crisis motivation and ideational motivation
Accepting that they live in turbulent environments quite a few organizations try to prepare for
future changes in their working conditions and consequently elaborate or develop alternative
courses of development. They want to change before they fmd themselves in a crisis, and they
develop new strategies and new ideas for their organizational tasks. They want to "be better", to
improve their overall situation and be prepared for external changes. Missions are clarified,
goals revised, strategies developed, policies for modem management formulated as well as
principles of how to organize. To some extent that was the initial situation in the cases used as
examples above; to some extent the management in Furniture as well as Airline perceived the
challenges to motivate a good organization to become better - even though it would have to
involve considerable changes in collective practices. The initial challenge in Transport was
probably seen as somewhat more existential, but not as immediately dramatic.
The question that could be asked in all three cases was why the various individuals and groups
started to impose on themselves - as well as others - another modus operandi, other criteria for
how to perform their tasks and (co)operations? There was no immediate and urgent need to do
149
so. Perhaps the organizational forces preserving the present way of functioning were more
forceful than a vague need for future change, even if excellent and convincing ideas for a better
organizational direction had been worked out and intellectually understood and even accepted.
If an organization is in such a situation it has to base. the motivation for change on a
dissatisfaction with the discrepancy between the existing situation and what could be. Another
way of putting it is that it must capitalize on future crisis.
This seems to constitute a weak rationale for change, bur it is not nonexistent since it could be
that the reframing efforts had some effect in the beginning of the Airline and Transport project
However, this was not the case in Furniture. The difference between the first two and
Furniture is, of course, also related to the differences in reframing structuration. However, the
ideational motivation for change seems to constitute a weaker basis for the establishment than
the situation where a crisis exists in parallel, therefore, it is "possible, but difficult". Such a
situation - ideational motivation, but no crisis - probably demands stronger change efforts than
a situation in which external pressures threaten the existence of the organization.
Perhaps the reason that crisis represents a forceful motivation is that it clearly signals that things
cannot remain as they are. The organizational members are offered an alternative route for
survival when ideas for a new organizational direction exist as a possible solution. This
situation represents a considerably stronger potential for persuasion than only being offered an
alternative route that might improve a future situation. Transport had, for instance, developed
clear and relatively trustworthy ideas for a new direction both as far as the company/market
relations are concerned and also concerning how to get there in terms of managing and
organizing the enterprise. The need for following this direction became more convincing when
the market dropped dramatically and the firm was faced with the need for immediate action. At
least it became clear that something had to be done; that the existing organizational direction was
not good enough as the situation had developed relative to the environment
This is also probably the experience underlying the classical OD thinking that the main phases
in change are unfreeze - change (or move) - freeze (Lewin 1951, Lundberg 1984). More
basically, it also is in line with the study of paradigmatic change which according to Kuhn is
seen as changing in the set of assumptions, usually implicit, about what sort of things make up
the world, how they act, how they hang together, and how they may be known. Paradigms
may be understood not only as formal rules of thought, but also as rhetoric and practices in use
(Kuhn 1962: 373). Kuhn suggests that:
"Confronted with anomaly or crisis, scientists take a different attitude toward existing
paradigms." (91) He also says: "It is, I think, particularly in the periods of acknowledged
crisis that scientists have turned to philosophical analysis as a device to unlock the riddles of
their field (88). To sum up, it is when the existing tools cannot help us solve our problems and
execute our tasks any more, that we are receptive to new perspectives on our tasks and
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relations."
(Kuhn 1962)
Kuhn saw this view as valid for organizations: "We propose that formal organizations be
considered paradigms in operation, different in degree and content, but not in essence, from
scientific paradigms in use ...Like scientific disciplines, formal organizations have histories,
undergo internal and external changes, and experience strains" (374)
Ideational and crisis motivation should be seen as sort of analytical dimensions. In practice,
these factors will exist in different degrees and could also be represented by the same
phenomenon. A crisis could, for instance, contain the beginnings of new ideas, since the crisis
means that one can't go on in the same way. Simultaneously, ideas for a new direction could
also, for instance, clarify the perceptions of a crisis as well as represent the capitalization of a
future crisis. It could be said that klisii motivation represents a reactive and repairing element,
and ideational motivation a proactive and opportunistic element in the creation of a change
rationale. These two elements can, of course, also be blended and found in different
proportions. However, for the sake of illustration and exploration, the combination of the two
rationale elements can be seen as four ideal types of conditions. It will be discussed in the next
section whether each of these situations constitute a reframing rationale:
Rationales for creatin& refraIning momentum
1. Crisis and ideas for a new direction
2. Ideas for new direction, but no crisis
3. Crisis, but no ideas for a new direction
4. No crisis, no ideas for new direction
We have already explored the first two situations. Situation 1 constitutes a sound rationale for
organizational reframing, and situation 2 would be a difficult, but possible situation as a basis
for developing a change momentum. In situation 4 no crisis, no ideas for a new direction - the
environment is not experienced as posing a threat to the existence of the firm. It manages OK,
but neither clear nor espoused strategic alternatives exist There is no manifest tension related
to the present way of functioning. This situation clearly does not offer a basis for efforts aiming
at establishing a new direction or change momentum for such a direction. It is a qualified guess
that attempts at deviating from the present situation/direction will be arrested. With the lack of a
crisis as well as espoused ideas for a new direction, there will hardly be many such attempts
taking place. "Don't rock the boat." The paradox is that this could represent a virtuous circle as
long as the environment does not change its demands on the organization and as long as the
tools of the paradigm work.
However, when the characteristics of the environment change, the virtuous circle turns into a
vicious circle. Sooner or later this happens, and the organization then finds itself in a crisis. If
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neither management nor any other significant agency has been prepared for this, the
organization finds itself in a situation of crisis but with no clear and espoused ideas for a new
direction - situation 3. Many organizational crises strike like lightening from a clear sky. It
strikes whole business sectors, like the banking business in 1987/88 and the car retail industry
in 1988/89, or individual firms of which there are numerous examples.
Even if a crisis emerges, it is usually only retrospectively that it did not strike suddenly. Still, it
is quite likely that individual members - and sometimes groups - of the enterprise have
foreseen that things would go wrong, and even voiced this through internal channels. But they
have not been heard. There has been no collective awareness of the coming crisis. When it
strikes, it is always unpleasant because its consequences are not only organizational, but also
private in character. People can lose their income and status, and if they have to be "on the
dole" they can have other grave psychological as well as social problems.
The point to make is that such organizational crisis is characterized by anomaly; old models no
longer work. However, when an organization - especially an old enterprise - experiences crisis,
the members do not realize that anomaly is the problem. New models do not emerge and old
circles are not broken even if a crisis is being experienced. Crisis alone does not constitute a
reframing rationale. More often, the organization is paralysed (Bate 1988) and characterised by
the "more-of-the-same phenomenon" (Watzlawick 1974) - it takes more of the medicine that
caused the illness. One of the obvious reasons for the paralysis is that the members of the
organization do not see a lifeline; they do not perceive an alternative course of action.
Experiencing crisis, but not seeing what can be done to get out of it, leads to a perception of
threat and insecurity which contributes to organizational paralysis and a self reinforcement of
the old culture.
It is therefore suggested that if crisis is to contribute to the development of a change rationale,
the way out of the crisis must be pictured and seen in a trustworthy way. A foundation on
which to build the future must at least in vague outline be perceived by the members of the
organization. If not through a complete set of ideas for a new direction, the participants must
see that through a series of actions, cut-downs and savings they can gain a foothold for
survival.
Rationale for reframin&- summin&up.
In the last section the need for establishing a change momentum in the period of liminality was
identified. It was argued that two factors should be focused on in the efforts to establish a
reframing momentum: rationale and structuration for reframing. The notions of ideational and
crisis motivation are also seen as conditions for constituting a rationale for organizational
reframing. Also identified and presented were four different blends of these two kinds of
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motivation and their potential.
A combination of crises and ideas for a new direction is the best rationale with the strongest
power of conviction. Ideas for a new direction, could constitute a possible rationale based on
the possible "future crisis" it could capitalize on by demonstrating the inability and inadequacy
of the existing frame. Crises alone would not constitute a constructive rationale for reframing
since such a situation does not include a direction for frustration and dissatisfaction. The point
is, naturally, that there is a potential in this situation for developing fruitful ideas for where to
go.
Rationale and structuration for reframing • making the seeds grow?
If an organizational situation is characterized by a rationale for change and mechanisms
structuralizing change, then the organizational members should have obtained an intellectual
picture of the new direction and they are simultaneously "forced" into experiencing that
direction. We can see, however, that this situation is liable to cause problems for the members
of the organization.
Take, for example, the warehouse worker in Transport. To be able to perform in the new way,
he will need more and different kinds of information. Take the local branch manager of
Banking. To be able to take on autonomous responsibility he or she will need a qualitatively
different decision system in the relationship between Headquarters and the local branch, he or
she will need another budgeting and accounting system. Imagine also the teams being
implemented in Airline. To be able to function in a multifunctional way they will need
information on how they perform on different variables. It is also a prerequisite that in order for
them to function in a new way the reward system should not bar the members from performing
the "new" functions.
Systems and structures must consciously must be changed and adjusted to support the new
direction if the seeds for change momentum are to grow. To make a goal structure function as
described it must, for instance, be supplemented by information systems. Organizational
members need to know how they perform in relation to the goals being set up. They need to
know early enough to correct their actions if organizationallearning is to occur and sometimes
they also need to know other things in order to be able to perform their job differently. The
transport worker in the warehouse should know more about when the different trucks are
expected and with what cargo. He should know what goods are expected and when they are
due, etc. The structural pressures represented by new products and goal structures should also,
as fast as possible, be supported by changes in the career/status and compensation system. The
progress and lack of progress towards the new direction must be consequently followed up. If
the old direction is the one being honoured this is not possible for it does not pay.
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The point is that establishing a change momentum is a dynamic and complex process. Many
aspects must be attended to in parallel. The establishment of mechanisms representing
structuralization of change-oriented activities in parallel with a change rationale may well start a
movement. Together they represent sort of seeds for a change momentum. For a change
momentum to be established they must develop towards self reinforcement; the structuration
mechanisms must be ~nerative; or it must generate more structural and system adjustments
along the lines of the new direction.
One of the first obvious factors is developing supportive information and reward and sanction
systems, ete. This is, however, only the beginning. The basic purpose of the structuration of
change is to generate changes that embed the direction it is set up to forward in the basic
structures and systems of the enterprise. In a sense what we basically should aim at is
&enerative structuration. The aim for its functioning is that it should become embedded in the
action system of the organization.
By reflecting the rationale for change, the change structure should in a way contain or constitute
the ~ for the thinking and acting of the new organization/organizational direction. It should
contain and forward the creation of the programmes for the new organizational direction.
Consequently, its functioning should result in the continuous reformulation and reformation of
the distribution of authority and tasks, the information and decision systems, career and reward
systems, ete, so as to channel resources, energy and interpretation towards the new direction.
The point is that the different aspects of structure and systems should establish reciprocal and
reinforcing interactions toward the new direction beyond the precarious change efforts based on
the reframing rationale and the initial mechanisms for the structuration of the reframing process.
Conditions for reframing organizations - four types
For the sake of simplicity we shall imagine that rationale and mechanisms for structuration can
be represented by two variables each with two possible values. This is quite clearly a
simplification. It follows from the previous discussion that it is not obvious when we, for
instance, face the situation of a change rationale having been constituted. The two categories
crisis motivation and ideational motivation, are both rough and relative categories and their
interplay has only superficially been explored. Still, we can reassess the suggested conditions
for momentum for change to see if they work as conceptualizations. That would leave us with
the table at the top of the next page showing four ideal types of possibilities:
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CONDITIONS FOR CREATING A REFRAMING MOMENTUM
Structuration
Yes No
Yes Favoured Ideational
dea1end
Rationale
No Impossible Disfavoured
or ambiguous
FIG. 6.1 CONDITIONS FOR CREATING A REFRAMING MOMENTUM
It follows from the discussions that the "Yes/"Yes situation would offer the best possibilities
for a momentum for reframing to be established. Similarly that the "No/No" situation would
represent the least likelihood for a change project to gain foothold:
Structuration and rationale for reframin~; Among the organizations observed, Transport seems
most clearly to fit the yes/yes situation. It was characterized by both clear ideas for a new
direction; a strategy both for what to do and how to do it. A significant drop in the market
situation in parallel with changes in the competitive situation constituted a crisis that manifested
itself into considerable reductions in the work force. However, it seemed to succeed in
establishing a significant momentum for reframing. The organizational members started
changing their orientation towards tasks and problems significantly. For an outsider the most
visible was the success it had with guaranteed deliveries of goods, a kind of performance that
seemed more or less antagonistic to its initial orientation. It was summed up as a shift from a
ritualistic towards a problem-solving orientation related to work performance. It was also
concluded that a shift from a "volume" orientation handling goods towards a business/profit
like orientation.
The other example here could be Airline. The change rationale is suggested to be weaker,
established primarely through clear ideas for where to go and how to do it. There was not an
acute crisis, still there were heavy economic or cost problems that put significant pressure on
allievels of the organization. The strategy was (in a specific way) to be more market oriented
and go for a very specific market segment with a certain concept. It was also to be more
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business oriented at all levels by infusing "holistic" responsibility at all levels, that is
responsibility at the lowest possible level. This was done by clearly delegating responsibility to
local managers combined with the development of a multifunctional decentralized organization
in the shape of semi autonomous work teams.
The goal-oriented management structure that was set up was supposed to be implemented
downwards in the organization in a linking pin sort of structure. The process of doing so was
started but to a varied degree and form in different parts of the organization. The management
structure followed up the managers according to the new standards thereby embodying and
reflecting the new direction. Some new organizational features like decentralization of
management responsibility and the emerging teams can also be seen as a change structure.
It seemed as if Airline had established significant seeds for a momentum for reframing.
Managers and management systems seemed - and were perceived to be - functioning
differently, in the sense that management, and thereby also organizational members, were taken
more seriously. The language of the company now included words that reflected the new
direction like, for example, teams, although there is a considerable variation in how people
conceive of this particular concept. However, there also seemed to be an emerging shift in the
orientations of the individual members of the organization that included a higher awareness of
the meaning of market dependence as well as costs and profit.
Neither structuration nor rationale for reframin~: In contrast to these two cases there are two
examples in the "No/No" situation. Electric Industry is quite clearly represented among them. If
clear ideas for a new direction existed at Electric Industry, it was only with the top manager,
and perhaps grains of them with some of the others in the top management group. They did
not, however, get expressed in a consequential way; there was some sort of an agreement
among the members of the top management that the new direction should be developed along
the lines of a quality focus in the line (management) structure. These ideas were not very clearly
formulated and represented, therefore there was a rather ambiguous concept for a new
direction, the ambiguity being increased by the lack of homogeneous understanding and
commitment in the top management group. The top manager more or less abdicated from the
change work, which brings us to the question of crisis or no crisis.
The company did actually do quite well as it was. However, the top manager foresaw
fundamental structural changes in this business sector. These changes would probably lead in
several years to (this part of) the company being closed down. One could say that a rationale for
change existed for the owners that would lead them to reestablish the firm under other
conditions. For the collective of people constituting the present organization, however, this
was not so. Neither did the management and the external consultants succeed in establishing
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effective mechanisms structuring change effort. This was mainly due to several management
problems that became manifest when they tried to implement a new direction that was perhaps
somewhat unclear. The management of the project was redesigned as a result of employee
reactions to the top manager trying to stay out of it. The change project, however, never got a
foothold. At some point it was redefined - it was supposed to be as a break preparing the
ground for more fundamental change work - towards a more technical operational angle. Not
long after the whole project faded away.
Furniture is somewhat more difficult to categorize, but we see it basically as being in this
category. It was demonstrated that effective mechanisms for structuralizing change was not
established. There was, however, a rationale for change that was weak in the beginning of
the project: fairly clear ideas for where to go. There were, however, reasons to believe that
the commitment to this consciousness was rather halfhearted, or only espoused, when it
came to the line managers. At a later point in time the firm experienced a crisis, which they
in fact managed to cope with. The reframing rationale did not seem to be strengthened
through this period, mainly as a result of the fact that the company managed to control the
situation with the use of old means. In a way it was initially perceived as a crisis, but since it
was managed in the short run, the inadequacy of the established frame was not proven.
The structure set up for reframing purposes - the steering group and the change seminars -
seemed very successful in the beginning. The managers taking part in the seminars
discussed vividly and there seemed to be a realistic understanding and acceptance of the new
direction. They even wanted more seminars than scheduled because they were so successful
and were useful for the purpose of being completely prepared for going in the new
direction. However, the reframing process did not, as you remember from above
presentations, get beyond the ideational-oriented stages of preparation. The various change
efforts more or less faded away.
When the firm faced major difficulties, the.management didn't cope with the challenge of
capitalizing on the crisis for developing a reframing rationale. One could rather say that an
antagonism between the change project ("the process") and operations developed. When the
new division manager tried to implement some structural and management changes that he
saw as sustaining and strengthening the change ambitions, he was, as seen in the section on
counterforcing change, fired. The reasons given from the top manager was that it was
especially the way he had presented and implemented the changes that was wrong and had
caused the organizational reactions. Additionally, they could not afford unrest in this part of
the firm that, in profit terms, was going well. All in all, we see the situation at Furniture to
be one in the category of neither structuration nor rationale for reframing.
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Conditionin& a reframio& momentum
Situations characterized by both a reframing rationale and mechanisms for reframing
structuration favouring a reframing momentum have been discussed. Examples from Airline
and Transport were used for this purpose, as Money Market could have been. Situations
characterized by neither structuration nor rationale in which a reframing momentum did not
seem to emerge were also discussed assisted by examples from Electric Industry and
Furniture. Two categories have not been discussed Car Retailer seem to fit one of the
remaining ones. It was characterized by the existence of a reframing rationale. Mechanisms
for establishing an effective structuration of the reframing process did, however, not seem
to have been established: Neither was did a reframing momentum seem to develop. Among
the cases there is no example illustrating the situation characterized by structuration, but no
reframing rationale. It was labelled "impossible or ambiguous" in figure 6.1. The point is
that a managed reframing process established as a process of structuration but with no basic
motivation or content more or less seems like a contradiction in terms.
In sum, relating the situation of the various cases to the notions of structuration and
rationale for reframing supports the idea that they could be conceived of as basic conditions
for the establishment of change momentum. These are proposed to be seen as necessary, but
not sufficient, conditions for the establishement of a reframing momentum. The combination
of a reframing rationale (content) and a reframing structuration (form) is suggested to
condition a reframing momentum (process).
Reframing organizations - towards a model
So far a set of empirically grounded working concepts for reframing organizations has been
suggested. The concepts of anchoring, integration, inductive vs. deductive learning approaches
and centrally vs. locally driven reframing solutions were seen as reflecting central aspects of
reframing processes. The task of reframing organizations was reformulated to one of
establishing a reframing momentum. The concepts of rationale and structuration for reframing
organizations were seen as reflecting basic conditions of the reframing endeavour.
Little has been done, however, to clarify the relationships between these concepts and how
they are related to the endeavour of reframing organizations. This is the agenda of the next two
chapters. What Mintzberg calls a "creative leap" shall be made from the platform of the
"detective work" in order to suggest a set of propositions and and suggest further ideas for a
model of reframing organizations. The empirical anchoring of the reframing concepts shall
constitute the basis, but analysis, reflection, speculation have to be undertaken and the work of
other authors will be drawn upon.
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Chapter 7: Propositions for a Model of Reframing Organizations
The aim of this chapter is to develop a set of propositions for a model of reframing
organizations. These propositions are based on the conceptual knowledge developed in the
previous chapters, and they will constitute the platform for the further construction of a model
undertaken in the next chapter.
It seems appropriate to underline that the notion of a model is used in a limited sense. It
should be conceived of as sort a set of interrelated strategic variables. Rather than literally
developing a model for "how to do it", the intention is to suggest a model that directs attention
in a fruitful and helpful way. It should highlight aspects of the task that can be handled in
different ways and suggest guidelines along directions to cope with them.
By doing so the study is moving "towards a model". There will be limitations to its use and
applicability, especially limitations originating from the way it was developed. Furthermore, the
model is rather general in character and its various parts can be researched in further depth and
detail. Also, the phenomenon which it is supposed to reflect and refer to is of such a nature that
the idea of a general and final model is not realistic. It will always be necessary to stretch
further.
Suggesting a set of reframing propositions needs turning back. It is necessary to recapitulate
and sum up the findings so far. The essence of these will be seen as a workin& h)lX>thesis of
which the various propositions represent a specification and interpretation. In practical terms,
however, the construction of the reframing propositions is to a large extent built upon the
various grounded reframing concepts. This also means that the empirical roots of the
propositions are implicit in the fact that they are built upon these concepts.
Reframing organizations - task, issues and conditions
In the first section of the empirical part of the study, a series of emerging reframing issues were
identified. It was suggested that these issues reflect important aspects of the reframing process
that can be handled in different ways, and that they constitute useful and fruitful reframing
concepts. The organizational tendency of rejecting new orientations was then analyzed, This
was done because the reframing concepts were seen as reflecting organizations counterforcing
change.
The suggestion was then that organizations could be conceived of as being characterized by a
momentum sustained by the interrelationship of rational, political and especially cultural factors.
On this basis it seemed natural to see the task of reframing organizations as one of creating a
reframing momentum. Identified next were the notions of rationale and structuration as
conditions for organizational reframing. We have therefore arrived at a situation where a series
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of concepts for reframing organization are suggested:
Conce.ptsfor reframin&or&anizations:
RetraminK momentum: Reframing organizations implies the creation of a
momentum for reframing
Reftamini cooditions; The creation of a reframing momentum is based on reframing conditions:
• Rationale: basic motivation for reframing the organization
• Structuration: mechanisms enforcing and reinforcing the new orientation by controlling that
priorities and activities are according to the new frame
Reframini issues: The creation of reframing momentum implies a set of issues that
can be handled in different ways, again of crucial importance for
whether it is created or not:
• Anchoring: Focuses the possible existence of active and supportive and rational as well as
symbolic coupling between management as well as union representatives and the
reframing efforts
• Integration: Focuses the relationship or competition between the old and the new frame
• Top management driven vs. local driven solutions: Focuses the loci of
forming and makes concrete the new frame
• Inductive vs. Deductive Change Efforts: Focuses the way (the ideas
representing) the new frame are communicated and supposed to be learned
FIG. 7.1 CONCEPTS FOR ORGANIZATIONAL REFRAMING
These working concepts do not represent either or categories. All the projects have, for
instance, a strong overall top management change solution - a centralized tendency. There is
mainly because the studied change projects were initiated from top management. However, all
the projects still have decentralized aspects. Identifying the single project case as being in
either one or the other category would be either impossible or very difficult That would at least
imply some sort of an average evaluation. A managed reframing programme would, for
example, normally tend to have an initial ideational tendency in its orientation; at least the
management groups of the organization would be told and taught what to do and also why to
do it . An exploration of what was actually done throughout the project would reveal ideational
elements as well as elements of enforced experiences. Furthennore, the question of whether or
not they confront an integrated change programme would usually be impossible to answer by a
yes or a no. Also, the question of whether or not the change project is based on top
management anchoring can rarely be answered by yes and no. At least it is a matter of degree
and, furthermore, the answer could vary according to what aspect of the project one was
focusing upon.
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This brings us to the point that little is known about the interrelationships between the different
concepts. What is implicit is that we face complex social processes. So, the kind of
organizationalleaming (internal process) that occurs as a consequence of a change activity - or
sequence of activity - can hardly be perfectly predicted in advance. It is tempting to listen to
what Richard Normann says: "Strategic change is not so much an analytic deductive process as
an open ended, inductive, synthetic process" (Normann 1985:220). We shall return to that
point after the next section.
Working hypothesis
The following is a discussion of the relationship between the perspective and the findings
which suggests a working hypothesis. The "perspective" constitutes the conceptual
understanding that informed the perception of the problem as well as the empirical search.
Organizational frames were seen as taken for granted collective models channelling collective
interpretation and (inter) action. They were seen as (re)created in interaction and in the tension
between the social system and the system(s) of meaning, as embedded in social system(s) and
artifacts, and with a heavily self-sustaining nature due to the above characteristics.
When relating this to the fmdings, it is necessary to draw attention to one of the fust things
needed: to distinguish between reframing efforts (the external change process) and their effects
(the internal change process). By doing this, we can move further in identifying, and in a way
revealing, the inherent organizational counterforces to change. Rational, political and cultural
factors are seen to constitute an organizational momentum with the cultural factor as the central
one, implying that the reframing task is one of creating a reframing momentum in the period of
liminality.
This is well and simply put by Biggart, who says that "change is an act of destruction as well as
creation" (Biggart 1977:410). "Destruction" therefore must precede, or take place in parallel
with the establishment of the new organizational direction. "Destruction is an inherent part of
successful change; without destroying competing forms, the organization allows its
competitors to flourish unimpeded" (Biggart 1977:424).
In a sense the paradox is that the ~ in some way or other has to be implanted or grow mu gt
~ QkI which is to be destroyed in the same process. This is so because most organizations
must perform - fulfill their tasks - at the same time as they go through the process of change.
Firms must produce products, bring them to the market and also perform the administrative
functions, at the same time as they are changing. Furthermore, we see growing out of the old as
meaning that not literally everything - every habit, procedure or thinking practice concerning
work - becomes obsolete. It was, for example, revealed that several systems at Transport and
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Airline would counteract the new organizational direction. The reward system at Airline would
underpin other qualities than what was need for the new frame to be realized, and a new
communication system more or less enforced itself in Transport in order to be able to follow-up
the new concept Even though there were probably more aspects of these organizations that
needed to be revised, there are no reasons to believe that this was the case for every established
pattern and practice. It is the inconsistent and counterforcing patterns that must be destroyed for
the new to take root
For the new to be able to grow out of the old, destruction and creation must be parallel and
interwoven processes. The period where the strongest forces are settled, has been coined "the
period of liminality". This is the period where the organization is still on the threshold between
the old and the new. Whether it will proceed into the new "room" is not yet settled, and in fact
the new does not yet exist as a concrete form. As Feldman (1989) says, this is an "as if' sort of
reality where myths, wishes and hypotheses rule.
It therefore makes sense to picture it as Biggart does when he says that change work takes place
within a "dynamic mWl .awl wll between contradictory forces, where change is a
multidimensional process that destroys as it creates" (Biggart 1977:425). One might add that the
challenge for management is to establish a foothold for change that makes this process take
place. However it is within such a "push and pull" that one seeks to establish an impetus to the
reframing efforts - a reframing momentum:
:>------------------:>--------<:II~(JE~C>FtTS;----:>--------------:>----------------:>
Period of liminality. Establishment of Reframing Momentum?
<----------<-OOUNTEFtFC>FtæS; - C>FtGANIZA TIC>NAL MC>MENTUM----<---
FIG. 7.2 ESTABUSHING A FOOTHOLD FOR REFRAMING
It is appropriate to not consider counterforces as "barriers to change" that should be run over,
they are integrated into the natural processes of the organization and it is into these processes
that the new are infused or implanted. In the light of this perspective, the point is exactly that
organizational frames have emerged over time during a process of interaction about tasks
related to the environment in an interplay mediated by established structures influenced by this
interplay ("the living history"). This point is related to the conception of structuration as a
condition for organizational reframing. It reflects the need for persistently influencing
organizational processes towards the new and intended organizational frame. The need for a
reframing rationale could simply be related to the fact that the process of reframing means
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changing or shifting the "meaning in the system of meaning". The reframing process must
consequently include a reason for this change as well as a new agenda for new meanings to
develop.
When intemtion is identified as a reframing concept it is seen as related to the same process-
oriented view and especially to the point that meaning is created interactively and that it ''resides
in the acts". The process of reframing is consequently faced with an issue of implanting the
"new" in the "old". Whereas the identification of inductive as well as deductive approaches for
learning the new frame can be accounted for or at least seen, in light of the duality of
organizational frames as a system of meaning or ideas on the one hand and as created through a
process of interaction and embedded in the patterns of interaction on the other hand.
The identification of lW1manawneot (central) as well as locally (decentral ) driven solutions
reflects the same sort of dilemma Organizational frames are created interactively and thereby
locally on the one hand. On the other, managed change demands "new" ideas as raw material
for the reframing process. Consequently there is a need for central solutions to fulfil such a
need. In natural reframing processes these ideas are imported or created during the interplay
with the environment which also inflicts circumstances that impose change. In artificial change
these bearings must be intentionally created by anchorine.
Searching for the essence in this, one can find reason to suggest that there is an undertow in the
issues reflected by the working concepts. The duality between frames as ideas and as embedded
act(ion)s seems to constitute the main challenge to handling the management of reframing
organizations. This view is accounted for by seeing that organizational momentum is
constituted by the ideas of the prevailing frame being reinforced and reproduced by established
structures and systems of the enterprise. Structuration reflects this duality because it mirrors the
process-oriented nature of organizational frames, as integration mirrors the duality by reflecting
the issue of confronting new ideas with ongoing organizational processes.
The duality is furthermore represented by the coining of inductive vs. deductive means of
learning the new organizational direction. Deductive oriented deals with communicating ideas
as ideas, whereas inductive oriented deals with imposing the new ideas through new patterns
of (inter) action. However, as interests are related to - and invested in - the existing frame, there
is a need for anchoring the change efforts. In addition to the central initiatives for a new
organizational frame, decentrally (local) driven solutions are identified. This is related to the
duality mentioned because of a need to connect the ideas to the situation of the individual. If
ideas are to channel interpretation and be reflected in actions they must be worked out in relation
to the situation where these actions unfold.
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Considering the totality of what is reflected by the working concepts as discussed above, a
working hypothesis can be formulated as follows:
A reframing momentum is based on a rationale. Reframing momentum is accomplished by
integrating change efforts into the processes of the organization. This is done by consistently
altering the premises for (inter) action in accordance with communicated ideas representing the
intended frame. Members of the organization are involved in the concretizing of this frame.
Propositions • ''the supporting beams"
The working hypothesis weaves together and also constitutes the foundation for more specific
working propositions of how to work with reframing organizations. Whereas the working
hypothesis constitutes a rather general and fairly descriptive synthesis of the insight reflected by
the "reframing concepts", the working propositions are supposed to be a fruitful guide for
working with organizational change for the purpose of reframing organizations. Additionally,
theyare supposed to reflect and concretize the hypothesis. They shall, however, be rooted in
the working hypothesis but will be more specific in how to focus change efforts. The working
propositions must be seen as a whole.
1. Or~anizational reframin~ demands a rationale for reframin~
A reframing rationale is seen as various combinations of facing a crisis and having ideas for a
new and better organizational direction. The concept connects the issue of reframing
organizations to the environment; it points towards a connection between the relationship
between the organization and the environment on the one side and the conditions for
accomplishing change on the other. It deals with the basic kind of motivation for tackling the
existential problem of the organization: "When you don't know where you are going it is hard
to get there." Or, as someone supposedly said: "If you don't know where you are going, you
might end up somewhere else." Efforts and activities for establishing a new frame for
organizational thinking and action should relate to a basic reason. The proposition refers to
motivational as well as directional aspects of the change process, two factors seen by others as
essential if change is to be realized (Nadler 1977).
In the terms of Jønsson and Lundin (1977) the motivational and directional aspects are provided
by what they call a ghost myth, which we also find close to the idea of a reframing rationale.
They find the surving organization as being characterized by subsequent myths or leading ideas
guiding the behaviour of the organizational members. A crisis is creeping up when the
prevailing myth demonstrate tangible anomalies. "For a crisis to be resolved," they say, " a new
prevailing myth has to appear from among alternative ghost myths." A ghost myth represents a
different perspective on reality providing new answers to what, why and how questions must
find support/replace the existing one and stems from possible explanations to why anomalies
appeared.
164
This is quite essential because "if there is no good reason to leave, you might as well stay."
Why should the members of the organization engage in change? In the literature on
organizational development there has been a concern for the need to "unfreeze" organizations
(cfr. Lewin 1951). In the literature on the philosophy of science, Kuhn (1962) has been
concerned with the influence of crisis. His thesis is that anomalies following crises are the basic
driving force in fundamental - paradigmatic - changes in the scientific community. Kuhn, as
well as other authors, has also pointed out that this view can be valid for other institutions
(Kuhn 1962:374, Brown 1978). Whereas new ideas point out the probability that there are
"better places to be", crises make it evident that you have to move; they make you look at the
establishment with different eyes.
2. Reframin& efforts are driven by structurarlon
The concept of "structuration" is generally understood as referring to the existing frame bearing
on the ongoing production of the frame of tomorrow (Giddens 1976). In this context
structuration is meant to refer to a requirement for mechanisms controlling change efforts
enforcing the new direction, that new things are performed and that things are performed
differently, so as to give the reframing efforts persistence. This is also a view held by Quinn
and Kimberly (1984:311/12) and underline the need for creating a structure supporting the
change, a view which they express by saying, "there is creation in regulation. Don't abdicate.
There is confirmation in novelty"
An important conceptual background for this proposition is the understanding of organizational
frames as a process in which the production of meaning cannot be changed by ideas as such but
is constrained by the socio-structural system (Allaire and Firsirotu 1984). This is related to the
nature of meaning, as Geertz put it saying that "meaning resides in the acts", and that "man is
an animal suspended in a web he himself has spun" (Geertz 1973). He also demonstrates that if
the interpretation of a situation implies actions that no longer are possible, tensions forwarding
social change will arise. In a sense a sort of an unfreeze situation is created. New understanding
will have to develop. Structuration is suggested to utilize this kind of a situation systematically
to infuse the new and intended frame. Structuration means both breaking up the established
network of meaning existing in the form of collective practice and concretizing new ideas by
enforcing new practices.
There is also a symbolic argument here as new practices and systems signal what kind of action
the locus of power wants from the members of the organization. However, the reason for using
a notion of structuration is not justified only by this. First, structuration must be formed in
consideration of the existing organizational patterns, it must, as Jim March puts it, be done by
"attuning to the natural processes" (March 1981). We also bear in mind the need for persistence
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in this matter derived from the nature of organizational momentum. The point is therefore to
embed the ideas of the new organizational direction in the structures and systems of the
organization as the new organizational frame finds its concrete form(s). This should be applied
in a generative way: When new action and thinking are emerging they should continuously be
underpinned by mechanisms controlling them.
Therefore, this proposition can be seen as guiding the execution and practice of the change
efforts. In other words, the practical implementation of reframing efforts foUowin~ the ~
workin~ pmposition should be designed so as to forward structuration,
3.1 and 3.2 Or~anizational reframin& demands anchorin& and or&Mizational acceptance
One can conceive of organizations as also being political systems where what is decided and
what happens are connected to the existence of shifting dominating coalitions. New initiatives
can consequently be met by various counterforces which implies that they will not be realized.
In a way, change can be seen as a redistribution of power (Greiner 1967), indicating that actual
reframing must tind political support and that it must be seen as legitimate. Consequently, this
supports Pettigrew, who sees "politics as the management of meaning" and as an essential
aspect of a change process (pettigrew 1985:44). It seems reasonable to suggest that the
establishment of a reframing momentum demands the existence of a nucleus of political support
for the changes (e.g. Warmington et al. 1977).
The issue of anchoring change actions emerged as an important issue in the analysis on this
background. In sum, it is justified to suggest two (sub)propositions, one concerning the ~
mana~"nt and one concerning key leaders:
3.1 Top management anchoring:
By top management anchoring is meant top management giving active and visible support to
the reframing efforts. Top management refers to the top manager as well as others that would
naturally be considered part of the top management group. Top management have a strong
bearing on the agenda of the organization through their instrumental distribution of resources,
but also through how their actions are symbolically interpreted by the organizational members
(Pfeffer 1981). Reframing attempts will not get going if top management does "not lead the
way", and the change attempts will fall apart when/if it becomes known that top management
does not lead.
Why should organizational members buy the new ideas if top management does not? And, even
if they do, why should they practice them if they do not believe that top management will do
so? In that case the new ideas will not be reflected in the actual priorities and choices of the top
management. It won't pay to follow the espoused new direction because it won't be rewarded
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and because it won't be supported by the important allocation ofresources. Top management in
a sense is identified with and personifies the "right" organizational direction even when it is no
longer a good one for the company (e.g. Starbuck et al. 1977, Hedberg and Nystrom 1984).
Feldman (1989:29/30) puts it this way, "For the creativity of the liminal phase to be
transformative, the powerful and important must support it. Otherwise the only reaction will be
blame."
3.2 Organizational acceptance:
Organizational acceptance refers to understanding and accepting the new ideas by key leaders
of the organization. Key leaders are formal as well as informal leaders and opinion leaders,
including union ones. Organizational acceptance is needed in order to get the reframing
endeavour started and to be able to take the concrete step in question. It was suggested that
"anchoring" was demanded from top management When it comes to other leaders it is
suggested that anchoring only from a "critical mass"is called for (Schon 1983).
It seems in line with the observations leading up the reframing concepts to suggest that
reframing efforts must be supported by those constituting the power structure of an enterprise,
otherwise they will work against the new ideas and their implementation. However, this is
quite an impossible demand. First, it is not in the interest of all those in power positions to
support the new ideas since the new frame will bring about changes in the power structure.
Second, it is also unrealistic since it should indicate that the reframing more or less had to be
completed before the process started - therefore the proposal for the demand for "organizational
acceptance" .
The point is that even if the the project is not completely anchored with these leaders, an
organizational acceptance will make it possible to do something to move in the intended
direction. "The train can get rolling, and when it rolls it is much harder to stop." When started,
other mechanisms get a chance to work. It would, for example, be possible to design and
implement a follow-up and control structure. This means pressure on doing things the new and
intended way, leading to new experiences and also changing the power relationships.
Organizational acceptance can make it possible to implement a new compensation system, new
information systems or a new distribution of tasks. This again exposes people in the
organization to new situations and expe~ence and it changes the initial conditions for the task of
reframing organizations.
3.3 Oreanizational reframjne should be based on consistency and intemtion
By this proposition it is meant that reframing momentum should be created through reframing
efforts that are based on consistent signals and integrated in ongoing organizational processes.
Several issues emerge under this label that have one thing in common: Problems for the
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reframing ambitions will arise if the members of the organization do not think that the new ideas
really count. To include the new ideas in their situational understanding and programmes for
action seems little likely if they feel, sense, think on and experience, that it really is the old
frame that still is the real agenda in the organization. 1bey can't be expected to be convinced
that the new ideas really count This issue has several aspects. Two of them concern top
management. The other two focus on the structural aspect of the change efforts and their
relationship with the organizational processes.
a) Top manager consistency:
Top manager consistency means top managers being consistent in what they say and do. In the
earlier chapters we saw difficulties when the organizational members faced conflicting signals
from top management Top management is a strong source and sender of signals as it
represents the locus of power for the material distribution of the organization. Top management
dispositions are consequential for the premises of how organizational members perform their
job and also for their life in the organization in more general terms. Top management also
represents important role models for what is worth while.
Ambiguity can be inflicted by the top manager when he or she, for example verbally expresses
one set of priorities for the organization - the new organizational direction - while at the same
time expressing another set of priorities through actions and dispositions which follow the old
organizational direction. It seems reasonable to assume that the organizational members in the
best case will go on as before. If their interpretation is that the top managers await the
organizational responses, we can hypothesize that this would nourishe opportunism and
political games. If this situation of mixed messages is felt to be undiscussable, there exists a
situation where one cannot talk about the real premises underneath organizational interaction
and, consequently, the basic conditions for learning and changing are not present (Hennestad
1990).
b) Top management consistency:
Top management consistency means that reframing efforts must be supported by consistency in
the signals form the various members of the top management group. Organizational members
also experience mixed messages when the top management as a group send conflicting
messages, or when different top managers demand different things from the organizational
members. This might be due to a lack of a coherent understanding in the top management group
or the lack of a common language on relevant issues. When the organizational members witness
different messages from different members of the top management group, they might also
witness a political game. Members of the top management group might have verbally complied
with the new organizational direction inside the group, but outside the group they go on as
before, or in some other manner, because they think the new ideas will not be put into practice
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or because they actually try to sabotage them.
The point is that the effects for the change efforts are as destructive as when mixed messages
are experienced as coming from the top manager. They might even be worse, because
experiencing different positions in this issue from the top management group can give rise to
the formation of coalitions based on assumptions of possible directions of development. Such a
situation will certainly weaken the prospect of the reframing efforts.
c) Integration between change structure and operational structure:
If the new ideas are to become effective it must be assumed that they have to be felt as
"counting". Since the existing frame of an organization is "embedded in the acts", meaning, as
Smircich says, "being in relation", the new ideas - the prospective new frame - will have to
deviate from "what already counts" and be taken for granted in the organizationallife. There
are therefore reasons to believe that (even if it is experienced as being supported from top
management) members of the organization will experience some sort of mixed messages when!
if they try to practice the new ideas or do new or old things differently. What they try to do will
tend to be negatively sanctioned in the daily organizationallife.
The new organizational frame will be realized in the mundane everyday life of the organization.
Consequently its ideas must be brought to bear upon the everyday situation. This means that the
ideas must be put in a position in which they can "compete" with the established ones for the
attention of the organizational members. Of course there is sort of a paradox in this: The new is
brought to bear upon the old in the sense of being implanted in the same processes
underpinning the old. "There is creation in destruction". By breaking up established practices
and making new needs and demands explicit, organizational members can experience anomaly
and crisis in their everyday situation, thereby being more critical to what is established and
open to new ideas. Replace the word scientists with organizational members and see what
Kuhn says: "Confronted with anomaly or crises, scientists take a different attitude to existing
paradigms" (Kunh 1962:91).
This seems to presuppose that the new ideas and their derived solutions and activities have to be
followed up with the same intensity as the running activities (operations) of the f111Il. This
means that there has to be a close connection - some sort of integration - between the change
structure and the operational structure of the organization.
Moss Kanter realizes the same phenomenon when she says: "Throughout, I have marshalled
evidence to show the importance of integration to the innovation process, close structural
connections between potential innovator and users, between functions and departments,
between the innovation project and use" (Kanter 1988:205).
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Our observations indicate that change structure groups and committees mandated to have
leading role in a change process and who follow the development and take initiative for new
solutions when problems arise, etc, must consist of actors who have responsibility for the
implementation of the new ideas. This means that line managers should have a central role in
change structure/ organization and that this must not be separated from the line. Although it, of
course, can drawon supplementary resources. Such an integration and connection also seems
necessary from the point of view of feeding back to the change process the effects of the effons
already put into force. This is essential for relating new efforts to the organizational processes.
d) Integration of structures and systems:
As observed in the chapter on emerging reframing issues, systems and structures also seem to
be sources of signals to the organizational members, influencing their interpretation of the
situation. "Old structures and systems" might symbolize other situational understandings than
are necessary to support the development of the new frame. When embodying other ideas and
encouraging other interpretations and solutions than forwarded by management as the new
organizational direction, the organizational members experience mixed messages. Supporting
the new frame presupposes systems that comply with it.
This also seems necessary to preserve what is gained. When people start to think and act in the
intended way, it is always a risk that they can reven to old habits, as suggested by the concept
of liminality. Moss Kanter observes the need to "take care of what is gained. She identifies as
an important cause for change programmes that fail to "insufficiently develop vehicles to
institutionalize the programmes." She says, for example, that "programmes need to be
institutionalized in the sense that they become a part of common work practice, supported and
rewarded throughout the organization" (Kanter 1984:213).
Systems and structures are important symbols or senders of signals in the organization in
addition to bearing on thinking and acting. The organizational structure connects individual and
groups to specific parts of their environment, and the information system selects certain aspects
of the reality.
3,4 Or~anizational reframin~ must be based on or~anizational direction by rop mana~emem
(centrally) and concretized locally (decentral )
This proposition means that reframing organizations must include and be supported by an
interplay between centrally formulated direction and locally designed solutions. The dilemma of
centralization vs. decentralization is well known in the literature on management and
organization (e.g. Camall 1990). This dilemma also seems to be reflected in the efforts of
reframing organizations. In all the companies in the sample the reframing efforts were centrally
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initiated. However, we observed a good proportion of locally formed solutions also seemed to
help the change on its way. These observations seem in line with Mintzberg when he points out
that the actual strategy in use is created in an interplay between the one that is intended and ideas
that are emerging.
It is impossible to design in full detail solutions at all levels and for all circumstances as to how
the new direction is to be practised, though it is how the new ideas are enacted that decides
what it is becoming. An old proverb says that "the one wearing the shoe knows best where it
squeezes." In line with this, we feel Rosabeth Moss Kanter rejects the idea that the profit of
participation is comminnent She says: ''The real merit of participative mechanisms is that they
generate concrete ideas, make it possible for these ideas to be taken advantage of, connect
people to situations and solutions of critical problems, increase the likelihood that people's
relevant capacities will be utilized, and increase the probability of effective performance"
(Kanter 1983:214).
The need for participation through the design of local solutions is based on the need for new
solutions to relate to local situations. By participating, individual organizational members will
be able to relate his or her job situation to the new direction and thereby also develop an
understanding of what the new direction means in concrete terms. Furthermore, if meaning is
created interactively, it seems justified to assume that it must be recreated interactively (Bate
1990:40).
3.5. Or&anizationa} reframin& is endowed with meanin&
by inductive as well as deductive means
This proposition means that reframing demands that the ideas are both motivated and
explained, and also realized by the learning imposed experiences.
Most change projects seem to start with consciousness-raising and or conceptually-oriented
seminars, internal marketing or other ways of "teaching" or getting the message through. Some
even seem to want to complete the change in the seminar rooms before it is implemented.
Others throw the organizational members into deep water and expect them to swim. We have
seen here different patterns in how such inductive and deductive learning styles are combined,
and expect that there are reasons for both to be used. I shall further explain why I propose a
combination of the two. It seems, however, that reflected in this issue is the duality between
culture as ideas and as being embedded in the action system.
a) The inductive aspect
The conservative power reflected in the statement "meaning residing in the acts" has previously
been pointed out Bateson reflected that "an explorer can never know what he is exploring until
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it has been explored" (Bateson 1972:xvi). Ideas for a new organizational direction are in the
abstract before being experienced. It can be difficult for organizational members to proceed in
the new direction, even if it seems intellectually the right thing to do. In a way the new ideas
have not proved their superiority. Not before looking back on some kind of experience is it
possible to see what ideas for a new organizational direction imply.
Drawing a parallel to system-oriented psychiatric research it must be kept in mind that
Watzlawick et al. (1974) hold higher order learning to presuppose measures taken to break the
old frame. They prescribe changing the premises for the kind of situation that needs to be
reframed. New experiences make people look upon the situation with "other eyes" and learning
can take place. There is a parallel here to the concept of "unfreezing" and the significance of
anomaly for forwarding change. Imposed experiences can be seen as a new frame for old
situations and contribute both to unfreezing the situation and creating opportunities for learning
the new ideas that are offered.
b) The deductive aspect
There is also a need for motivating and being explicit by formulating the ideas for the new,
something the organizational members can relate to and confront Weick throws light on and
gives our puzzle depth when he says:
"The explorer cannot know what he is facing until he faces it, and then looks back over the
episode to sort out what happened, a sequence of retrospective sensemaking ...But the act of
exploring itself has an impact on what is being explored, which means that parts of what the
explorer discovers retrospectively are consequences of his own making. Furthermore, the
explorer is guided by preconceptions of some kind even though they may be generic
preconceptions such as 'this will have made sense once I explore it although right now it seems
senseless" (Weick, Gilfillan and Keith 1973).
This supports a view that experiences (inductive learning) do not result in unambiguous ideas.
When members of an organization are put in a situation which forces them to relate differently
to the tasks and each other, there are several possibilities as to what they learn from it. The
interpretation arises in retrospect. However, what they experience is still influenced by their
preconceptions. Experiences following enforced new situations will need "interpretation
assistance" if they are to reflect and support the intended organizational direction.
Communication and clarification of the ideas reflecting the intended frame is needed to influence
preconceptions with which the organizational members meet new situations and consequently
what they experience. Since experiences with this as a background are still open to
retrospective understanding and interpretation, post explanation and communication also seem
appropriate to influence the new situation emerging and to be supportive of the intended
organizational direction.
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Summin&up
It is proposed that:
1. a condition for the refraIning efforts to have such an effect is that they are
based on a reframing rationale representing content and motivation.
2. a condition for the refraIning momentum to become established is that the
reframing efforts constitute a process of structuration given the change efforts
form.
3. this can be established and maintained by the reframing efforts
3.1 being anchored in top management as well as
3.2 having organizational acceptance - accepted by a critical mass of key
leaders,
3.3 basing them on consistent signals and integrating them in ongoing
organizational processes,
3.4 formulating them as organizational direction centrally (by top
management) and concretized locally (decentral solution) and
3.5 endowing them with meaning by inductive as well as deductive means
by explanation as well as (imposed) experience.
It should be underlined that these propositions have a somewhat different status, as 1 and 2
express some kind of necessary, but not necessarily sufficient, conditions. The first one must
exist or be established as a basic condition. The second is some kind of an overall requirement
for the reframing efforts to work: according to the intentions. Whether it is realized or not is
seen as being dependent on how the refraIning efforts are handled. The other propositions
propose which ~idelines to orient the refraIning efforts in order for these efforts to result in
the establishment of a reframing momentum. Guidelines mean that they point towards what
should be pursued.
Towards a model
The need for organizational refraIning is created by the nature of organizational frames. It refers
to the view that organizational understanding becomes embedded in the social patterns and
artifacts of the organization in a self-sustaining manner. This naturally constitutes a problem
when the agenda is reorienting organizations in the sense of pursuing another direction by
emphasizing other values, customer needs, ways of meeting them, ete. By observing attempted
reframing endeavours I have developed a set of reframing concepts, which encapsulate and
reflect central issues when this kind of organizational change is pursued. By relating them to
the initial perspective a working hypothesis that is intended to consitute a renewed conceptual
platform is suggested.
173
By presenting propositions for reframing organizations the study moves one step further and
reflects slightly more freely with some references to other peoples relevant research and ideas.
The propositions are, however, supposed to reflect and concretize the working hypothesis.
Thererby they prove to be close to a nonnative "translation" of the reframing concepts and have
a clear relationship to the empirically grounded findings of the study.
The propositions can be considered a rough model for reframing organizations. However, as
guidelines they immediately raise new questions: How are they related to each other and to the
task of reframing organizations? The data offers us little help to answer these questions
systematically. I would still like to offer some ideas or tentative answers, therefore we must
depart somewhat from the empirical grounding and reflect, speculate, and draw more freely on
other contributions.
In doing so in the following chapter on ''Towards a Model: Ideas for further construction", we
move, in Mintzbergs terms, even further from the "detective work" and undertake a "creative
leap" (Mintzberg 1978). The relationship with the ideas that are empirically grounded are kept,
however, by considering the propositions as the "supporting beam" for the model.
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Chapter 8: Towards a model for reframing organizations
- ideas for further construction
The aim of this chapter is to construct and suggest a more comprehensive model for reframing
organizations. It will be based on the exploration of the relationships between the propositions
presented in the last chapter and some ideas for how these can be conceptualized. Speculation
and reflection based on other people's writings will be undertaken more freely than in the
preceeding chapters. Using the propositions as "supporting beams" should, however, help us
keep our feet on the empirical ground
Shifting concerns
A seQuence of phases?
If the working hypothesis and propositions are to be fruitful guides for working with change
as well as generating deeper knowledge, there is a need for a framework to arrange them in
relation to each other and the change situation. The same need is reflected in the focus on steps
and phases in the literature on organizational change. Although most of this literature is based
on a conception of change far more instrumental and mechanistic than what follows from the
perspective here, there are common themes.
The classic one is Lewins (1951) "unfreeze", change (or "move") and "refreeze", which reflects
needs that have been touched upon in previous chapters. This is understood as destroying the
old as a whole in the sense of loosing it up as a system rather than destroying every part of it,
and also the need for freezing which is understood as conserving, preserving or stabilizing the
new. Lippit et al. (1958) conceives of the process of managing change as developing needs,
establishing relationships, working towards change and then evaluating.
There are other such planning oriented conceptions of change: Bechard (1969) identifies the
phases as diagnosis, strategy, plan, educate, consult and train, whereas innovation literature
identifies characteristics of the innovation process as evaluation, initiation, implementation and
routinization (Hage and Aiken 1970). Zaltzman, et al. (1977) suggests the phases knowledge
attention, decision, preparatory implementation and continued and reinforced implementation.
They say: "In the process approach, innovation is viewed as an unfolding process consisting of
stages in which characteristic factors not only appear in greater or smaller degree, but also in a
certain order of occurrence." The stressing of "the processual" in parallel with the spelling out
of sequential phases is not unusual in the literature on change (e.g. Warmington 1977).
Concerns of chane«
This view seems, however, to be increasingly modified by some of the leading contemporary
writers on the theme. Lundberg (1984) brings Lewin's framework further by suggesting that all
transitions go through the phases of induction, management and stabilization, but that planned
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change should ~ through diagnosis, planning and action within each of the these phases.
Rosabeth Moss Kanter, in her well-known contribution to the understanding of innovation and
change, The Chan~ Masters fmds the prototypical successful innovation to be made up of by
three waves or iterations - problem definition, building of coalitions and, mobilization.
Her conception of waves of change is interesting, as it represents an understanding of overlap
and interconnections. This view is taken even further by Pettigrew. In commenting upon
Johnstone's fourstep model of change, development of concern, acceptance and understanding
of the problem, planning and action and stabilizing of the change, Pettigrew takes care to stress
that the notion of phases should not be understood in the narrow sense. He says,
"these phases, of course, do not occur over similar time periods, neither do they necessarily
follow the sequence indicated. Concerns are raised and problems acknowledged get blocked,
the context changes, new concerns appear and the processes accelerate through to action, using
solutions made available by previous debates" (pettigrew 1985:457).
The sequence myth is suggested in the literature to connote the tendency of - and interest in - the
change literature of conceiving of the change tasks as a set of separate and predictable steps or
phases (Normann 1985). The alternative process image is suggested to be is a spiralling one, an
image that, as we shall see later, also Lundberg (1984) was close to.
The phases proposed and discussed often reflect essential issues or concerns in a change
process. In a sense they represent functions that have to be filled, states that have to be reached,
aspects of needs that have to be attended to, etc. There are reasons for conceiving of such
issues as concerns mthcr lhan phases. This is a justified modification in view of the process-
oriented nature of organizational culture. This makes it feel right to join Normann in his
rejection of the sequence myth. Although preferring to conceive of these issues as shifting
concerns rather than phases, I do not fully depart from the idea of some kind of sequence, and
return to that issue after presenting a set of concerns which are essential to the issue of
reframing organizations.
Pro.posin~ a set ofconcerns
The four-step model introduced by Johnstone (1975) is supported by Pettigrew's
comprehensive and longitudinal study of "Continuity and Change in ICf'. Pettigrew also fmds
that the descriptive-oriented framework is fit to organize more prescriptive guidelines or
propositions for managing organizational change. As indicated by the quote in the last section,
he does not conceive of these phases as phases in the strict sense of the word.
There are similarities with the conceptualization developed by Kanter, who, however, does not
stress stabilization as a concern. A set of concerns in line with these is: Anchoring,
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organizational acceptance, new action and stabilization. The fust two reflect worries that were
identified through the search for reframing concepts, and the anchoring aspect was also
reflected in one of the propositions presented in the last chapter. Suggesting it as a concern
represents a further qualification of the propositions.
Anchorine deals with the issue of top management identification and support. Anchoring is the
situation where top management, or others that constitute the power elite, is identified with and
personifies the intended organizational direction. In this situation the top management in
symbolic as well as practical and material terms, behaves supportive towards it. Anchoring as a
concern reflects the proposition of the need for anchoring change efforts in top management.
This proposition is consequently seen a condition for managing the change process
successfully. Thus there seems to be reason to suggest that it constitutes an element in the
framework ordering the relationship between the other propositions.
Oreanizational acceptance deals with establishing a "critical mass" of support for the intended
organizational direction and having the organization as a whole accept the new. By that is meant
that a significant and sufficient number of leaders, formal and informal, accept the change
actions chosen to forward the reframing process. Acceptance means that they exert sufficient
understanding and support as to make it politically possible to implement these change actions.
This is taken to mean that indifference, implying the lack of resistance, sometimes can
constitute organizational acceptance in this sense.
This is a contingent concern in the sense that what is a critical mass will vary with what actions
are planned. It reflects the proposition that organizational reframing demands acceptance by a
critical mass of key leaders. Organizational has been added to acceptance. This reflects a rather
pragmatic prolongation of the view that top management anchoring is needed because
organizations are political systems, but that can be done with acceptance from lower level
leaders. This also means that the organizational members should know what is going to
happen and why. A critical mass of key leaders plus other informed organizational members
are seen as organizational acceptance. This interpretation also considers the need for deductive
learning - being informed.
New action - enacting the new ideas - deals with new and changed performance on the way to
realizing new ideas and is materialised in roles and tasks. The members of the organization do
new things or old things differently. The abstract ideas are to be implanted in the local situation
of the members through new demands expressed in action programmes. In a way this is a
rather obvious concern since it focuses on the actual change from a management and
organizational point of view. On the other hand, this is also why it is considered an important
concern. It is in the transformation of ideas, ambitions and plans into action that so many
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change ambitions are aborted. Also, from the point of view of changing the meanings of the
organization, we must bear in mind the axiom that meaning resides in the acts.
Stabilizin& deals with "making the change stick". That means underpinning, consolidating and
cementing the changes that are emerging. Again, this means taking care of both the ideational as
well as the structural aspects of what is happening. It is about post interpretation; What is the
meaning ofwhat has happened in view ofwhat is going to be? It is also about post-structuring;
(re)structuring to establish bearings to underpin the intended ideas and actions that are in the
process of becoming integrated in the organization.
I do not have a conceptual parallel to, for instance, Jonstones and Pettigrew's development of
concern or Kanter's problem definition. This is because the focus here is primarily on the
process of refraIning and not on the process by which the organization becomes aware of what
is wrong, what to do, or in which direction to change. The closest to this in the conceptual
understanding here is identifying the need for the refraIning rationale as a necessary condition
for managing the process of refraIning organization. Otherwise there are parallells. When these
authors focus on recognition and understanding of the problem as well as building of
coalitions, also in line with Quinn (1980, 1982), I focus on and conceptualize anchoring and
organizational acceptance as two separate concerns for change. When Johnstone conceptualizes
planning and action and Kanter mobilization we are concerned with new action, and, as with
Johnstone, there is a need to conceptualize stabilization as part of the change process.
Cyclic seQuences of shiftin& concerns
What is the relationship between the concerns if they are not step-wise phases? The answer is a
dubious one in that they both are and are not. Step-wise the challenge is to conceive of the
relationship without becoming a victim of the sequence myth. Conceiving of them as "shifting"
concerns has already been proposed. But in what sense do they shift? In spite of preferring to
use the notion of shifting concerns instead of steps of phases, it is a fruitful initial guide to
conceive of the shifting concerns as occurring in a sequence, but in a circular fashion.
The idea of shifting concerns following a circular sequence is also in line with the ideas of
Quinn and Kimberly (1984:304). That is, an effective and complete reframing process might
have followed a sequence from anchoring, acceptance, and new action to stabilization in terms
of the main emphasis in the different periods. However, if we consider the process of directing
efforts aiming at refraIning the organization, the image should be considerably more complex
and contingent.
The sequence of concerns has to be run through several times. This is because a reframing
process will consist of various aspects. It is necessary to focus and work with the different
178
levels of the enterprise, as well as different departments and functions (sales, logistics, etc.) as
they will need a special focus and/or project It can be assumed that a special project launched
to help take care of one of the concerns has to consider all the concerns proposed. This could,
for example, be an alteration of the reward system to stabilise other changes. Even if this does
not represent a complete reframing process, it represents a shift that reflects the issue of
meaning residing in the acts.
Another reason for sticking to the image of a cyclic process is the idea of self reinforcement
reflected in the the notion of organizational momentum. This draws on the ideas of Pascal
Gagliardi who pictured cultural formation as virtuous and vicious circles, as presented in
chapter five. The circle of anchoring, organizational acceptance, new action and stabilization
follows to a large extent the same logic: Anchoring and organizational acceptance - as described
above - make it possible for new ideas (the parallel to "distinctive competence") to be exercised.
Successful exercises (new actions) are followed by idealization and stabilization. The natural
formation process presupposes success as a condition for idealization and stabilization - that the
new ideas work. When new arrangements work they can also be used as models (it ~ possible)
for other parts of the organization. Whether organizational arrangements work or are a success
- is not an objective issue. The point is whether they are perceived to work. The perception,
however, can be influenced by various things, as indicated in the above section on stabilization.
The notion of organizational refraIning as several cyclic sequences of focusing on shifting
concerns should, however, allow for seeing them as shifting and interrelated. Sometinies one
of them can be skipped or at least have a very weak focus. The period focusing on anchoring
can, for example, be thought of under certain circumstances as accelerating through to action.
Stabilization can influence and increase the degree of acceptance, etc. At the same time, the
various concerns very often will overlap, like the focus and efforts on stabilization before the
concern for new action is completed. etc.
StartiO&the cycle
Where does the overlapping cycles of shifting concerns start? Usually by anchoring. First,
since the focus is on managing organizational reframing it is somewhat evident that
management starts as well as directs, the directed process. Second, an essential aspect of a
reframing process is, as outlined previously, a political one. This, as argued, implies a
primary role for the symbolic as well as material disposition of top management Pettigrew,
conceiving of change as phases says, "...neither do they necessarily follow the sequence
indicated ..., and emphasizes the anchoring role of leadership in initiating strategic change in his
study of leI (Pettigrew 1985:457).
" ...one pattern that is evident is the central role of leadership in initiating strategic change.
George Bridge in the Agricultural division, John Harvey-Jones in the Petrochemical division,
structure change and the corporate change process of the 1970's and early 1980's, and Tony
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Woodburn in the Mond Division, all started change processes by sensing, and at ftrst
imprecisely articulating, concerns about mismatches or performance gaps between aspects of
their organization and what they saw as a changing environment", (Pettigrew 1985:45 7/8)
Pettigrew also goes on to specify in what way they initiated the change process.
The conclusion supports the view that top management plays a central role in the organization's
ability to adjust and learn (e.g. Starbuck, et al. 1977, Nystrom and Starbuck 1984) and
indicates that change is not realized without top management support (e.g. Greiner 1967). The
cycle of shifting concerns should start with or be based on anchoring.
The model that is closest to this description is shown below, although it misses the point that
the overall reframing process is not only repeated cycles of overlapping concerns, but is also at
several cycles in parallel:
Stabilizin
Ancboring- - - - Organizational Acceptance - - - -New Action - - - - -Stabilizing
FIG. 8.1 CYCLES OF OVERLAPPING CONCERNS
The relationships between concerns and propositions
Propositions and concerns
A reframing rationale constitutes a basic condition for the establishment of a reframing process;
it is some kind of ground on which to design and tackle this kind of process. The reframing
efforts also must be designed and implemented as to create and reinforce a process of
structuration. A set of propositions that should serve as guidelines for working with reframing
organizations has been suggested around this. In this chapter it is also suggested that the
process of reframing organizations is facing a set of shifting concerns. A remaining question
is: What are the relationships between these propositions and concerns?
The remaining three propositions about to be discussed relate to approaches to the issues of
intefmltion, formation of solution (decentral and central) and learning (inductive as well as
deductive). In discussing the meaning of the propositions related to the major concerns of the
process, it is necessary to focus more closely on their operational implications.
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necessary to focus more closely on their operational implications.
Anchorini: When anchoring is the focus the issue is that the reframing efforts are connected to
the organizational power structure so as to get active support. Otherwise the seeds won't be
able to take root This will not happen if the top manager is perceived to send mixed messages
to the organizational members. In a way this deals with managers as models (e.g. Peters 1978).
Therefore, the proposition on integration should mean consistency between word and acts and
from situation to situation on part of the top managers - especially the CEO.
When it comes to the issue of defming solutions at this stage, it seems natural to suggest that
top management must take the initiative. This is almost tautological since the focus is on
managed change. Furthermore, for a reframing process to have active support it must have an
identity, it must clarify where the organization now is meant to go, and it must show what kind
of reframing is needed and intended. This is still not to be understood as a completely top-down
process. In other periods of the process, decentral initiative will be needed. But this suggestion
implies that this will take place in interrelationship with the initial frame.
The next question deals with learning and the dilemma of a proposed need for inductive as well
as deductive learning approaches. When concerned with the anchoring of the process it seems
that the members become aware of what the intended frame is all about, and that it is supported
and forwarded by the top. This being the case, it seems reasonable to suggest that the main
approach to learning should be deductive in trying to convince the members of the superiority
of the intended frame.
Or&anizational acceptance: When this is the focus it is important that a critical mass is formed
and that the members of the organization understand that a critical mass favouring the new
direction is emerging. This implies that top management focus in this area therefore should be
perceived to be relatively homogeneous and that the attitude of top managers towards the
intended organizational direction must be experienced accordingly.
The question of who has the initiative in forwarding solutions should, in this situation, be
answered slightly differently than when anchoring is the concern. There is an emphasis on the
new ideas coming from the top management. It is these solutions that set the new agenda.
However, there is a point and a possibility for focusing on the decentral aspect The point is
both to start the process of making the new ideas real by having people relate to them seriously,
as well as to start the process of realizing them in terms of finding concrete solutions. In pratical
terms, this means that the local level could be "trying out" what the intended organizational
direction would mean. A dialogue between key actors and top management based on the
estimated implications of the intended new direction should take place. What does it mean to us
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and is it possible?
The learning aspect of this deals with getting key members of the organization to understand
and accept the essence of the new direction. Primarily, they are in a situation where the initiative
is with the top formulating and forwarding the new ideas in a situation where new action has
not started to take place. On the other hand, there is an element of trying out the new which
could imply inductive learning. In terms of gaining acceptance, however,the main emphasis is
on the power of conviction of the new ideas. In other words, that the main learning must be
trusted to be created by ideational rather than experiential means.
New action: What is the meaning of integration when (the creation 00 new action is the
concern? It seems justified to assume that it is about a correspondence between the new ideas
and the demand and requirements for what to do and how to do it that people are exposed to.
The questions therefore must be whether it is consequently followed up and whether activities
following from the new directions are performed. This is so that they compete with the "old"
culturally embedded forms. This again means that new demands and requirements, formulated
and forwarded to support the new organizational direction, must consequently be put forward
in settings and arenas that deal with the daily operationallife of the organization. The new must
in this sense be integrated in the ongoing stream of organizationallife.
When it comes to the issue of who should have the initiative for formulating solutions, the
situation is one of postulating that there is a need for local and concrete solutions reflecting and
supporting the ideas for a new direction. In this context, it is easy to suggest the solution to the
central/decentral dilemma. Local competence is necessary for connecting the new ideas to the
local situation. Therefore, local design is called for to define and formulate solutions for new
action reflecting and supporting the new direction.
Inductive learning has been described as one of comprehending ideas from new - possibly
imposed - experiences. It is implicit in this view that all affected members have to fully comply
with the actions taken. The form of learning is the inductive one; learning through imposed
experiences by contributing to both new actions and the formulation of new solutions, and in
doing so also contributing to the destruction of old forms.
Stabilizin&: When stabilizing is the concern the focus is on preventing the organization from
falling back to old habits, as it is inherent in the phenomenon in question to do so. Bearings
should be created to support what is emerging. Integration in this context should therefore mean
a revision and adjustment of the structures and systems of the organization to support the
intended organizational direction both in the material and the symbolic sense.
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In terms of the locus for identifying solutions, the implication must be on a local initiative to
allow for and make possible the actual and potential definition of the situation of the
organizational members to be reflected in the design. Systems and structures are, however,
often rather complex and integrated in the overall functioning of the enterprise (e.g. pay
systems in a highly unionized firm). There is, therefore, a need for top management initiatives
and solutions in the coordination issue. When stabilization is the concern both central and
decentral solution initiatives are needed. There is, however, a need for further clarification of
this "dilemma of a dilemma" which we will return to later.
The issue of the approach to learning in the context of a concern for stabilizing the
organizational members' understanding of their own situation is connected to the requirements
of the intended direction. Taking part in reforming the systems and structures of the enterprise
offers a kind of experience that carries with it a new perspective concretizing the new and
intended organizational direction. This would imply an inductive approach to learning. On the
other hand, a deductive approach is needed to endow with meaning the new experiences people
already have made when exposed to demands for new action, assisting in the retrospective
sensemaking (e. g. Pfeffer 1981). In other words, inductive as well as deductive approaches to
learning are suggested.
Organizational New
Anchorin& Acce,ptance ~ StahiHzation
In"'mtion; Consistent Consistency Consistent Consistency
articulation and in managers' demands in structure/
action signals and system
follow up design
Alu2roach 10 Central: Decentral: Decentral: Decentral/Central:
solutioos; Top management Local Local Local
direction "scenarios" design design, top
- try out coordination
Allgroach 10 Deductive: Deductive: Inductive: Inductive and
learnin&; ideational ideational imposed deductive
conviction conviction experiences (explanation)
The content of the table characterizes the lWIin emphasise of the focal relationship.
FIG. 8.2 RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN CONCERNS AND THE APPROACHES
TO SOLUTION, LEARNING AND INTEGRATION
The discussion has revealed a need for further clarification as the notions of inductive/deductive
as well as centralIdecentral were used slightly differently, and were dependent upon which
concern was being focused on.
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The notions of learnin& and solution approaches revised
A need for both top management coordination as well as decentral suggestions and solutions
taking care of the concern for stabilization has been identified, as well as a need for inductive as
well as deductive means around the same concern. This means that having different concerns in
mind seems to put the conceptions in question in a different light.
When discussing the approach 10 solutions there should be a central emphasis when
"anchoring" is the concern and it should deal with what are the new frame, strategies, goals
ete. This is the same conclusion when stabilizing is the concern, but the solutions should deal
with coordinating systems and structures to underpin what is emerging. In the first case the
emphasis is on prospective-oriented solutions, in the second case the emphasis is on
retro:apective-oriented solutions. This, however, must be understood in a particular sense. The
solutions are formed for the future, but their intentions should be to stabilise what is emerging.
When there is a decentral emphasis, the focus is on identifying possible solutions for
performing new Wb when organizational acceptance is the concern, and for designing them
when new action is the concern. The focus is, however, on finding solutions or systems for
how these newarrangements are to be supported (e.g. pay and information systems) when
stabilizing is the concern.
Anchoring
Organizational acceptance
New action
Stabilizing
Centralization Decentralization
Prospective Retrospective Task(design) Systems
x
x
x
x x
FIG. 8.3 CONCERNS AND APPROACHES TO SOLUTIONS
When discussing the apmoach ro learning the focus is future oriented when anchoring and
organizational acceptance are the concerns. New actions, however, impose on people new
understanding, but the content of that understanding can not be completely foreseen. It is
therefore a need for a retrosPCCtiye focus when stabilizing is the concern, whereas the
pros.pective was the perspective when anchoring and organizational acceptance were the
concerns. Even when/if all the organizational participants understand and accept in advance
what is going to be put into practice, the practical experiences might prove different from what
was intended, raising a need for retrospectively oriented sensemaking. Or the sense people
make out of their experiences can prove to vary. The point is to assist in the retrospective
process of sensemaking.
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When new action is the concern, the focus should be on learning by performing the job or the
~ differently; the job directions are changed and the pressures on the jobs are changed. When
stabilization is the concern, however, (inductive) learning should follow from assessment of
and reviewing how the job is to be done: What new standards, directions as well as systems
and structural arrangements, should be designed and implemented?
Inductive
Thetask Assessment
Deductive
Prospective Retrospective
x
x
x x
Anchoring
Organizational acceptance
New action
Stabilization
x
FIG. 8.4 CONCERNS AND APPROACHES TO LEARNING
Integrating these revisions into one matrix leaves this picture:
Organizational New
Anchoring Acceptance Action Stabilization
Learning Deductive! Deductive! Inductive/ Inductive/assessment
approach prospective prospective task Deductive retrospective
Solution Central! Decentrall Decentral! Decentral/system
approach prospecti ve task prospective CentraVretrospective
FIG. 8.5 CONæRNS AND APPROACHES TO SOLUTIONS AND LEARNING
Four modes of reframing organizations
The idea that organizational reframing is created through a reframing momentum is central in
this study. Reframing momentum is created through a process of structuration for change and
is based on a reframing rationale. Structuration for reframing is suggested to be created by
organizing the working propositions of integration and consistency, learning approach and
approach to solutions in relation to the shifting concerns; anchoring, organizational acceptance,
new action and stabilization.
These three aspects are related to the task of reframing organizations and are the last steps
before suggesting a model. In doing this the focus will be on the role and meaning of
integration related to the shifting concerns, and the actual formation of the new frame is
accomplished by the construction of new solutions and the learning of their ideas and practice.
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EKpandin& the notion of intemtion
So far, the issue of how to switch between the shifting concerns has not been touched upon.
Integration has, however, been proposed as conceptually reflecting the central paradox of
bridging the old and the new with the aim of making the new take root in the old. Actionwise,
the steps taken to pursue integration should reflect the need to attune to the natural processes of
the organization by consequently supporting consistently the intended organizational direction.
Against this background it seems reasonable to suggest that the notion of integration should be
expanded to include the need to integrate information about effects into reframing efforts. By
doing so integration can be seen as a centrallwh or node in the cycle of concerns.
By this is meant that integration - as the hub in the cycle of shifting concerns - should be
performed to meet the diawostic needs of the reframing process. This deals with including
the dimension of change that is, for example, described by Torbert, " ...an ongoing, aesthetic
alertness that integrates intuition, knowledge, action, and outcomes as they are occurring"
(Torbert 1987). He calls this "action inquiry". I see it as a dimension of a change approach
making one able to attune to the situation in terms of adjusting to what kind of effects have
occurred. Is the time ripe for shifting concerns? Do we have to "wheel back," or focus again
on a concern we thought we had attended to before moving on?
There is a need for participation in the reframing process in order to connect to the situational
understanding of the participants and in order to make concrete the ideas for a new direction.
This diagnostic function also improves the conditions for the dialogue in the process.
Developing awareness of the various actors' reactions and situational understandings in order to
be able to relate to them is included in integration as it is now understood.
The need for such a continuous diagnosis and implicit dialogue is related to the concept of the
organization as counterforcing change - characterized by momentum - and the need for decentral
involvement also offering a constructive potential for producing suggestions and solutions that
can make change efforts more effective. There is also a strong argument for this in the thesis
that meaning is (re) constructed or arises from the crossing of perspectives, or as says Bråten:
" Meaning is seen to arise in the dialogue of perspectives in and between individuals within the
reality which they create and in which they exist That is, there is a primary dialogical circle
that makes even the individual act of creation an event within the meaning horizon of the
lifeworld in which the individual exists with other individuals and in virtue of which there is
communication between them." [Bråten (1987) with reference to Mead ( 1934) and Schutz
(1972).]
This expanded notion of integration underlines the need for a structure to fulfill its function.
The analytic notion of an integration structure can work for this purpose as well as take care of
consistency in the following up of new demands as proposed. Analytical means that the
integration can be handled within the framework of the existing structure of meetings, or by
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adjusting them to meet this requirements. It has been previously argued that a separate change
structure would, or could be, antithetical to the need for integration.
Modes ofreframin& or&anizations
As it now stands, reframing organizations is accomplished based on the conditions of
reframing rationale and structuration. The development of solutions - making the new frame
concrete - and the learning of solutions and ideas and the performance of integration conditions
for structuration are supposed to be created. This means that the actual formation - the "real-
ization" - of the new frame is performed though the actions for creating and learning solutions.
The integration activities deal with how to connect the process of formation into an ongoing
organizational process. In the construction of a model for reframing organizations, it is
therefore useful to see the combination of the development of solutions and the learning of
solutions and ideas as the fonnation approach.
A model for reframing organizations should order the propositions in relation to each other, the
shifting concerns as well as the wholeness of the task of reframing organizations. To be able to
to so I suggest conceiving of the various combinations of integration and formation approaches
as related to the various concerns as modes. This implies that the reframing process can be seen
as four interrelated and overlapping modes. Each mode deals with taking care of a concern of
reframing by choosing the appropriate approaches to the issues of integration and formation.
These modes are: conviction, directed dialogue, constituting, and consolidation. Each of them
is presented with a summing up of their interrelationships in the shape of a model.
It follows from the definition of modes that spelling them out, as well as presenting the whole
of the model, actually sews together the earlier parts of the discussion of this chapter. The
definitions below means integrating the ideas summed up in figure 8.5 and the idea of a
formation approach with the expanded notion of integration and the conception of modes of
reframing.
Mode of conyincin&: In the mode of convincing, the concern is establishing anchoring. The
emphasise of the founation approach is therefore what are called central prospective and
deductive prospective. In practical terms we can take this to mean that the top manager should
envision and communicate what the new enterprise should be and also what it means in terms
of ideas for tackling and handling tasks - the central perspective. The new direction should be
communicated by information through various channels explaining what the organization
should do and motivating why it should do so -the deductive perspective.
In this process, intemtion should be established by pursuing consistency between what is said
and done by the top manager in and across various contexts. This also means that the new
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ideas are brought into the arenas of the management function of the enterprise rather than
remaining in change seminars (management), culture workshops, etc. The point is that the top
manager becomes identified with - he or she, in a sense, personifies or embodies - the new
organizational direction.
Mode of directed dialo~: In the mode of directed dialogue, the concern is establishing
organizational acceptance. The emphasis of the fonnation approach is on decentral focusing
task and the deductive prospective. In practical terms this means that the top management
should initiate and motivate a new organizational direction and that there are discussions and
assessments about how to implement and practice at middle management levels and among
other key people, like informal leaders and union spokespersons. In other words, there should
be a decentralized search for solutions based on a centrally communicated direction. This also
implies a dialogue between key leaders and between key leaders and top management.
In this process, intemtion should be pursued by the different top managers sending consistent
signals about where to go, the point being that they are seen to agree on the new organizational
direction. The new ideas consequently also have to be brought into the various existing arenas
of the organization. This is also necessary in order to diagnose how the process is emerging
and to integrate information about this into the process of handling reframing efforts, which
again is necessary to relate to counterforces in a constructive way.
Mode of constitutini: In the mode of constituting the concern is new action; the enactment of
the ideas behind the new organizational direction. The emphasis of the fonnation approach is on
the decentral focusing task and on the inductive by task. In practical terms, this means that
local activity or participation is called for when identifying how to perform the job or task
according to the new ideas. Implementation of local goals, standards and organizational
principles, will start, however, in this mode even if it could be that the new is not completely
understood or accepted throughout the whole organization.
In this mode, intelWltion should be pursued by consistently following up new requirements and
standards. This has to be done in the arenas and settings of managing operations - the day-to-
day organizational life. It should make a difference whether or not new standards and
requirements, rather than the old, are followed. There has to be an effective follow-up structure
integrating the newarrangements into organizational processes which also catch the effects of
change efforts which are feeding the diagnostic data into the directing of the process.
Mode of consolidation: In the mode of consolidation the concern is stabilising the new
practices and thinking in line with the new organizational direction. The emphasis of the
fonnation approach in this mode is more complex than in the other modes. Previously, it was
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suggested that the focus should be decentral on systems combined with a central focus on the
retrospective when it comes to the solution approach. When it comes to the learning approach,
an inductive emphasis on assessment combined with deductive retrospective focus was
suggested.
Inte~ation is pursued in this mode by engaging in and following up the revision and alteration
of the organization structure(s) and accompanying systems. The point is to assist the
constitution of a new organizational frame by creating consistency between the new ideas
pursued so far and the facets of such organizational features.
In practical terms, this means that there should be a local level suggestion of solutions in the
revision process, that is, suggestions on how systems and structures should be altered to
underpin the ideas of the new direction. There is, however, a strong need for the coordination
of these suggestions for those structures and systems that cannot be seen as decoupled from the
enterprise level, which calls for some sort of central or top level involvement.
The process of reviewing and assessing systems and structures constitutes one inductive way
of learning about one' s situation related to the new organizational direction. The effects of
enacting the new direction so far , however, can be both ambiguous and varied. Consequently,
there is a need for a centrally- and retrospectively-oriented interpretation communicated to the
organization as an element in the collective interpreting process.
Towards a model of reframing organizations
Organizational frames were defmed at the first page of chapter one of this study as collective
models of and for organizational action that channel interpretation and enactment of situations
and that were embedded in the social structures of the organizations thereby sustaining their
own existance. Organizational reframing was consequently defmed as planned change of the
system of organizational frames. Four modes for accomplishing a change in organizational
frames have been suggested. Each mode attends to a particular concern identified in the process
of reframing organizations and is characterized by different approaches to formation and
integration.
The formation approach deals with identifying an organizational learning of solutions, the
models that are to provide the new organizational frames. Integration deals with the approach to
making the new take root in the old, how to attune to the natural processes by supporting
consistently the new and intended. The four modes of reframing organizations reflect the
conceptual understanding generated in the study of attempted reframing, the propositions
developed on this conceptual platform as well as the analysis of the relationships between these
propositions and conceptual ideas about the concerns of a reframing process.
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The four modes outlined in the last sections were the modes of convincing, directed dialogue,
constituting and consolidation. They attend to the concerns of (in the same order) anchoring,
organizational acceptance, new action and stabilizing. The modes are not to be considered as
alternative or competing modes. The four modes respectively sort out and sum up clusters of
emphasis in a process of reframing organizations. These interrelationships between them
follow from the previous discussions and can be pictured as below:
Anchoring ~
Stabili-
zing
Formation approach:
Inductive by assessment,
central retrospective and ,..
deductive retrospectivez"
decentral on system I
:...._System - structure., --t
\
Formation approach: -.
Inductive by task, -I
decentral on task
Demands. i
standards and
Formation approach: \
Deductive prospective and
~ central prospective \
GRA \
TION ~ - - - Consistency --
I
•Say
and do
I
Modeof
CONVINCING
Modeof
CONSOLIDATING
I
Organizational
" "Formation approach: acceptance
Deductive prospective",.....----- ...
decentral on system
._----_
Modeof
CONSTITUTING
follow up Modeof
DIRECTED
DIALOGUE
FIG. 8.6 COMPRHENSlVE MODEL OF REFRAMING ORGANIZATIONS
Accomplishing reframing must be understood as a dynamic process where the relationships
between the four modes are of the same quality as suggested when discussing the concerns.
This also implies that steps back and forth between modes may be needed. Counterforces, new
information and new ideas can make it necessary to go back to one of the "previous" modes;
renewed anchoring and organizational acceptance might, for instance, be needed. Externally
imposed events can also effect the development and status of the reframing process by, for
example, putting the new ideas and their premises in a new light
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Although the modes do not constitute clear-cut phases, the model is still to be understood as
characterized by an implicit accumulation factor. The four modes are interdependent rather than
separate aspects of a change process. A mode of consolidation, for example, does not make
sense if there is nothing to stabilize. When, for example, the emphases for integration in the
mode of constituting are on demands, standards and follow-up, the mode is based on there
being also a consistency between top managers and what they say and do, etc.
The four modes of - or for - reframing organizations are suggested against this background: At
one level they should be understood as circular sequences of concerns that must be attended to
by different approaches in terms of finding solutions and learning them. At another level the
relationships between the modes must be seen as far more complex. This is particularly
reflected in the notions of shifting concerns and the expanding notion of integration as the
central hub in the model.
There is some son of paradox in the conception of the model both following and not following
a sequence. There is, on the one hand, a sequentiallogic of social construction in the concerns.
But the fact that concerns primarily should be seen as fulfilling functions, reduces on the other
hand, the reasons for seeing the modes as purely sequential. There could be a need for shifting
between modes because newevents as well as new information can make it necessary to go
back. Several parts, levels and aspects of the organization can demand a separate refraIning
focus, etc.
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Chapter 9: Contribution and Limitations
The aim of this study has been to develop a model for refraIning organizations. This has been
done. In order to claify what kind of a contribution the study represents, it is necessary to go
back to the starting point for the study. The problem of developing a model of this kind was
seen as reflecting a need for establishing more knowledge in the field of management of
change. The problem was identified from the position of a cultural perspective on
organizations. It deals with developing a model for the planned change of the system of
organizational frames. Organizational frames are defined as collective models of and for
organizational action that channel interpretation and enactments of situations. Thereby they
become embedded in the social structures of the organizations sustaining their own existence.
When organizations face the need for doing other things or doing things differently, the
established ways of defining and enacting situations become obsolete. Due to their funnelling
and persitent character, organizational frames both sustain obsolete orientations and hinder the
implementation of new ones. Insight in, and knowledge about, critical issues or variables for
the task of reframing organizations is consequently seen as being of central importance to the
field of management of change. Considering the nature of the task of developing a model of
reframing organizations, it was seen as appropriate to do this by exploring actual attempts at
changing the way members of organizations define and enact their tasks.
The setting utilized for this studyoffered a challenging opportunity for doing just this. A
process of two years of inductive- and grounded-oriented research in interaction with people
having responsibilities for change endeavours produced a set of reframing concepts and
conditions. Critical issues in a process of reframing organizations are presented in Chapter
Four. The choices made or avoided in these issues as suggested in Chapter Five, should create
a reframing momentum for the reframing endeaveour to succeed. The study further suggests
two important conditions for this in Chapter six. The reframing efforts must be handled so as
to create a process of structuration continuously enforcing new performance. At the same time a
reframing rationale must exist or be created.
By further analyzing the conceptual insights that emerged from the reframing endeavours, and
assisted by other research contributions, a set of normative propositions were developed in
Chapter Seven. Their groundings are naturally not so strong as is the case for the reframing
concepts. The value and fruitfulness of the findings have, however, been increased by the
propositions being more directive. They suggest guidelines for action and offer possibilities for
further research in terms of exploring further details and conditions, testing, etc.
Both the practical and the theoretical aspects are also helped by the ideas for further construction
192
presented in Chapter Eight. The relationships to the organizational practice and the actual task of
reframing organizations are clarified. The notion of the four modes of reframing organizations
provides a tentative framework for understanding the relationships between the propositions.
Each mode reflects a particular concern of the reframing task. They approache the issues of
integration, implanting the new in the old, as well as the learning and solution aspects of the
formation issue differently.
These characteristics also represent, however, what the practitioner is after. For the latter what
is developed in this study should appear as a set of strategic variables for the task of reframing
organizations. These variables have different qualities depending on which stage of the model is
considered. Put simply, the reframing concepts direct atttention, the propositions serve as
guidelines for action, and the ideas for funher construction compose a more comprehensive
map for that guidance. Still, at no stage is this a "how to do"model. The user, when wanting to
apply the model, will be confronted with a host of unanswered questions, like: What is the
(relative) importance of the different variables? What is that contingent on? etc. As strategic
variables they are sensitizing more than concluding, providing a directive source for ideas and
reflection in order to find local answers and solutions.
The model for reframing organizations is seen as both contributing to further research on
organizational change as well as being of potential use for managers and organizational
practice. These are two kinds of interests that sometimes conflict. The interest of research is
truth, at least in some sense of the word, whereas the interest of the manager is action. In this
case I don't see this conflict as being significant The aim of the study has been to develop
conceptual understanding that fits and works. The conceptual understanding should be
applicable to, and indicated by, the data under study and thereby be meaningfully relevant and
able to explain the behaviour under study. It should be fit for relating to and changing the social
reality. Credibility for this was also established in relation to actors in the field
It is therefore probably somewhat more important for the researcher to realize that there are
different degrees of empirical support in the various stages of the model. He or she takes an
interest in the truth matter more than the action matter. I think, however, that the later stages of
the model, the propositions and the comprehensive model, make the findings more valuable
also for the researcher. They make clearer what the implications of the grounded findings
would be as well as suggest their relationships.
First, it should be emphasized that the grounded fmdings are the basis for these funher stages,
meaning that they are built upon and embody this grounding. Second, I see this part of the
contribution as making it more fit as a source for funher research. It is funher researchable
both because it is put forward as a set of propositions and also because the ideas for further
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construction suggest further exploration on issues like contingencies, relative importance,
concretizations, operationalizations, etc.
The issue of contingencies in the way to apply the model is directly related to the issue of
applicability. The potential for transferring the findings to other settings was initially seen as
quite good since the setting represented quite common organizations in relationship to the
problem. When looking at the various conceptual findings - like anchoring, integration,
inductive vs. deductive learning and top management vs. local solutions - this view is
strengthened.
There seems to be little in the nature of these concepts that tie them to a particular kind of
organization or industry. They seem to reflect quite general aspects of organizational processes.
In fact, I don't even think they reflect situations and problems that are special for the private
sector, which all the case organizations belonged to, rather than the public. Neither do I think
they are restricted to organizations using external help in their change endeavours. This is also
because the difference between the situation studied and the one characterized as being based on
internal expertise are unclear. It follows from the same view on the nature of the reframing
concepts that, although credibility primarily was established with the project leaders and
consultants, the use of conceptual knowledge is not restricted only as related to the positions of
such actors.
It seems on the other hand quite likely that issues such as the relative importance of the
reframing concepts and the subsequent propositions, the emphasis and strength needed on
each, their concrete meaning, etc., can be expected to be dependent upon local conditions. This
view bears relationship with what Kluckhohn called a "universal but variable thesis" in the
study of numerous subcultures (Kluckhohn 1964:345). A set of human problems for which all
groups must find solutions was identified as the general element. Variation stems from the
infinite number of ways which groups come to term with and resolve these problems.
This is naturally an ambitious analogy. However, the possibilities for applying the model and
its elements as such in other setting are seen to be quite rich. The meaning and importance of
the various elements will, on the other hand, vary in different situations and be dependent on
conditions like local history and organizational culture. Additional elements might even prove to
have as strong an importance. For example, the emphasis that has to be placed on anchoring
and manager integration, could be dependent on the history and traditions of management style
and decentral autonomy and responsibility in that particular organization.
The problem of the study was formed from a cultural perspective on organizations. The study
has a value beyond the actual model produced related to this perspective. First, it demonstrates
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one possible application of a cultural perspective to the study of organizational change.
Contributions in this field are not numerous and tend to be normativelyand conceptually
oriented with no substantial grounding. Second, the study implicitly suggests that in spite of
meaning being a system of ideas, the task of changing it also deals with such organizational
features as power and structure. This might not be a surprising suggestion to all the readers, but
it is certainly not trivial. Observe, for example, all the money, time and effort spent on internal
marketing and cultural workshops as the principal tools to change collective meaning.
This was a rare and rich occasion for studying organizational change since several serious
change endeavours had a focal point through the fact that the firms studied cooperated with one
consultancy firm. This situation provided a potential setting for producing data on attempted
change, bringing experiences from different cases together for comparative exploration. It was
possible to take advantage of the situation since the consultancy firm had decided on the policy
of continuously learning from their experiences.
The study is based on what happens when people in organizations actually engage in changes.
The need for this kind of knowledge in the area of organizational change was identified as a
basis for the study. When such contributions are scarce it has do to with the fact that such
situations are often found difficult to be to research. Problems of access, timing, resources as
well as difficulties in finding appropriate methods are all reasons that this has been left
unexplored. In this case a rare and unique situation was taken advantage of by being creative in
the application of methods.
From a research point of view the methodology had to overcome a lot of problems. For
example, the process of research had to provide interesting and useful insight not only after but
also during a process of research for the people involved. On the other hand, the research
activities should not interfere in or disturb the actual change actions. And there were also
resource restrictions. The research then had to, as far as possible, take advantage of what
otherwise could have been hindrances. Like, for example, the project leaders also were the
most important informants, that the data collection could be combined with assessing project
status and problems and member checks and practical evaluations could be combined with
feeding back preliminary conceptual findings. The latter made the research activities useful in
the short run for the participants and strengthened the credibility of the long-term results.
There are, of course, limitations to the study. Many follow from the fact that a study can't be
everything. There are choices and trade-offs that have to be made. This, for example, is a
theory-generating study based on a purposeful rather than a representative sample. This restricts
what can be said about generalization. The study is grounded but the data could have been
thicker. That would have made it more difficult to be general, etc.
195
There are also limitations following from the perspective taken. The problem of the study is, for
instance, seen from a management perspective. This could cause some blindness for employee-
initiated action and processes. The perspective is fairly instrumental and structural, envisaging
the organization as an instument for human interest using terms like "mechanisms", etc. The
study could therefore lose sight of features like action initiated by enthusiasm, morale and value
appeal. The search could also be accused of being seduced by the idea of collectivity in the
sense that the idea of collective meaning tones down and could make the search overlook
individual and group variations, etc.
It is, however, more or less unavoidable that a perspective taken in research will imply
limitations. "To see is also not to see." The perspective is, in a sense, a necessary simplification
and also represents a trade-off. What is essential is that the perspective is legitimate and fruitful
in view of the research interests, and that it is made explicit and that appropriate methods are
implemented.
All in all, we see the contribution as fruitfully filling a place. There was a need for this kind of
study. It appoaches the problem of change in a fruitful way by means of the concept of
organizational frames and by exploring attempted change as it takes place. The findings should
be interesting and fruitful for at least two kinds of audiences. The researcher seeking to expand
the existing knowledge should be interested in what they say, and also in the possibilities
offered for further research. The practioner is offered guidelines and ideas for reflections for
how to meet an important challenge.
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